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ABSTRACT
By the First World War British interests had established a preeminent economic 
position in South America’s Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and southeastern 
Brazil). The United Kingdom was the leading importer, provider of commercial services, 
and holder of direct and portfolio foreign investment. The British were most dominant in 
sectors such as banking and railways. This tremendous economic position and its 
corresponding influence were buttressed by a constructed and carefully maintained 
British public image. Put simply, the British possessed influence and power based on 
their reputation. This can collectively be termed prestige.
British interests during the period were able to adroitly exploit the early roots of 
British commercial and political ties with region. The combination of freelance British 
fighters having served in Southern Cone revolutionary forces in the early nineteenth 
century and the recognition of the newly independent republics by the British government 
gave Britons the ability in the early twentieth-century to claim British linkages were 
beneficial from their very inception. Subsequent British commerce, investment, and 
settlement in the region were perceived by the Great War as integral to South America’s 
extraordinary economic development. Discursive elements consistently reinforced a 
positive historical interpretation of the British impact on South American economic and 
political development. Thus by the Great War era, the British enjoyed a prestige strongly 
rooted in a legacy of past achievements. This was central to the widely held Anglo-South 
American viewpoint that Britain would continue to figure prominently and positively in 
the Southern Cone’s future. Paralleling this embellishment of British contribution to the 
region was the cultivation by the British for a reputation of honesty and superior skills 
and methods. British prestige inspired admiration and confidence in Southern Cone elites 
and consumers, conferring British interests with tangible advantages over their foreign 
rivals.
During the years under discussion, 1910 to 1925, British official and private 
actors engaged in a concerted policy of prestige cultivation. These activities shed 
tremendous light on Anglo-South American interchange as well as British identity. 
Ultimately, prestige allowed Britain to maintain a postwar position not commensurate 
with its actual economic power, conferring British influence considerable resiliency.
KEEPING UP APPEARANCES
INTRODUCTION
From roughly 1910 to the mid-1920s the British community in South America’s 
Southern Cone (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and to a lesser degree, southeastern Brazil) 
reached its pinnacle in absolute influence, size, and wealth despite a relative decline vis- 
a-vis its commercial competitors. In this region British interests focused heavily on 
commercial services such as banking, insurance, shipping, and, especially, direct foreign 
investment. The most notable British community was in Argentina, numbering some 
30,000-40,000 Britons. However, sizable groups of Britons could be found in 
Montevideo, Valparaiso, Santos, Sao Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The bulk of this 
population viewed itself as a temporary expatriate community. Bringing with them their 
families or starting new ones there, Britons worked in the import-export sector, as 
professionals, as expert ranch hands, or, more frequently, on the staffs of the large 
British-owned railways and public utilities. Once careers neared completion or fortunes 
were accumulated, many returned ‘home’ for retirement.
Unfortunately, investigation and analysis of the British presence in Latin America 
regarding perceptions, concerns and identity has been generally neglected.1 Though 
some very admirable work has been done regarding British communities2 in South
1 Rory Miller states, “[Tjhere has been relatively little [study] o f  the mentalities either o f  British officials 
and businessmen who were primarily concerned with Latin America.” Britain and Latin America in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (London: Longman, 1994): 244.
2 Andrew Graham-Yooll, The Forgotten Colony: A H istory o f  the English-Speaking Communities in 
Argentina  (London: Hutchinson, 1981); Written while Graham-Yooll, an Anglo-Argentine journalist, was 
in political exile from Argentina. Alistair Hennessy, “Argentines, Anglo-Argentines and Others”; John 
King, “The Influence o f  British Culture in Argentina,” and Simon Collier, “‘Hullo, Tango!’ The English 
Tango Craze and its After-Echoes,” in The Land that England Lost: Argentina and Britain a Special 
Relationship, eds. Alistair Hennessy and John King (London: British Academic Press, 1992); Deborah 
Jakubs, “The Anglo-Argentines: Work, Family and Identity, 1860-1914,” in English-Speaking 
Communities in Latin America, ed. Oliver Marshall (London: Macmillan Press, 2000).
2
3America up to 1914, there has been little study of the era of World War I, especially the 
challenging years of the war and post-armistice recovery.3 This thesis aims to fill that 
void in historiography, at least partially by trying to define British ‘prestige’ and studying 
its important role in these foreign lands. Though ‘prestige’ might be a nebulous term and 
difficult to define or appreciate, it was real and important to Britain’s “gentlemanly 
capitalists” and government officials. Overall, ‘prestige’ was important to Britons 
communally and individually. British diplomatic dispatches,4 travel literature,5 and 
newspapers (e.g., South American Journal)6 concerning the region consistently referred 
to ‘prestige’ and ‘reputation’ as one of Britain’s most durable forms of strength and pride.
British prestige in South America rested on several legs, such as its long history 
of political and commercial relations with the region, overwhelmingly positive 
evaluations of what was seen as British character, and British power and wealth. Each of 
these elements was adroitly exploited depending on the context of a particular situation; 
whether it was a naval visit, the opening of a new British business, or a banquet of 
Anglo-South American elites. Britain’s relations with South America can be categorized 
as a history of being perceived as first; first to break into the Iberian mercantile 
monopolies to trade: first to recognize their independence; and first to trade and invest in 
the region on a large scale. British interpretations constructed a rather embellished 
narrative of these events, resulting in the conclusion that they were a positive force in the
3 Roger Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine Connection, 1900-1939  (London: W estview Press, 1985). GraviPs is 
an account o f  British commercial relations with Argentina; his focus is mainly o f  economic statistics and 
economic trends, coupled with the high-politics o f  trade agreements.
4 George Philip, ed. British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from  the Foreign Office 
Confidential Print, Series D, Latin America 1845-1914, Volumes 6, 8, 9 and Latin America 1914-1939, 
Volumes 1-4 (Bethesda: University Publications o f  America, 1992).
5 A particularly prolific author o f  English language travel literature was William H. Koebel.
6 South American Journal and Brazil and River Plate M ail (London), 1910-1925. This weekly newspaper 
was published in London, its primary concern being British free-standing companies, import-export 
trading, investments, and communities in South America.
4region, economically and politically. Besides a storied legacy, British prestige was based 
on confidence-inspiring character, friendship, respectability, and trustworthiness.7 These 
constructions facilitated Anglo-Southern Cone relations, especially commerce. Thus 
British influence or sway rested heavily on its reputation and high esteem in South 
American eyes.
What will also be stressed is how very self-conscious the British were; they saw 
nearly everything British as a vehicle to enhance or possibly tarnish their prestige.
Before, during, and following the First World War, British state agents, the Royal Navy, 
and private citizens engaged in acts intended to cultivate prestige. Generally, these 
activities can be termed prestige diplomacy. This consistent, albeit rather uncoordinated 
policy was a major bulwark of the British maintenance of the status quo in the Southern
o
Cone, yet this remains neglected by scholars. In contrast to the numerous works on the 
United States Navy in Latin America as a public relations tool, coverage of the Royal 
Navy in South America is limited.9 Ultimately, evaluating British prestige in the 
Southern Cone sheds further light on British identity as well as their view of the region 
and its peoples and vice versa. Our understanding of the strong British commercial and
7 With the perspective o f  a multi-generational Anglo-Argentine, Graham-Yooll found: “A whole myth 
became solidly built around the British nature.” Graham-Yooll, The Forgotten Colony, 225.
8 M y view  is contrary to a number o f  historians who feel the British presence was devoid o f  ‘cultural work’ 
or active public relations until the 1930s, beginning with the British Council (see chapter 3). See: 
Hennessy, “Argentines, Anglo-Argentines and Others,” in Hennessy and King, The Land that England  
Lost\ Gerald Martin, “Britain’s Cultural Relations with Latin America,” in Britain and Latin America: A 
Changing Relationship, ed. Victor Bulmer-Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and 
Sir Robert Marett, Latin America: British Trade and Investment (London: Charles Knight, 1973): 209-11.
9 According to Rory Miller, the Royal Navy remains an “under-researched” element o f  the British presence 
in Latin America. What little literature there is remains confined largely to the Napoleonic years through 
the Aberdeen blockades (1840s) o f  the River Plate. Miller, Britain and Latin America, 59. For a good but 
very brief sketch see Barry Gough, “Profit and Power: Informal Empire, The Navy and Latin America” in 
Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism: The New Debate on Empire, ed. Raymond E. Dumett 
(London: Longman, 1999).
5political position, especially its resiliency, in this region during the years under discussion 
needs to include the subjective, yet important, element of prestige
CHAPTER I
THE BRITISH PRE-WAR POSITION IN THE SOUTHERN CONE 
Several influential works on British foreign policy, economic expansion, and 
imperialism have situated Latin America within their discussion; they deserve a brief 
mention before proceeding. John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson’s seminal work, “The 
Imperialism of Free Trade,” stated that imperialism “may be defined as a sufficient 
political function of this process of integrating new regions into the expanding 
economy.”10 Their contention was that British imperialism was predominantly economic 
in nature, one that went beyond formal territorial control, such as India, to also include 
independent nations, such as those in Latin America. Gallagher and Robinson maintain 
that British imperialism was a sliding scale of control: “The difference between formal 
and informal empire has not been one of fundamental nature but of degree.”11 Thus, 
nations like those of South America could be considered part of an informal empire due 
to the exertion of commercial, financial, and social power over local elites. The intent 
was to further access, development, and integration in order to accrue profit. Informal
empire was opened to establish reciprocating trade of British imports, mainly
1 0manufactures, and native exports, usually raw materials. The work of P.J. Cain and 
A.G. Hopkins largely concur with this thesis but place more emphasis on British 
commercial services and finance, whereas Gallagher and Robinson emphasize
10 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism o f  Free Trade,” The Economic History Review  
6, no. 1 (1953): 5.
11 Ibid., 7.
12 Ibid., 9
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• 10manufacturing. In the Western Hemisphere, the British “sought to turn the conquered 
or the co-opted into productive economic partners, and sometimes exported [their] own 
resources of capital and people as developmental agents.”13 Strong economic pressure 
was exerted upon the South American governments to follow London’s economic rules 
and practices and, above all, remain creditworthy.14 Both sets of authors agree that 
informal empire was active and successful in Latin America, especially in Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile.15 Similarly, Peter Winn’s local study in Uruguay found that “informal 
empire was both British policy and Latin American reality.”16
The most extreme interpretations of ‘informal empire’ regarding Latin America 
have come to collectively be termed ‘Dependency Theory.’ Built heavily on the ideas of 
center versus periphery and zero-sum game economics, this line of inquiry argues that 
metropolitan powers were able to mold and keep peripheral Latin American nations in a 
subservient economic position by making them largely, if not completely, dependent on
i
foreign capital, technology, commercial services, and markets.
12 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000  (London: Longman, 2002), 659.
13 Ibid., 664; Cain and Hopkins, “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New  
Imperialism, 1850-1945,” The Economic History Review  40 (February 1987): 10-11. See also their “The 
Political Economy o f  British Expansion Overseas, 1750-1914,” The Economic History Review  33 
(November 1980).
14 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, 653.
15 Ibid., Ch. 9; Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism o f  Free Trade,” 8, 13.
16 Peter Winn, “British Informal Empire in Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century” P ast and Present 73 
(November, 1976): 100.
17 A concise description can be found in Louis A. Perez, Jr., “Dependency,” Explaining the History o f  
American Foreign Relations, eds. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Patterson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). Some major ‘Dependency’ works o f  note are Fernando Cardosa and Enzo 
Falcetto, Dependency and D evelopm ent in Latin America  (Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1979); 
Eduardo H. Galeono, ed., The Open Veins o f  Latin America: Five Centuries o f  the Pillage o f  a Continent 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973). A helpful compendium is James L. Dietz and James H. Street, 
eds., Latin A m erica’s Economic Development: Institutionalist and Structuralist Perspectives. Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 1987. A concurring American interpretation can be found in William Appleman Williams,
The Tragedy o f  American Diplom acy  (New York; Norton, 1972).
8The concept of British informal empire has not received universal consensus 
among historians with the predominant trend in the past twenty years being decidedly 
against interpreting the British role in South America as indeed ‘imperial.’ “Only at the 
highest level of abstraction can Latin America.. .in the mid-nineteenth century be 
described as parts of a British informal empire,” Martin Lynn argued recently.19 Alan 
Knight contends that by 1914, when Britain was arguably at its absolute pinnacle of 
strength in South America, the British “‘imperialist’ role, if ‘imperialist’ it was, had run 
its course.” Some studies have failed to find any consistent exertion of control over 
nations that were part of Britain’s supposed ‘informal empire’. Instead, they have 
portrayed a rather laissez-faire-minded British government that intervened rarely, often
9 1only to save life and property during crises. In addition to these conclusions based on 
regional studies, studies pertaining to specific countries have been particularly set against
• • • 22 • 23characterizations based on ‘informal empire,’ particularly in Argentina and Chile. As
19 Martin Lynn, “British Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” in The 
Oxford H istory o f  the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century, ed. Andrew Porter (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 120; Also see Lance Davis, “The Late Nineteenth Century British Imperialist: 
Specification, Quantification, and Controlled Conjectures,” Dumett, Gentlemanly Capitalism , 84.
20 Alan Knight, “Britain and Latin America,” in Porter, The Oxford History o f  the British Empire: The 
Nineteenth Cenutury, 144.
21 D.C.M. Platt, “The Imperialism o f  Free Trade: Some Reservations” The Economic H istory Review  121 
(August, 1968): 298-300. Also so see Platt’s “Further Objections to an ‘Imperialism o f  Free Trade’, 1830- 
1860,” The Economic History Review  26, no. 1 (1973): 77-91; Finance, Trade, and Politics in British 
Foreign Polciy, 1815-1914  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), xiii-xxi, 54-70, 82-6, 308-52; but especially 
Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1972); ed., Business 
Imperialism 1840-1930: An Inquiry B ased on the British Experience in Latin America (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977).
22 H.S. Ferns concludes: “The Argentine Government has always possessed the power to forbid, to 
encourage, or to shape the economic relations o f  Argentina with other countries including the British 
community. The British Government has never had the power to oblige Argentina to pay a debt, to pay a 
dividend, or to export or import a commodity whatever.” Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960): 488; also see his “Argentina: Part o f  an Informal Empire?” in Hennessey 
and King, The Land that England Lost, Andrew Thompson, “Informal Empire? An Explanation in the 
History o f  Anglo-Argentine Relations, 1810-1914,” Journal o f  Latin American Studies 24 (May 1992).
23 Michael Monteon, “The British in the Atacama Desert: The Cultural Bases o f  Economic Imperialism,” 
The Journal o f  Economic History 35 (March 1975): 97, 114-7; Thomas F. O ’Brien, “The Antofagasta 
Company: A Case Study o f  Peripheral Capitalism” The Hispanic H istorical Review  60 (February 1980).
9for ‘Dependency Theory,’ there has been resounding rejection of its tenets in recent 
decades by informal empire proponents23 and critics.24 Recent theories in the United 
States and Latin America posit Latin America’s lack of economic maturation more on 
internal factors, such as Latin American culture and elites as well as market forces 
beyond anyone’s control. Victor Bulmer-Thomas, a scholar of Latin American 
economic history, convincingly argues that “escape from the [economic] periphery has 
always been possible,” exemplified by the United States, Scandinavia, British 
Dominions, Japan, and, recently, East Asia. “Thus the main reasons for the relative 
backwardness of Latin America are to be found within the region itself.”26 In recent
97years this interpretation has found Latin American proponents. As Lawrence E.
9 oHarrison asserted in 2000, though probably prematurely, “dependency theory is dead.” 
Miller argues that both extreme advocates of informal empire and the opposite approach
23 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, 244-5.
24 D.C.M. Platt convincingly argues that much o f  Spanish America remained outside the world economy in 
the first half o f  the nineteenth-century. Dependency theory, which purportedly rests on early nineteenth- 
century roots, according to Platt, “is scarcely sustainable.” “Dependency in Nineteenth-Century Latin 
America: An Historian Objects,” Latin American Research Review  15, no. 1 (1980): 113-28. See the 
rebuttal to Platt’s argument in Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, “D.C.M. Platt: The Anatomy o f  
‘Autonomy’,” Latin American Research Review  15, no. 1 (1980): 131-46; and Platt’s counter reply “The 
Anatomy o f ‘Autonomy’ (Whatever that may Mean): A Reply,” Latin American Research Review  15, no. 1 
(1980): 147-9.
25 With specific reference to Argentina, James H. Street argues, “Dependency was not so much imposed 
upon Argentina by greedy design as it reflected the fortuitous union o f  two cultures at significantly 
different stages o f  historical development.” Argentina became dependent on external linkages, especially 
manifested in the introduction o f  outside technology and expertise o f  which its elite took little concern in 
mastering. See his “The Platt-Stein Controversy over Dependency: Another V iew ,” Latin American  
Research Review  16, no. 3 (1981): 173-79.
26 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f  Latin America Since Independence, Second Edition  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 392-3. Arguments for the internal causes o f  
‘dependence’ can also be found in David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty o f  Nations: Why Some are so  
Rich and Some so Poor (New York: Norton, 1999), 310-28.
27 Claudio Veliz, The New World o f  the Gothic Fox: Culture and Economy in English and Spanish America  
(Berkeley: University o f  California Press, 1994); Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, Carlos Alberto Montaner, and 
Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Guide to the Perfect Latin America Idiot, trans. Michaela Lajda (Lanham, Maryland: 
Madison Books, 2002); Carlos Alberto Montaner, “Culture and the Behavior o f  Elites in Latin America,” in 
Culture M atters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington 
(New York: Basic Books, 2000).
28 Lawrence E. Harrison, Underdevelopment is a State o f  Mind: The Latin American Case (Lanham, 
Maryland: Madison Books, 2000), xvi.
10
“distort and overlook the complexities of the subject.” He contends interpretations 
limiting “imperialism in terms of conscious political or economic control and the 
extraction of excessive profits, and to pose autonomy as the antonym to dependence” 
downplay the influential predominance Britain enjoyed among Latin American nations.29 
When considering the extent of British interests in South America, this emphasis on 
structural power appears warranted.
The power underlying British prestige in South America was economic. From the 
mid-nineteenth century to the First World War was the heyday of British commercial 
expansion and remuneration in Latin America. While British trade with Latin America 
increased threefold between 1865 and 1913, London saw its comparative advantage in 
South America being service sector capitalism.30 Prior to the First World War Britain 
possessed a flourishing relationship with the Southern Cone countries; many British 
businesses, across a wide scope of sectors, had been in place for decades.31 The easiest 
generalizations can be made regarding British commercial services and imports to the 
region.32 In all these countries British banks played a key role in providing credit, 
discounting, and mortgaging. A great number of insurance policies, especially marine 
accounts, were held with British insurance companies, registered locally or in Britain.34
29 Miller, Britain and Latin Am erica, 241, 243; Articles stressing the ‘structural power’ Britain could wield, 
but South America could not, include: Charles Jones, ‘“ Business Imperialism’ and Argentina, 1875-1900:
A Theoretical Note,” Journal o f  Latin American Studies 12 (November, 1980); A.G. Hopkins, “Informal 
Empire in Argentina: An Alternative V iew ” Journal o f  Latin American Studies 26 (May, 1994). These 
interpretations, especially Hopkins’s, argue ‘informal imperialism’ does not have to agree with or support 
‘Dependency Theory.’
30 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, Chapter 9.
31 Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic H istory o f  Latin America, Chapter 3, 4, and 5.
32 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, 245-52, 271-4; Miller, Britain and Latin America, 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
33 David Joslin, A Century o f  Banking in Latin America (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), Chapters 
2, 6, and 12; Robert Greenhill, “Commercial Banks and Mortgage Companies” in Platt, Business 
Imperialism, 17- 52; Miller, Britain and Latin America, 130-33.
34 Robert Greenhill, “Insurance Companies” in Platt, Business Imperialism, 54- 73.
11
Southern Cone urban centers that grew in response to economic development granted 
concessions to foreign utility companies; a great many were British. Predominantly 
national, but also state and municipal governments, negotiated loans, many with houses 
in London, to restructure their debt and to fund a whole host of projects, most 
infrastructural. Finally, the means by which goods and people were transported, land 
and sea, were built mainly with foreign capital, materials, and engineers and fueled by 
imported coal, much of it all being British.38
However, generalizations can only go so far; the anatomy of British relationships 
with each republic was unique. In Argentina and Uruguay, British capital, pedigree
36 In Montevideo British utilities included the gas, water, telephone, and tramway companies. For a rather 
thorough list o f  British utilities in Latin America, see J. Fred Rippy’s “Notes on Early British Gas 
Companies in Latin America,” The Hispanic H istorical Review  30 (February 1950); and especially “British 
Investments in Latin American Electrical Utilities,” The Hispanic American H istorical Review  34 (May 
1954). For an overview o f  these companies’ operations, especially their relations with local, state, and 
national governments, see Linda and Charles Jones and Robert Greenhill, “Public Utility Companies” in 
Platt, Business Imperialism, 77-118; Miller, Britain and Latin America, 136-7; M.H.J. Finch, “British 
Imperialism in Uruguay: The Public Utility Companies and the Batllista  State, 1900-1930” in Latin 
America, Economic Imperialism and the State: The Political Economy o f  the External Connection from  
Independence to the Present, eds. Christopher Abel and Colin Lewis (London: Athlone Press, 1985), 250- 
65. Almost all the major British utilities and railways were free-standing companies capitalized through 
direct investment and quoted on the London Stock Exchange. They were registered and headquartered in 
the United Kingdom. However, the bulk o f their onsite technical and managerial staff was British. For a 
good overview o f  how such companies were formed and functioned, see Mira Wilkins, “The Free-Standing 
Company, 1870-1914: An Important Type o f British Foreign Direct Investment,” Economic History Review  
41, no. 2 (1988): 261-9.
37 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, Chapter 9; Miller, Britain and Latin America, 124-25. 
For a good, but dated, overview o f  foreign lending to Latin American governments see Frank Whitson 
Fetter, “History o f  Public Debt in Latin America,” The American Economic Review  37 (May 1947): 
especially 142-4.
38 Miller, Britain and Latin America  133-6; Robert Greenhill, “Shipping” in Platt, Business Imperialism,
119-55; Robert G. Albion, “Capital Movement and Transportation: British Shipping and Latin America, 
1806-1914” The Journal o f  Economic History 11 (Autumn 1951): 361-2, 364-5, 369-70; For an interesting 
and thorough contemporary survey o f  British railways in South America, see W.S. Barclay’s “The 
Geography o f  South American Railways,” The Geographical Journal 49 (March 1917): 161-84, 187-201; 
and “The Geography o f  South American Railways (Continued),” 50 (April 1917): 241-48, 272-6. As 
Barclay told the Royal Geographical Society during his paper’s presentation, “The British public have a 
great stake in these South American railway undertakings, not only in money, but in prestige.” South 
American Journal, January 13, 1917, 61. Whereas the majority o f  Argentine and Uruguayan railways were 
British-owned and operated, in Brazil and Chile the government owned the majority o f  rail routes in 1914. 
In the latter nations, however, the British still owned the majority o f  foreign rails. Nearly 93 per cent o f  
South American imported coal prior to the Great War was from the United Kingdom. Jermain Kinder, 
“British Export Promotion in South America 1918-1932.” Ph.D. dissertation, University o f  Chicago, 1976, 
11-14.
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livestock, and railroads helped develop the nations’ frontiers further. However, unlike 
Uruguay, Argentina was the destination of several hundred millions more in pound 
sterling and many thousands of more Britons. Moving away from wool and hide 
production, the Plata republics in a remarkably short period of time became integrated 
within the Atlantic economy as major food exporters (meat and grain) and manufacture 
importers.38 In Brazil, British commercial services, railways, and infrastructure helped 
construct an export economy built heavily on coffee and rubber and a domestic economy 
of sugar and cotton production and processing. For the west coast similar 
generalizations can be hazarded; British merchants, bankers, and capital helped construct 
and facilitate an import-export economy aided by infrastructural improvements 
constructed and operated by joint-stock companies registered mainly in London. The 
primary Chilean exports, however, were mined, such as nitrate and minerals.40
38 Vera Blinn Reber, British M ercantile Houses in Buenos Aires, 1810-1880  (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1979), 2-9, 136, 145; Bill Albert, South America and the First World War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 7-8, 12-6; J. Colin Crossley and Robert Greenhill, “The 
River Plate B eef Trade” in Platt, Business Imperialism, 284-319; Thomas Whigham, “Cattle Raising in the 
Argentine Northeast: Corrientes, c. 1750-1870,” Journal o f  Latin American Studies 20 (November 1988): 
313, 333; A.G. Ford’s “Capital Exports and Growth for Argentina, 1880-1914,” The Economic Journal 68 
(September 1958): 589-93 and “British Investment in Argentina and Long Swings, 1880-1914” The 
Journal o f  Economic H istory 31 (September, 1971); H.S. Ferns, “Investment and Trade Between Britain 
and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century” The Economic History Review  3, no. 2 (1950): 204-15; Julian S. 
Duncan, “British Railways in Argentina” Political Science Quarterly 52 (December 1937): 559-69; Colin 
L ew is’s “British Railway Companies and the Argentine Government” in Platt, Business Imperialism, 395- 
426; and British Railways in Argentina 1857-1914: A Case Study o f  Foreign Investment (London: Athlone, 
1983).
39 Robert Greenhill, “Brazilian Coffee Trade” in Platt, Business Imperialism, 198-230; Richard Graham, 
Britain and the Onset o f  M odernization in Brazil 1850-1914  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1968), 2-8, 51-111. British business interests could be found in other sectors as well, see Marshall G. 
Eakin, “Business Imperialism and British Enterprise in Brazil: The St. John d ’el Rey Mining Company, 
Limited, 1830-1960,” The Hispanic American H istorical Review 66 (November 1986): 699.
40 Robert Greenhill and Rory Miller, “The Peruvian Government and the Nitrate Trade, 1873-1879” 
Journal o f  Latin American Studies 5 (May 1973); Greenhill, “The Nitrate and Iodine Trades 1880-1914” in 
Platt, Business Imperialism, 231-82; Charles William Center, “Great Britain and Chilean Mining 1830- 
1914” The Economic H istory Review  12 no. Vz (1942): 76-82; John Mayo, “Britain and Chile, 1851-1886: 
Anatomy o f  a Relationship,” Journal o f  Inter american Studies and World Affairs 23 (February 1981): 95- 
120; Monteon, “The British in the Atacama Desert,” 117-33; O’Brien, “The Antofagasta Company,” 1-31.
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To fully comprehend Britain’s very substantial presence in the Southern Cone
between 1910 and 1925 one must appreciate how dominant Britain was in the world
economy by the eve of the First World War. In describing the global economy in 1914,
one American economic historian wrote that “the overlord of this international system
was Great Britain: its capital London.”41 Though Britain was behind the United States
and Germany in the relative share of world manufacturing, her commercial services
comfortably made up for it.42
Britain truly commanded the commercial seas. She possessed forty percent of the
world’s total merchant marine tonnage and carried fifty percent of its commerce. In
contrast, the United States’ shipping was absolutely pitiful, transporting only 9.7 percent
of just its own foreign trade.43 This disparity was strikingly evident even in the Western
hemisphere, especially in South America (Appendix I, Table 1). In 1912 United States’
imports to Brazil had “increased by leaps and bounds;” the United States was also
Brazil’s best customer, receiving thirty-nine percent of her exports. What is remarkable
is that Britain gained from increases in commercial traffic between Brazil and the United
States because Britain performed the bulk of the insuring and shipping.44 A study of
British shipping in Latin America between 1806 and 1914 concluded the
decision to employ British rather than other shipping often depended upon 
the long-established, well-entrenched, and closely interlocked British 
interests ashore—on the waterfront, in the business and financial districts,
41 Edward C. Kirkland, A H istory o f  American Economic Life (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951), 
524.
42 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f  the G reat Powers (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 202
43 Kirkland, A H istory o f  American Economic Life, 525, 533.
44 That same year British shipping had a growing and undisputed lead, with 2,868 vessels calling on 
Brazilian ports. Germany was second with 1,008, while the United States had only 18. Doc. 39.
Robertson, “Annual Report on Brazil for the year 1913,” Petropolis, Brazil, January 15, 1914 in Philip, 
British Documents on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1845-1914,” Vol. 9, 173.
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and in the hinterlands of the seaports, as well as upon the local 
representatives of the Foreign Office and Royal Navy.46
British ownership of key infrastructure, such as “docks, lighterage, repair facilities” and
most Latin American coaling facilities augmented the Union Jack’s preponderancy.47
British shipping investments in Latin America in 1913, as reported by the London
business monthly South American Journal, totaled £15,362,230 and enjoyed an annual
return of 6.2 percent.48 ■
Britain could rightly be called the world’s financier. The stability of the British
pound had given rise to the sterling standard over gold. Even during the First World War
an American business writer termed the pound sterling in Latin America as “Emperor
Supreme in the Realm of Finance.” 49 Between 1910-1913 British foreign investments as
a percentage of domestic savings was the highest in the world at 55.3 percent. France
was second with 12.5 percent. British financial export power during this period
accounted for 8.7 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. The United States would not
even approach that level until the 1980s.50 Niall Ferguson comments on the prewar
situation, that “in reality the most important economic factor in early twentieth-century
world politics was not the growth of German economic power at all. Rather, it was the
immense extent of British financial power.”51 In Latin America, as Cain and Hopkins
explain, “Britain’s competitors [namely Germany and the United States] were unable to
46 Albion, “Capital Movement and Transportation,” 369.
47 Ibid., 370.
48 J. Fred Rippy, “British Investments in Latin America, End o f  1913,” The Journal o f  Modern H istory 19 
(September 1947): 226; Irving Stone’s later study finds British shipping investments as being higher in
1913, roughly £18,300,000. Stone, “British Direct and Portfolio Investment in Latin America Before
1914,” The Journal o f  Economic History 37 (September 1977): 701.
49 William E. Aughinbaugh, Selling Latin America, A Problem in International Salesmanship: What to Sell 
and How to Sell It (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1915), 290.
50 Kevin H. O ’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The Evolution o f  the Atlantic 
Economy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2000), 209.
51 Niall Ferguson, The Pity O f War (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 35.
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dent her supremacy in finance and commercial services. In 1914, the City [London] and 
sterling still dominated short-term trade finance and the market for long-term 
development capital.”51
Britain’s 1913 Latin American holdings totaled nearly £1.18 billion, accounting 
for roughly one-fifth of British overseas investments.52 British direct and portfolio 
investments were not only substantial, but comfortably the majority share in each 
Southern Cone nation in 1913 (Appendix I, Table 2).53 The South American continent 
was ranked first in the world in terms of international non-industrialized debt.54 Second 
to government loans, the leading field for British investors was railways followed by 
finance and public utilities, such as water, gas, electricity, telephone, and urban mass 
transportation (Appendix I, Tables 3, 4, and 5).55 British-controlled railways in the 
Southern Cone exceeded their foreign competitors in mileage and capital in all four 
nations (Appendix I, Table 6). They employed several thousand Britons on their 
technical and managerial staffs and placed steady orders for British coal and railway 
materials. By far the most impressive achievement was the British Railways in
51 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, 251.
52 For a thorough break down, see Stone, “British Direct and Portfolio Investments,” 690-722. To place 
British investments in Latin America in a more global historical perspective, see John R. Oneal, “Foreign 
Investments in Less Developed Regions,” Political Science Quarterly 103 (Spring 1988): 131-7, 146-8.
53 Though hardly precise, consult J. Fred Rippy’s estimates o f  other foreign holdings in the region during 
the war era. Estimates for German investments in the Southern Cone in 1918 (US Dollars): Argentina $250  
million (£ 51 million); Brazil $150 million (£ 30.8 million); Chile $75 million (£ 15.4 million); Uruguay 
$2.5 million (£ 0.5 million). Estimates for 1914 United States investments in the Southern Cone are: 
Argentina $36 million (£ 7 million); Brazil $28 million (£ 5.75 million); Chile $180.5 million (£ 37 
million); Uruguay $5.5 (£ 1.1 million). Rippy estimates French investments in Latin America at $1.6 
billion (£ 329 million) in 1913. “German Investments in Latin America,” The Journal o f  Business o f  the 
University o f  Chicago  21 (April 1948): 64; “Investments o f  Citizens o f  the United States in Latin 
America,” The Journal o f  Business o f  the University o f  Chicago  22 (January 1949): 21; “French 
Investments in Argentina and Brazil,” Political Science Quarterly 64 (December 1949): 560.
54 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, 249.
55 Stone, “British Direct and Portfolio Investment,” 694; Using only London Stock Exchange quotations to 
tabulate British holdings, see J. Fred Rippy, “British Investments in Latin America, End o f  1913,” The 
Journal o f  M odern H istory  19 (September 1947): especially 226-7.
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Argentina; they were 14,630 miles long, compromising 70 per cent of the nation’s route 
mileage in 1914.56
Despite improvements in American and German finance, British banks grew 
profitably. The four leading British commercial banks in South America in 1914 held 
combined assets of £88.8 million while holding a third of domestic deposits in Brazil and 
a quarter of them in Argentina and Chile.57 At the time British commercial banks in 
Latin America accrued annual profits of 13.4 per cent, well above the average British 
return on Latin America investments of 4.7 per cent and Southern Cone investments of 
5.0 per cent.58
By 1913-1914 Britain was the leading importer in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Uruguay, the larger and more stable republics (Appendix I, Tables 7 and 8). It should be 
appreciated, however, that Argentina, Brazil, and Chile accounted for eighty-five percent 
of Latin America’s total foreign trade.59 Between 1911 and 1913 Britain provided 39.77 
per cent of South American imports and purchased 35.85 per cent of its exports; the 
leader in both respects.60 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Britain 
experienced relative export decline in Latin America. British exports suffered due to 
increased alternatives, that being foreign competition (especially from Germany and the 
United States) and local production, and, to an ever-increasing extent, dependence on 
aging technology and poor marketing strategies.61 Britain’s strongest products were 
decades-old staples: cotton textiles, coal, iron, and steel. Capital goods, such as
56 Colin Lewis, British Railways in Argentina, 197.
57 Joslin, A Century o f  Banking in Latin America, 108-10.
58 Rippy, “British Investments in Latin America, End o f  1913,” 226.
59 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, 251.
60 Kinder, “British Export Promotion,” 6.
61 Miller, Britain and Latin America, 202.
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machinery, locomotives, and rolling stock, were also important. Where Britain lagged in 
volume and competitiveness would become some of the twentieth-century’s most 
dynamic fields: electrical goods, processed chemicals, and automobiles.
Not only did Britain lead in the key South American import markets and the 
continent’s service sector capitalism, but it also possessed the prestige attached to these 
accomplishments—the essence of its very strong economic and political position. As 
closer inspection of South America has revealed, on the eve of World War I British 
commercial power was well beyond what America or Germany, its closest rivals, 
possessed despite a closing gap in trade statistics. Even after the commercial havoc 
caused by the First World War, so observed University of Nebraska Professor Jacob 
Warshaw in 1922, “The British commercial edifice in Latin America is without question 
the most substantial structure erected by any foreign nation. Its foundations are an 
integral part of the foundations of most of the important Latin American countries.” “If 
Britain’s inability to retain her position as an industrial leader proved, in the very long 
run, to be her undoing as an imperial power of the first rank,” as Cain and Hopkins have 
asserted, British leaders and subsequent scholars were “right to believe that her empire, 
her enormous accumulation of financial assets spread across the globe, and the banking 
and commercial skills of the City [London] would be critical in keeping her at the centre 
of the world economic stage well into the twentieth century.”64 Nowhere else was this 
more apparent than in the major independent republics of South America.
62 For a very good overview o f  British trade with the region, see Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 
103-6, 136-42, 302 and Kinder, “British Export Promotion,” Ch. 1.
63 Jacob Warshaw, The N ew Latin America  (New York: T.Y. Crowell & Co., 1922), 114.
64 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 396.
18
This paper proposes a framework that situates Britain between the controls 
described by informal empire theory and the interpretation of its critics. Martin Lynn 
argues that the label of ‘informal empire’ “distorts” rather than reflects Britain’s 
relationship with the developing world and was “much more pluralistic and mutually 
permeable.”65 British interests within Latin America were neither omnipotent nor alone, 
yet they were hardly weak or secondary. America’s rise as an imperial and commercial 
power within the Western Hemisphere carried significant weight, as did German 
commercial competition before and after the war. What can best describe Britain in the 
Southern Cone preceding, during, and shortly following the Great War was the 
enjoyment of a first position or primary presence that resulted from a combination of 
structural and prestige elements.
Many authors have oversimplified ;the foreign policy and economics involved in 
the transference of ‘hegemony’ in the Western Hemisphere from Britain to the United 
States.66 It does seem that the United States possessed military hegemony in the Western 
Hemisphere by 1914; however, in terms of economics and politics, the picture is less 
clear-cut. Britain’s primary presence in South America was far from declining. In fact, it 
was growing healthily. Within the Southern Cone power dynamic, Britain commanded a 
primary foreign presence, similar to the external power dynamic in late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century China, but was not the only presence.67 Others exerted power and
65 Lynn, “British Policy, Trade and Informal Empire,” 120.
66 Some examples are: John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f  G reat Power Politics (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2001): 235-36; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation o f  American Expansion, 1860- 
1898  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998): 278.
67 Lynn, “British Policy, Trade and Informal Empire,” 116-7; Jurgen Osterhammel, “Britain and China, 
1842-1914” in Porter, The Oxford H istory o f  the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century', Jeremy Black, 
The British Seaborne Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), 371.
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wielded influence, such as the French, Germans, and Americans. The strong British 
presence rested heavily on concrete realities, such as leading trading statistics, investment 
holdings, shipping manifests, and naval presence. The argument that will be made is that 
Britain’s primary presence, its privileged position, or even its ‘informal empire,’ in the 
fifteen year period of 1910 to 1925 rested on its high prestige among the republics almost 
as much as it did on the structural power of economics. The United States had become 
the leading military power in the hemisphere, but Britain was still senior in regard to 
economics and finance south of the equator. This was something the United States was 
intentionally trying to emulate and ultimately surpass.
American business author, William E. Aughinbaugh, writing in 1915, proved 
prescient: “The war in Europe developed the most remarkable business situation for the 
United States ever presented to any nation.”69 In brief, the war years were a tremendous 
shock to the British domestic and global economy. This naturally impacted its interests 
in South America. Industrial production, human talent, and capital were diverted to the 
war effort, thus largely ending the large stream of investments Britain sent South 
America for the rest of the period. With a dramatic reduction in manufactures exported 
from Europe, the United States stepped in to the fill void, thus capturing a market share 
that after the war it would lose little of as competition returned. American bankers and 
investors started to make their debut in force as well. In the postwar years, the United 
States made its presence more and more felt, particularly in Brazil and Chile. The 
damage wrought to Britain’s position and the response through a policy to cultivate 
prestige will be discussed.
68 Ian L.D. Forbes, “German Informal Imperialism in South America before 1914,” The Economic History 
Review  31 (August 1978).
69 Aughinbaugh, Selling Latin America, 3-4.
CHAPTER II
BRITISH PRESTIGE—A CONCPETUAL FRAMEWORK 
The word ‘prestige,’ and to a lesser degree ‘reputation,’ were used consistently by 
Britons concerned with South America, whether they were businessmen, diplomats, 
journalists, or travelers. In the decades prior to the First World War prestige had added 
significance. Prestige was one of the central elements to Ronald Hyam’s explanation of 
British, as well as European, foreign policy and imperialism from 1815 to 1914: “the
7 fidynamics of government thinking are driven by prestige.” Having, recognizing, and 
valuing prestige comported well with a widely-shared contemporary worldview that all 
nations could be gauged on a linear path or ladder of progressive development. Prestige 
diplomacy was something many states engaged in, including those of South America.
In an argument devoted to identifying British prestige, assessing its impact, and 
identifying activities directed towards its enhancement, it is essential to develop the 
concept fully.71 The most exacting, if not scientific, definitions of prestige can possibly 
be found in the study of sociology. A ‘prestige model’ is “a frame of reference in which 
the holder sees society as divided into many layers of differentiated stat us groups” and is 
an “attitude that sees society as relatively open, with those at the top of society deserving 
their positions on account of their merit or talent.” Studies of societal hierarchies based 
on prestige find that they “usually end up as a defense of the status quo.”72
70 Hyam, B rita in ’s Im perial Century, xvi-xvii.
71 As Grant Hugo explains, “Prestige is among the most potent, and the least precise, o f the many 
abstractions w hich... dominate the deplorably unquantifiable discussion o f  international disputes.” See his 
Appearance and Reality in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 141.
72 “Prestige” in Dictionary o f  Sociology, eds., Tony Lawson and Joan Garrod. (London: Fitzroy Dearborn 
Publishers, 2001), 192. Also see “Prestige” in Allan G. Johnson, (ed.) The Blackwell D ictionary o f  
Sociology  (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 238-9.
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Though the sociological definition is by no means wrong, for our purposes it 
would be best to use a contemporary British diplomat’s view of prestige as our analytical 
framework. Arguably, Harold Nicolson was one of the first to develop prestige as a 
concept and define it as pertaining to British foreign policy in the early twentieth century. 
He was the son of Foreign Office titan, Arthur Nicolson, 1st Baron Camock, who after a 
long and distinguised career of diplomatic posts served as the Under Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs from 1910 to 1916. It was only natural for the younger Nicolson to 
follow paternal footsteps; his diplomatic career began in 1909, scoring second highest 
that year on the Foreign Office’s competitive examination. After a succession of postings 
mainly in Europe, the opinionated Nicolson butted heads with superiors in London and 
left the Foreign Office in 1929. During the 1930s he became a pre-eminent writer and 
respected parliamentarian concerning British foreign policy.
In an April 1937 Rede Lecture at the University of Cambridge, Nicolson tackled 
“The Meaning of Prestige” in regards to British foreign policy. He posed the question to 
the audience, “how comes it that what we carelessly call ‘British prestige’ is so different 
in quality from the [other] various forms of national glory and honour...?” The comment 
gives added significance to the fact that Britons referred to their prestige often and rather 
loosely. This did not mean, however, that prestige was so abstract it was beyond capture. 
Firstly, Nicolson saw ‘British prestige’ as unique from other nations, elaborating, “the 
particular meaning of prestige in our own philosophy is: ‘Power based upon reputation 
rather than reputation based upon power.’”74 To the French, prestige “implies an emotion 
rather than a method,” resting dually on “military capacity” and “magnificent cultural
73 T. G. Otte, “Nicolson, Sir Harold George (1886—1968),” Oxford D ictionary o f  National Biography, 
October 2005. <http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/35239> (7 November 2005).
74 Harold Nicolson, The M eaning o f  Prestige  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), 8.
achievements.”75 Whereas for Germans, Nicolson believed prestige signified a need to 
make known their perception of Germany’s unrecognized greatness. German prestige 
before and after the war was best understood as an insecure sense of “national honour.” 
In his opinion, British policy used the most unemotional, consistent, and coherent 
application of prestige for politico-economic ends.
To answer what exactly were the components of Britain’s exceptional prestige 
status, Nicolson had observed that “our reputation is based partly upon present wealth 
and power, partly upon past achievements and partly upon national character.” But 
Nicolson was very careful to specify that the British reputation was “based, above all, 
upon our national character.”77 What exactly were the characteristics reputed as 
‘British’? Nicolson listed four pillars of British character:
(1) ‘Honesty’: As Nicolson explained, “not merely the ordinary every-day 
honesty of a commercial race...but predominantly our constant 
endeavour to approximate public to private morality.” Thus fiscal 
responsibility, transparency, impartiality, and integrity were what 
Britons prided themselves on and foreigners recognized as a recurring 
behavior. Moral reserves were felt to distinguish Britons from other 
nationalities.
(2) ‘Fair Play’: A natural British “dislike of bullying” exemplified in their 
“sympathy with the oppressed.” British methods were not venal, nor 
tricky, but instead straightforward.
(3) ‘Objectivity’: Nicolson had found Britons were more willing to 
consider “the other person’s point of view” in a variety of situations, 
economic and political.
(4) ‘Unity’: The phenomenon that “the majority of Englishmen are 
apt...to think alike.” Collective British action and solidarity were a 
source of strength and admiration.
75 Nicolson, The M eaning o f  Prestige, 14-16.
76 Ibid., 13, 17.
77 Ibid., 23. Rephrased slightly differently, N icolson also said, “ ...our prestige is founded, not so much 
upon power or [past] success, as upon our national character.” Ibid., 25.
78 Ibid., 25.
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Gerald Martin argues that it was difficult for the British to “exploit respect based on such
• 7Q ,qualities.” Much of the evidence surrounding the Great War and interwar years points 
to the opposite conclusion. Rather than prestige based on martial qualities or exceptional 
skills, moral character was the underpinning of British international renown. According 
to Nicolson, this gave British prestige a remarkable degree of durability and staying 
power: “ .. .a prestige which contains a high percentage of reputation is able to withstand a 
loss of power; whereas even a temporary decline in power will destroy a prestige which 
is devoid of reputation.” Thus British prestige was based on a mix of reputation and 
power in optimum “proportions.”80
Nicolson was not so foolish as to disregard ‘hard power,’ that being especially of 
a financial and military character.81 As he explained, British virtues “shine with a richer 
lustre when combined with immense wealth and power.” Briton’s financial resources, 
strong navy, and expansive empire accentuated immeasurably their positive attributes. In 
South America the most visible manifestations of British power were probably its 
railways, urban utilities, banks, and the endless stream of British liners, as well as tramps, 
that unloaded and loaded in port. Thus ‘prestige’ bed-rocked on ‘reputation’ had built an 
empire and capitalist world order (‘past achievements’). Whereas in the present, empire 
and wealth augmented that prestige and reputation only further; it was a self-reinforcing 
circle of three distinct, but interrelated elements.
79 Gerald Martin, “Britain’s Cultural Relations with Latin America,” in Bulmer-Thomas, Britain and Latin 
America: A Changing Relationship, 27.
80 Nicolson, 30.
81 Though Nicolson did not use this exact terminology o f  ‘hard power,’ his referencing o f  wealth and 
military might comports closely with current scholarly definitions o f  outright power. Probably one o f  the 
most rigid definitions o f  ‘hard power’ is that o f  John J. Mearsheimer, being: “the particular material 
capabilities that a state possesses.. .a function o f tangible assets.” Power “represents nothing more than 
specific assets or material resources that are available to a state.” The Tragedy o f  Great Power Politic, 57.
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How was prestige a method of diplomatic policy? Returning to Nicolson, he 
believed, and is hardly alone in this respect, the British foreign policy tradition was 
“mercantile.” Thus, “The mercantile conception of policy carries with it an equally 
mercantile conception of prestige.” Rather than military or high-state political objectives, 
a policy of prestige towards mercantile ends hoped to avoid flexing the muscles of 
outright power. “[F]or us,” explained Nicolson, “the idea of prestige is not so much the 
exercise of power, as the maintenance of our reputation and credit at such a level as will 
render the exercise of power unnecessary.. ..[I]t is closely analogous to the general theory 
of an old-fashioned banking-house, under which credit precedes, creates and maintains
O'}
power, but does not necessarily derive from it.” That Britain’s presence in South 
America was almost solely commercial gives this definition added applicability to British 
prestige in the region. Subsequent treatments of prestige’s role in foreign policy parallel 
Nicolson rather closely.83 With this framework, how the British attempted to keep up a 
positive and, above all, ‘British’ prestigious appearance in South America will be 
examined.
82 Nicolson, 21-3. This concept was nearly identical to Walter Bagehot’s nineteenth century description o f  
prestige regarding British banks, “an old established bank has a ‘prestige’ which amounts to a ‘privileged 
opportunity’; though no exclusive right is given it by law, peculiar powers is given it by opinion.” Quoted 
in Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 118.
83 Hugo’s explanation is quite analogous to Nicolson: “Prestige is influence acquired by past achievement 
or, more precisely in this particular context, by a reputation for successful persistence in the enforcement o f  
demands, in the implementation o f  threats and in the fulfillment o f  undertakings.” Hugo, Appearance and  
Reality, 142; Hans J. Morgenthau describes prestige as one “o f  the state’s ‘instrumentalities’” to engage in 
foreign affairs. “Its purpose is to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses, 
or with the power it believes, or wants other nations to believe, it possesses.” According to Morgenthau, it 
is used very frequently “in support o f  a policy o f  the status quo.” See his Politics Among Nations (New  
York: Knopf, 1963), 72-84.
CHAPTER III
THE DISCURSIVE ELEMENTS OF PRESTIGE: LEGACY AND CHARACTER 
Britain, on the eve of the First World War, as Alan Knight explains, “having 
helped make Latin America stable, capitalist, and productive.. .had no political monopoly 
on the fruits of those advances.” British companies, merchants, investors, and 
diplomats had to advance and maintain their interests in competition with many other 
countries. However, the British did enjoy a near monopoly on the fruits of historical 
interpretation of those advances, especially regarding the nineteenth-century. British 
activities, official and private, in South America from the final years of Iberian rule to the 
Great War were remembered as glorious triumphs on the battlefield, in the marketplace, 
or the international stage. These ‘past achievements’ were an integral part of the British 
prestige edifice. This interpretation also reflected how the British viewed their 
connection with the continent and its peoples as overwhelmingly positive.
British interest in Spain and Portugal’s South American possessions has its roots 
back to the Elizabethan era. During the colonial period, South America was mainly seen 
as an enticing, but technically forbidden market for British imports. From 1713 to 1739 
the Treaty of Utrecht bestowed British vessels with the right to import African slaves to 
Spanish America. British commercial efforts were not limited to that line of importation 
or time period. British sea captains and merchants repeatedly violated Spain’s decaying 
imperial authority in order to sell their contraband wares. The story was different with 
Portugal’s American empire; trade had been authorized by Britain’s traditional ally since
84 Knight, “Britain and Latin America,” 144. The Foreign O ffice’s official policy o f  seeking no special 
status comported well with its laissez-faire ethos and methods. This is explained more fully in D.C.M. 
Platt’s Trade, and Politics in British Foreign  Policy; and Latin America and British Trade 1806-1914.
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the mid-seventeenth century.85 Once Spain joined the forces of Napoleon in 1796 the 
British, as usual, waged war on peripheral frontiers, its naval superiority the instrument. 
With encouragement from business interests, but without London’s authorization, Sir 
Home Popham landed an expeditionary force from the Cape at Buenos Aires in June 
1806. After securing the city he sent detachments across the Plata to besiege 
Montevideo, finally carrying its walls in January 1807. The vastly outnumbered garrisons 
did not remain in control for long; uprisings in Buenos Aires led to the capture of 1,200 
British soldiers, the ignominious loss of royal colours, and the flight of the garrison’s 
remnants. The bloody failure to recapture Buenos Aires in June of 1807 forced 
Popham’s replacement to withdraw his forces from the Plata in return for British
86prisoners. The first major British foray in the region was nothing to be proud of. 
LEGACY
Selective memory and tradition construction over the rest of the century would 
gloss over such blemishes and produce a story embellishing subsequent British 
contributions to South America’s progress. Michael George Mulhall, co-founder in 1861 
of the Buenos Aires Herald, a daily newspaper to serve the British community, felt the 
role of Britons in the struggle for South American independence was being lost and 
forgotten as time progressed. Mulhall’s 1878 The English in South America was a
85 Miller, Britain and Latin America, 28-32; Knight, 126;
86 Michael George Mulhall, The English in South Am erica  (London: Edward Stanford, 1878), 93-4, 107-15; 
Miller, Britain and Latin America, 35; E.J. Pratt, “Anglo-American Commercial and Political Rivalry on 
the Plata, 1820-1830” The Hispanic American H istorical Review  11 (August, 1931): 303; Judith Blow  
Williams, “The Establishment o f  British Commerce with Argentina,” The Hispanic H istorical Review  15 
(February 1935): 43-6; David McLean, War, D iplom acy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics 
o f  La Plata, 1836-1853  (London: British Academic Press, 1995), 6.
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600-plus page tome to rescue such ‘past achievements’ from obscurity. As his 
introduction asserted, “the brilliant achievements of numerous Englishmen in this part of 
the world are falling into oblivion.” His chronicle spanned from the earliest colonial days 
to the time of its writing and from it “will be seen how much South America is indebted 
to Englishmen in arms, arts and commerce; and how Great Britain has reason to take 
pride.”87 This was a British attitude that would not go away.
The key heroes were British military and naval commanders who joined the 
independence movement. Admiral Brown, an Irish ship owner, joined the revolutionary 
government in Buenos Aires in 1814 as a Commodore in command of three ships. By 
the time his career ended he had driven the Spanish fleet from the Plata, commanded the 
city’s naval campaigns against Brazil in the late 1820s, and finally served as a peace 
delegate to end the internecine war in 1828.88
If Brown was the British naval hero on the east coast of the Southern Cone, 
Thomas Cochrane, the tenth Earl of Dundonald, was it on the west coast. Driven from 
England due to a stock exchange fraud trial, Cochrane, an officer in the Royal Navy, 
accepted a commission in the Chilean Navy offered by Bernardo O’Higgins, an Irish- 
born, but Spanish-raised governor of revolutionary Chile. Arriving in late 1818,
Cochrane reorganized and commanded the Chilean fleet against Spanish strongholds in 
Peru. Ironically, Cochrane’s services were hired by the Brazilian government in 1823 
and his ships would fight Brown’s Argentine navy in addition to the Portuguese.89 Other
87 Mulhall, The English in South America, 13-4.
88 Ibid., 144-67.
89 Ibid., 185-207.
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British freelance soldiers achieved legendary status as well, such as Bolivar’s Anglo-Irish 
Legion.90
If such British assistance, albeit of private subjects, was the martial glory of 
British ‘past achievements’ in South America, the foreign policy of Foreign Secretary 
George Canning topped it off. Skillfully allowing for Latin American independence to 
occur without alienating the Spanish and preventing French intervention through naval 
power, Canning is famously quoted, “I called the New World into existence to redress the 
balance of the Old.”91 British de facto recognition of Buenos Aires came in 1823 through 
the posting of a British Consul General. The action was followed by a £1 million loan 
from the London House of Barings in 1824 and by a Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 
1825. The city’s first incorporated bank, the Banco de Buenos Aires, had three of its 
original nine directors as Britons. Recognition and treaties with the other nascent South 
American nations followed. British diplomatic pressure was even instrumental in the 
creation of Uruguay in 1828.92 The Monroe Doctrine, enforced mainly by the Royal 
Navy and America’s tongue, was intended to prevent European aggrandizement in the
QTNew World, facilitate commercial expansion, and political stability. Referring to Latm 
American independence and the Monroe Doctrine, in 1825 Canning proclaimed, “If we 
do not mismanage our affairs sadly, she is English.”94 Because Britain had unrivalled 
naval, financial, and industrial power, it was far better situated to reap the benefits than
90 Ibid., 142-3.
91 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 243.
92 Williams, “The Establishment o f  British Commerce,” 51-6; Miller, Britain and Latin America, 27-45; 
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the United States or the rest of Europe. As Ronald Hyam explains, “there can be no 
question that British power counted far more than that of the United States. The Monroe 
Doctrine was so much windy rhetoric without the unseen hand of the Royal Navy.”95 
However, the development and integration of the newly independent Latin American 
republics experienced many false starts and disappointments. The main impediments 
were internecine warfare, the diminutive size and dispersion of the Latin American 
population, and the limits of contemporary technology.96 Not until after the mid­
nineteenth century, with the benefits of capital investments, mass immigration, steam- 
powered ships, trains, and the telegraph would Latin America begin to develop and be
■ 0*7integrated with the world economy on a major scale. As described, the British played a 
major role in the export-led growth of these nations.
Serving with revolutionary forces as well as participating in the commercial 
development of South America were reflective of British character, Mulhall had no 
doubt. South America’s growth exhibited “the unquestionable proofs of the indomitable 
energy of our race, the love of freedom which inspired our countrymen to throw in their 
destinies with the emancipation of South America, and the vigorous impulse that this 
continent has received in later years from the commerce, enterprise, and the genius of 
Englishmen.” 98 The British role in South American independence and development, 
political and economic, achieved near-legendary status among the British by the First 
World War. The legacy was buttressed in print again by W.H. Koebel, a prolific British
95 Hyam, Britain's Im perial Century, 56.
96 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, 248-249; Hyam, Britain's Imperial Century, 59; 
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97 Hyam, B rita in ’s Im perial Century, 59.
98 Mulhall, The English in South America, 15; Henry S. Ferns, “Beginnings o f  British Investment in 
Argentina,” The Economic H istory Review 4, no. 3 (1952): 345-6; Ferns, “Britain’s Informal Empire in 
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writer of travel literature and amateurish business surveys. His nineteenth book on Latin 
America was another thick volume (over 600 pages) of identical subject matter to 
Mulhall’s. Its unwieldy and long title summarized his intentions: British Exploits in 
South America: A History o f British Activities in Exploration, Military Adventure, 
Diplomacy, Science, and Trade in Latin-America?9 That it was published during the 
middle of the Great War should also be appreciated.
During the interwar years the legacy and ‘achievements’ under-girding British 
prestige were still felt to be a salient feature of their identity. In Activities o f  the British 
Community in Argentina During the Great War 1914-1919, a high production value 
scrapbook of sorts compiled and published by the Buenos Aires Herald in 1920, the 
recent heroics and sacrifices toward the war effort were felt to be on par with the previous 
British record. In its preface the usual discursive elements were mentioned to emphasize 
the British legacy: the policy of George Canning; the recognition of Buenos Aires; the 
1825 Treaty of Amity and Commerce; the first bank in Buenos Aires; the first foreign 
loan; the first British settlers to the Plata. It was ever so confident to proffer, “It has been 
truly said that to obtain an insight into the history of Latin-America it is necessary to 
study the writings of English authors,” since many had been “eyewitnesses of the most 
notable incidents of the wars of independence.”100
Whatever the occasion, however the medium of dissemination, the British rarely 
failed to play on their legacy. The British reveled in reminding themselves, other 
Europeans, North Americans, but most especially, South Americans of their past
99 W.H. Koebel, British Exploits in South America: A H istory o f  British Activities in Exploration, M ilitary 
Adventure, Diplomacy, Science, and Trade in Latin-America (New York: Century, 1917).
100 “Preface,” Activities o f  the British Community in Argentina During the G reat War 1914-1918, ed.
Arthur L. Holder (Buenos Aires, Buenos A ires Herald, 1920), 9.
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achievements. During nearly every major political and economic development in South 
America’s nineteenth-century history the British claimed to have a played role.
For the sake of brevity, only a sampling of South American acceptance and 
participation in this discursive tradition will have to do. Writing in relation to the British- 
Argentine Exhibition of 1905, former Argentine President Bartoleme Mitre, himself an 
honorary president of the event, wrote: “When in the centuries to come, the Argentine 
Nation tells the world of the use which it has made of its sovereignty, the name of Great 
Britain will figure in its story as the principal factor of its political, social and economic 
progress, whose influence has been at all times beneficial for the fortunes of the 
Republic, and must be so with even greater efficacy in the future.”101 At the St.
Andrew’s Society of the River Plate’s Silver Anniversary Banquet in December 1909, 
itself an occasion celebrating Scottish presence and unity in the region, the guest of honor 
was Victorino de la Plaza, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and future Vice 
President and President of Argentine (1914-1916). He reciprocated the toast to Argentina 
by stating, “How in many ways, this country is bound to the little isles across the sea are 
well known to you. The co-operation, friendship, and material assistance extended this 
Republic by the British Government during its nascent days now indelibly figures in 
history, and is to-day recorded gratitude of a thriving country which welcomes to its 
shores the members of a nation which rendered efficacious help in the dark day of 
trial.”102 Carlos Pellegrini, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs during part of the First
101 Quoted in “Preface,” Holder, Activities o f  the British Community, 16; Also quoted in Sir Reginald 
Tower’s “Annual Report on Argentine Republic for the year 1912.” Doc. 52 in Philip, British Documents 
on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1845-1914,” Vol. 9, 255.
102 There was a St. Andrew’s Society in Uruguay as well. South American Journal, January 1, 1910, 2; 
January 8, 1910, 49; January 7, 1911,7 . After Plaza became Vice-President-elect, he attended another 
British social occasion in Buenos Aires on April 12, 1910. He sat at the head table with the Minister o f  
Public Works, a Senator, and British Minister Walter B. Townley. The purpose was simply the going away
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World War, commented on the British role: “Great Britain rocked the cradle of our
revolution, and.. .intervened in a decisive manner in the definite recognition of our
independence...”103 Argentine intellectual, Dr. Francisco Moreno, in a lecture, stated
“Irish, English and Scotch sailors.. .gave us the victory on the sea through [Admiral]
Brown, and on land the roll of the army of the Andes is full of British names.”104
The Argentine Minister of Public Works, a position of supreme importance
because British railways fell under his jurisdiction, attended a banquet in his honor at the
Savoy Hotel (again, another British action to cultivate prestige) in London in the spring
of 1913. Don E. Ramos Mexia did not pull any complements or his adherence to the
British litany of ‘achievements.’ He told an audience of Lords, baronets, and railway
board members, first, that
I must begin by confessing the great admiration and the old sincere love 
for the British people...I started in my appreciation of England as a 
student of history, seeing in her the mother of human liberty, the cradle of 
self government, a sower of civilization all over the world, and in relation 
to my own country, the first European people to take even notice of its 
incipient existence..., the first to recognize its independence, the only one 
to promote our material progress at her own expense.105
On the west coast the British legacy hit all the key elements: participation of
Britons in the independence struggle, political recognition and inspiration, and British
commerce and investment. Regarding the British role in Chile’s independence, the South
American Journal noticed, “This fact is always a fruitful theme on occasions.. .when
banquet for the Central Argentine Railway’s general manager who was leaving for Britain on an extended 
vacation. That it garnered the attendance o f  over 200 and went well into the night suggests such events, 
like the St. Andrew’s Society’s, were not only important socially, but enjoyable socially. Ibid., May 14, 
1910, 539.
103 Quoted in “Preface,” in Holder, Activities o f  the British Community, 10.
104 Ibid., 10.
105 South American Journal, April 12, 1913, 494.
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approaches are made to grounds for mutual appreciation and honour.”106 These themes
(or discursive elements) were evident during a 1911 Royal Naval visit to Valparaiso. The
host, the Chilean Minister of War, stressed to the crowd and the British,
The bonds which unite us to Great Britain are as ancient as the existence 
of Chili, and as an acknowledgement of our independence and the 
enrolment of this young Republic in the circle of civilized nations, 
England being the great mother of parliamentarism, gave us excellent 
lessons on liberty and order, created our commerce and contributed 
towards its progress with her vast and efficient experience truly up-to-date 
with the times, invested her finances to give life to the first industries and 
railways.107
The First World War did not seem to dent such admiration in the Southern Cone. 
Historical ties seemed to lay at the root of the premier Buenos Aires newspaper La 
Prensa's stance during the conflict: “[W]e declare without circumlocution our close 
adhesion to the cause of the Allies, in conformity with the ties which unite Argentine 
civilisation to Great Britain, France, and Italy....Historic relations are indestructible.”108 
The leading Chilean newspaper, Valparaiso’s El Mercurio, praised Britain several days 
before the first anniversary of armistice day as if it were reading off the same script: “We 
knew that in Great Britain we had the greater master of our fundamental political 
institutions and of our navy; the powerful friend who guaranteed our external credit, 
always giving an adequate reception to our signature; the admirable champion of our 
trade, who sent us ships and supplies, received our products, and firmly established on 
our soil strong aggregations of capital and solid business enterprises.”109 Other examples
i°6 “ch jie and Great Britain,” Ibid., November 15, 1918.
107 South Pacific M ail (Valparaiso) inserted in South American Journal, May 20, 1911, 593.
108 La Prensa, January 19, 1916, quoted in Ibid., July 1, 1916, 5. Hosting British Minister Sir Reginald 
Tower during his 1918 spring tour o f  Argentina’s provinces, the Governor o f  La Plata told the large crowd: 
“We are united to Britain by bonds o f  steel. Britain is great because o f  her sincere love o f  liberty. 
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free peoples.” Ibid., October 5, 1918, 218.
109 El Mercurio, November 8, 1919, quoted in Warshaw, The New Latin America, 118-9.
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of this prestige-maintaining discursive tradition are ample in regards to Chile throughout
the First World War era.110 Legacy seemed to matter to everyone.
The discursive elements could be found in the Portuguese tongue as well. In
1918, a Brazilian professor told an Allies luncheon, “One cannot forget that in the first
pages of our history as a free nation are inscribed the names of Great Britain and its
famous Minister [Canning], whose noble efforts helped on the movement of
emancipation.”111 The Brazilian Minister to Britain, on the occasion of a visit from his
navy, had only praise for the Royal Navy’s anti-submarine warfare against the Germans.
As he explained, the “seas had been cleared of it, just as they have been cleared of piracy
112and the slave trade since Britannia has ruled the waves.”
Even American economists and business observers, in other words direct 
competitors to the British, adopted and disseminated the repetitive and sometimes tedious 
account of British achievements. An example out of many, but notably from the interwar 
period:
From the earliest times it has been English capital in the hands of 
Englishmen which has given the initial impetus to Argentine development
110 El M ercurio  professed to its Valparaiso readership in 1916, “We believe that the North Americans will 
never dislodge Europeans from our markets, because our national spirit and education are in greater affinity 
with the latter who know us better...France and England w ill still represent our ideals as in the past.” 
Quoted in South American Journal, June 10, 1916, 504-5. In 1918 the paper proudly proclaimed, “We 
have learnt from the English our great liberties, our great tolerance.” Quoted in Ibid., April 20, 1918, 246. 
In early June 1918, on the occasion o f  the visit o f  the British M ission led by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, El 
M ercurio  was only praise: “Great Britain is the incarnation o f  the liberty o f  nations and their rights as well 
as o f  commercial progress.” Quoted in Ibid., June 8, 1918, 364. In that same year Maximo del Campo at a 
dinner held by the Vina del Mar Club to raise funds for the Franco-Chilean Hospital in Paris still included 
the British in his laudatory speech: “As Chileans we have to pay a debt o f  gratitude for the brave sons o f  
noble France and illustrious England who aided our fathers in our struggle for liberty and independence, 
and have set our feet in the paths o f  culture and progress. Cochrane, Mackenna, Simpson, Miller [British 
generals].. .and Wheelwright [founder o f  the Pacific Steam Navigation Com pany]... .and many others have 
honoured our country and have benefited it in works that will not pass away.” Quoted in Ibid., June 1, 
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and always impelled it to augmented momentum. English money has built 
the railroads, established the banks and loan houses, encouraged the 
breeding of fine horses, cattle and sheep, built many of the great 
slaughtering plants, and supplied merchandise suitable for use in all these 
great enterprises...British men and money form essential pillars of
1 1 T
commerce with the Argentine.
The script might as well have been written by Mulhall or Koebel.
There was a downside of such a positive self-image, especially when reinforced 
by others. Arrogance and smugness were often a result, as evidenced by Percy F. Martin, 
a British business joumalist-columnist, in the summer of 1910: “The fact remains that 
Argentina to-day owes all her greatness, all her prosperity, and all her brilliant future 
which is believed to be in store for her, to the money-bags of British investors, to the , 
shrewd and cautious advice of British financiers, and to the unswerving good-faith of all 
the British doing business in the Republic.”114 Most Britons likely felt similarly about 
South America, but rarely were they so explicit, especially in public. During the war 
some Britons felt South America not only owed them a material, but “moral debt.”115
THE LEGACY CONSENSUS
What is amazing is the extent of consensus among elite circles on the 
basic historical interpretation of Britain in South American history. To the
113 Clarence F. Jones, “Argentine Trade Developments,” Economic G eography 2 (July 1926): 387.
114 Percy F. Martin, “The ‘Emancipation o f  the Argentine’: Public Sentiment Being Fostered Against 
British Influence,” South American Journal, August 20, 1910, 205.
115 During the First World War the South American Journal adamantly argued, “From the very first week o f  
war we have repeatedly emphasized this deep obligation to Western Europe o f  the Ibero-American peoples, 
which is now embodied in a moral debt to the Allied nations who are fighting strenuously for that 
democratic civilisation and liberty so vital to their independence and progress.” March 9, 1917, 146. 
Addressing accusations o f  pro-German sympathies in Chile in 1917, the paper questioned, “What has 
become o f  her inheritance o f  liberal ideals...H ow  can she reconcile the iron tyranny o f  Teuton despotism 
with her association with the aims and impulses o f  rational democracy[?]” “Is Chili Pro-German?,” Ibid., 
March 23, 1917, 178.
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British’s credit much of it was founded on truth, as the Buenos Aires Standard
noted with a bit of smugness in 1922:
No one knows better than Dr. Alvear [President of Argentina] how loyally 
[the] British... contributed to the funding and building up of the Republic.
The same influences are still active, still potent...the first Argentine loan 
was...sought and negotiated in London...British shippers created the first 
regular line between the River Plate and the parts of Europe. Trade 
followed the flag. The first bank was a British bank. The first successful 
attempt to carry the civilising rail across the camp [pampas] was made by 
British enterprise. To-day of the total of Argentina’s exports a good third 
goes to British parts.
There was absolute certainty in this narrative: “These are facts, not fancies. Like all 
concrete facts they have their explanation in real things.”116 The British fostering, 
encouraging, and perpetuating this tradition should be acknowledged: however, like any 
idea, once loose it can hardly be said to have been under the control or direction of the 
British. The embellishments and constant referencing by South Americans themselves 
reflected an utter acceptance of British prestige. This legacy became the basis of a shared 
discourse that only reinforced the positive British reputation in the southern cone. They 
reflected grand ‘past achievements,’ wealth and capability. At Anglo-South American 
ceremonies, banquets, naval visits, and anything calling for public utterances, the British 
legacy was often central to the speaker or writer’s message. As Grant Hugo explains, 
“[T]he creation of prestige demands a long period of relatively unbroken success... .It is 
not to be achieved in a decade.”117
116 Buenos Aires Standard  quoted in South American Journal, August 19, 1922, 148. The comments were 
in response to President-Elect Alvear’s visit to Britain during his European tour in the summer o f  that year. 
Alvear’s speeches in Britain only reinforced the Anglo-Argentine legacy consensus.
117 Hugo, Appearance and Reality, 158.
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In the late 1920s, when Anti-Americanism was rampant in the Plata and British
1 1 Q
investments were unsettled by labor and economic nationalism, the acceptance of the 
British legacy was far from gone. When the British Legation to Buenos Aires was raised 
to an Embassy in 1926, Six Deputies in the Argentine Chamber authored and passed a 
resolution, “as a token of homage and an expression of sincere friendship for the British 
Empire.” Its opening read, “The British Government was the first to recognize our 
political emancipation; it was with it we made our first treaty of amity and commerce. 
British capital was the first to come to the country to give value to the immense wealth of 
our soil, and Britain is to-day the principal consumer of our agricultural and pastoral 
products.”119 In the same year, after the Chilean government had recently laid the 
foundation stone for a statue of George Canning, an Argentine Senator urged his 
colleagues “to comply with our sacred debt to that illustrious statesman by erecting to
190him a monument” as well.
CHARACTER
A major factor influencing the British public face in the Southern Cone was the 
composition of its community’s members. By the twentieth-century, colonization 
schemes were no more, the majority of Britons came to the Argentine as employees (or as 
their relatives) of existing British enterprises. Manual labor was supplied mainly by the 
natives and the influx of Mediterranean immigrants, whereas the British, Germans and 
French provided technical and managerial skills. Yale Professor Hiram Bingham 
commented on his 1908 trip to Buenos Aires, “The Anglo-Saxon that you see briskly
118 Albert, South Am erica and the First World War, 313-17; Miller, Britain and Latin Am erica , 194-7.
119 South American Journal, October 2, 1926, 286.
120 Ibid., August 28, 1926, 183.
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walking along the sidewalks are not Americans, but clean-shaven, red-cheeked, vigorous 
• • 101Britishers.” In discussing Brazilian modernization in his 1960s study Richard Graham
asserted, “There were so many British engineers in Brazil that the Brazilian image of an
Englishman came to be that of an engineer.”122 British travel-writer C.R. Enock wrote of
Britons in Latin America shortly following the First World War:
The Englishman in Latin America is still to a certain extent a ‘milord’. He 
comes for great enterprises; his pockets are always overflowing with 
silver, which he is supposed to dispense liberally. The traits of 
impartiality and general commercial rectitude of Great Britain have been 
the cause. Furthermore, Englishmen who travel or reside in Latin 
American countries are generally men not falling below a certain standard 
of education, and if not always of independent means, they have come as 
representatives of wealthy firms, companies or syndicates. They are 
managers of branch houses, engineers, travelers, sportsmen, financiers.
The lower-class Briton is rarely encountered.. .There has been no influx of 
poor class immigrants from Britain.
Enock’s impression might reflect the widely held perception, but the British community 
in the Southern Cone was not so homogenous or monolithically affluent. It possessed a 
“multi-tiered occupational structure” into the twentieth century. Up to 1895 at least a 
quarter of the British population in Argentina were engaged in manual labor. However, 
the British were disproportionately represented in white collar fields; in 1895, 32.5 per 
cent of Britons were in professional fields compared with 16.4 per cent of the overall 
Buenos Aires population. Those British males engaged in manual labor, however, 
“achieved significant upward mobility” over the course of their career.124 That Britons 
were employed in some of the most visible and economically vital enterprises, such as
121 Hiram Bingham, Across South America  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911), 32.
122 Graham, Britain and the M odernization o f  Brazil, 137.
123 C.R. Enock, The Republics o f  Central and South Am erica  (London, 1922); 497. Quoted in Joslin, A 
Century o f  Banking in Latin America, 97-8.
124 Jakubs, “The Anglo-Argentines,” 137-38, 144-45.
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railways, tramways, utilities, and banks probably augmented the impression of Britons as
educated, gainfully employed, and, most especially, important.
Ronald C. Newton found in his study of Germans in early twentieth-century
Buenos Aires, that “admiration (tinged with envy) of the British was nothing new in the
German community.”125 British self-charity manifested through philanthropy and hiring
internally was seen as most admirable. How one German community member
commented on British assistance for new arrivals is revealing: “[W]hen someone knocks
on the door and says, ‘Civis britannicus sum,’ the simple fact that he is a British subject
1suffices to get him a position right away.” Records indicate that between 1872 and 
1923 some 27 per cent of German immigrants to Argentina required assistance from the 
government in seeking employment. The number of Britons on such rolls was much 
smaller.127
It also appears that once one was incorporated into the British community, he or 
she enjoyed a modicum of social status and acceptance not found within other foreign 
communities. As one German commented, “even the least significant person is 
somebody” in the British community.128 Ysabel Rennie found firsthand the same of 
British expatriates: “At home they might have been small clerks and tradesmen, or poor 
sheep farmers; but in Argentina they represented the Empire, they had standing in the 
community, and they were gentlemen.”129 Unlike many other nationalities, excepting 
migratory labor, the British could always return ‘home’ or find an Empire destination,
125 Ronald C. Newton, German Buenos Aires, 1900-1933: Social Change and Cultural Crisis (Austin: 
University o f  Texas, 1977), 106.
126 Newton, German Buenos Aires, 105.
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129 Ysabel Rennie, The Argentine Republic (New York: Macmillan, 1945), 165. quoted in Jakubs, “The 
Anglo-Argentines,” 152.
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acting as a sort of “psychological ‘escape hatch.’”130 This idea that Britons were always 
away from ‘home’ appears to be widespread. Britons, even after decades of residence 
and work in Argentina, would often retire back to the United Kingdom as Sir David Kelly 
described the phenomenon, “as though they had merely moved from Birmingham to 
London.”131
Ultimately the British community and diplomats’ policy toward immigration to 
South America, especially to the Plata, was one of discouragement. In terms of keeping 
up appearances relative to other nationalities, this can be explained simply in trying to 
avoid diminution of the middle and upper classes’ share of the community population, as 
well as an honest concern for those who would become hard pressed once they arrived. 
Out of a combination of sincere charity and a desire to avoid the visibility of destitute 
Britons, the community’s charitable mechanisms would care for impoverished 
compatriots until they could find work or were returned home in a relatively quick 
manner. Sir Reginald Tower, British minister to Argentina, vented his frustration in 
1913: “I have constantly pointed out both here and home that there is very little opening 
in Latin America for British unskilled labour.” Such Britons would be better off finding
• •  • • 1 'I?their fortunes within the Empire, not Argentina or the rest of South America. Due to 
the “distress among immigrants from the United Kingdom” in early 1913, the British 
Immigration Office in London finally released a notice strongly warning Britons of what 
awaited them in Argentina if they had not secured employment before embarkation.133
130 Ibid., 155-56; John Mayo, “The British Communities in Nineteenth-Century Chile: Engagement and 
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American Journal, January 17, 1914, 117.
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Only after the war was there some palpable encouragement for British immigration, and 
that was primarily directed towards facilitating the return of those nearly 10,000 who 
volunteered during the war.134
Sir Reginald Tower’s responsibility, not just for the United Kingdom, but for the 
Empire, was evidenced in his care of some 500 Indian Sikhs in Buenos Aires in 1912. 
Somehow they had been persuaded that work was plentiful; it proved to be otherwise. 
Denied the normal temporary government assistance for new arrivals because they were 
“Asiatics,” Sir Reginald told London he “spared no effort to induce the Argentine 
authorities to reconsider,” but to no avail. The Legation endeavored to find them 
employment and enlisted the Salvation Army to provide food and shelter for over a
* * 135hundred. Tower notified the Indian Civil Service to prevent any further such incidents.
One British Vice-Consul to Latin America described the rationale behind such
responsibilities, beyond simply humanitarian concerns, “[I]t has been felt that British
prestige would suffer if people who considered themselves and were considered by others
to be British subjects were not helped.” Thus denial of relief and medical support to any
of Britain’s imperial subjects would “not at all be to the credit of the Empire, or add to
1our prestige, which remains high.”
134 One columnist worried about the reduction in the British population in postwar South America 
explained the need for concern, “[A]part from the intrinsic value o f  his commercial activity, every patriotic 
European there represents for his homeland a positive wealth o f  propaganda, the danger o f  diminished 
communities may well be m anifest...those British volunteers from South America who survive war should 
be accorded every conceivable encouragement and facility to return.” F.H. W., “South American 
Expansion— A Passing Opportunity,” Ibid., November 16, 1918, 319. However, commenting on the surge 
in interest among demobilized soldiers in seeking employment in South America, the Journal warned, “the 
ordinary British colonist class is not as a rule suitable for Latin America.” In a subsequent issue it advised, 
“Only as selected and salaried officials, engaged by the managements o f  the British companies and 
business houses, is there any opening.” Ibid., November 30, 1918, 350; “Employment in South America,” 
April 9, 1921, 286; September 23, 1922, 242.
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The British community viewed each and every member as a visible representative 
of Britain. Probably the best summation of this notion that each Briton was an individual 
agent of British prestige is found in a lecture given to the Royal Society of Arts, replete 
with photos and cinematograph visual aides, by Campbell P. Ogilvie, Chairman of the 
Santa Fe Land Company in Argentina. He reminded anyone contemplating immigration 
that,
England is judged by the conduct of her persons.. .Argentina offers to-day 
a splendid opening for the best of England’s sons, but she does not want 
the loafer.. ..England’s prestige is seriously injured when so many of the 
‘wasters’ and worse are sent from the country... .It is but natural that from 
those, who go to foreign countries, England is judged. We should send 
abroad men who are bound to succeed, men who never forget that from 
their behaviour the Mother Country will be appraised.137
Like those who went to be pro-consuls and civil servants in the formal empire, the
supposed informal empire requested, in the tradition of Rudyard Kipling, that the home
islands also ‘send forth the best ye breed.’
SPANISH LANGAUGE COLLOQUIALISMS FOR BRITISH CHARACTER
Professor Jacob Warshaw, of the University of Nebraska, found in his study of 
The New Latin America, “Due to the Englishman’s reputation for efficiency, honesty, and 
business-sense, other public and quasi-public utilities have confidently been given over to 
his charge. Tramways-systems, docks, water, light, and power plants have been initiated
through British activity, and have become landmarks of high advertising value to the
1 • • • •British nation.” Similar to Harold Nicolson, this American felt the British position
rested heavily on ‘character.’ Some of the strongest evidence that the British had
137 South American Journal, December 3, 1910, 641.
138 Warshaw, The New Latin America, 116.
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impressed upon themselves and the South American psyche of British character’s storied 
and successful past was through Spanish colloquialisms or everyday figures of speech. 
There were many and nearly every Briton in South America seemed to know them and 
revel in repeating them.
The most commonly mentioned referred to British ‘honesty.’ “If a verbal promise 
is made,” explained the 1911 book Twentieth Century Impressions o f Argentina, “the 
native, to seal the contract, usually says palabra de ingles, meaning he will act as an 
Englishman, whose word is his bond.”140 Warshaw informed his American readers,
“‘The word of an Englishman’ (palabra de ingles) is the gold standard of commercial 
honor throughout Latin America.”141 Sir Maurice de Bunsen, head of the British Mission 
to South America in 1918 concluded, “It is impossible after such a journey not to feel 
impressed by the great position which Great Britain has achieved for herself in those 
regions. ‘Palabra de Ingles” (‘on the word of an Englishman’) is still the proverbial 
expression.”142 British honesty translated into punctuality and dependability: “If an 
appointment is made, and the hour fixed, it is usual for the natives to say hora de ingles, 
meaning that the Englishman’s hour, who is always on time.”143
John King argues the British always retained an intense “skepticism about the 
value of spreading such intangibles as language, literature, the arts and civilized 
values.”144 King and Alistair Hennessey are correct in the general deference of the 
British to the French, as well Italian and Spanish, influence in the fine arts. However,
140 Reginald Lloyd, ed., Twentieth Century Impression o f  Argentina  (London: Lloyd’s, 1911) quoted in 
Graham-Yooll, The Forgotten Colony, 226.
141 Warshaw, The New Latin America, 114.
142 Doc. 25 Sir Maurice to Balfour, Steamship Megantic, 18 September 1918, in Correspondence 
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143 Lloyd, ed., Twentieth Century Impression o f  Argentina quoted in Graham-Yooll, The Forgotten Colony, 
226.
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this is taken too far in stating, “In this battle for cultural supremacy the British were mere 
skirmishers.”145 Too many scholars examining the British presence in South America 
only look for what could be termed ‘high’ cultural diplomacy. There seems to be a 
consensus that “certain cultural manifestations” by the British were limited to the 
introduction of sports (golf, polo, tennis, and soccer especially), educational practices, 
and liberalism.146
Team sports certainly became a source for cultural interchange between Britons 
and South Americans. Even when matches were between Britons, they often garnered an 
audience of locals. British and Argentine polo teams reciprocated visits throughout the 
early twentieth century. Lord Hawke’s M.C.C. cricket team toured the Plata in February 
of 1912, more for British expatriates than anything else.147 But football (soccer) became 
undoubtedly the most popular British game for South Americans to watch and participate 
in—many forming their own teams and leagues once they learned its rules. In 1909 
touring teams of Everton and Tottenham held an exhibition match in Buenos Aires in 
which the President and Cabinet attended.148 In 1914, Koebel found in Uruguay, “As is 
general throughout almost the length and breadth of South America, [that] football is 
much in vogue here.”149 A British team sailed for Buenos Aires on July 24, 1914, only to 
have its planned tour cut short when war broke out.150 Argentine President Alvear, in 
what was perceived as an official endorsement, provided the first kick for the last game in
145 Hennessey, “Argentines, Anglo-Argentines and Others,” 28-9.
146 King, “The Influence o f British Culture in Argentina,” 161-62; Graham-Yooll, The Forgotten Colony, 
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149 W.H. Koebel, Uruguay (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1915), 133.
150 South American Journal, August, 1, 1914. 116.
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a 1923 series between a visiting Scottish team and one of Argentines; the Argentines 
went 2-1 in the three matches.151
In the 1920s football began to really take off in Brazil, the product of decades of 
British football clubs. Prior to the war G.J. Bruce found English language terminology, 
such as ‘pass,’ ‘goal,’ and ‘kick’ were shouted by the watching and playing Portuguese­
speaking majority. He was certain, that “if there is going to be a universal language, 
English leads for the honour, and British sports, especially football, will help to secure 
it.” Lawn tennis was “played as widely almost as football, but by a different set of 
people. It is yet the pastime chiefly of the wealthier classes.”152 Referring to sports in 
general, Koebel stressed, “The importance of this is not to be underrated; for the football 
and the golf-club, the lawn-tennis racquet and the racing craft, the polo ball and the 
coachhom, and all the rest of such gear, have been vitally instrumental in evoking a real
153 •intimacy and mutual respect between the British and the South Americans.” During 
the interwar years sports would be at the vanguard of public life and leisure; American 
basketball and baseball were quite absent in the Southern Cone. An activity that crossed 
class lines and would only grow also had commercial benefit. British sporting apparel 
and equipment were considered naturally the best for their respective sports, whether they
151 Military Attache, “Population and Social Conditions— Argentina,” Buenos Aires, July 1, 1923 in U.S. 
M ilitary Intelligence Reports Argentina, 1918-1941 Reel 1 (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications 
o f  America, 1985), 292.
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164-65; Graham-Yooll, The Forgotten Colony, 187-98; Karen Racine, “A Community o f  Purpose: British 
Cultural Influence During the Spanish American Wars for Independence,” in Marshall, English-Speaking 
Communities, 21.
46
were soccer balls, racquets, or golf pants.153 The less physical games of golf and tennis 
also appear to have crossed gender lines as well. Rosita Forbes found in Argentina, 
“Except on a golf course it is unusual to see a man and a women walking together.”154 
Values, as Nicolson argued, were central to British reputation, and it appears to 
identity as well. Gerald Martin states, “Early in this century the concept of selling Britain 
to the world was considered demeaning and needing to do so out of the question.” This 
was based on the assumption, “Everyone knew what an Englishman stood for.”155 The 
discursive elements present at the time appear to prove “everyone,” who at least mattered 
to the British, or at least who the British thought mattered, knew what the stereotypical 
‘character’ of a Briton was. If they did not then they were reminded through innocuous 
colloquialisms and stories of the British ‘legacy’ of contributions to South America. A 
positive stereotype had been established. It was a subtle, unsystematized, but consistent 
manner of keeping up British appearances. Yet subtlety was crucial to the mystique of 
the British. Warshaw explained, the British businessman “has earned a reputation for 
solidity, for sincerity, often times withheld from the more brilliant better advertised 
house.”156
Despite the British’s ‘enclave’ mentality, they remained visible. The effect was 
considerable, as Warshaw had observed. “They preserve a social aloofness, yet set the 
styles in sports, men’s dress and, in some instances, in household economy. The wealthy 
Argentine family often boasts a hall and an English governess [nanny], and the educated
153 The Bank o f  London and South America’s Monthly Review  in 1926 found British sporting goods to be 
taking o ff  in popularity in the Plata. For example, “g o lf stockings, for instances at one time exclusively 
confined to the British community, being every year more in demand as a result o f the extension o f  this 
sport among other communities in the country.” Quoted in South American Journal, August 28, 1926, 192.
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York: F.A. Stokes Co., 1932), 116.
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Argentinian or Chilean interlards his speech with Anglicisms.”157 A frequent British
traveler of the continent agreed. Speaking of Buenos Aires, “[T]he features which
distinguish the social life, business and sports of the capital, wheresoever they depart
from Spanish tradition, are very markedly British.” Bland noted the respect for French
culture in the fine arts and intellectual pursuits, but felt, “in other directions the prevailing
influence is conspicuously English. Your Argentine blade gets his clothes from London,
owns an English terrier, decorates his walls with English pictures, knows all about
football, and belongs to a rowing club.”158 In 1926, an American observed, “ ...the
Argentine citizen cares less for price than for attractiveness of design and novelty; he
dresses according to Parisian and London styles.”159 The Briton in South America, so it
was explained, “sticks to his English habits.. ..He lives his life approximately as he would
have lived it in England. It is not he who conforms; nor is his non-conformity a sign of
surliness or lack of sociability.” Yet Latin Americans adopted British customs, fashion,
and recreations “as they usually do for the purposes of invidious distinction in Latin
America wherever there is a nucleas of Englishmen.”160 Speaking rather disdainfully of
the Argentine “plutocracy,” Sir David Kelly recalled their waiting
until a foreign community had done the spade work in building up some 
institution and then quietly absorb[ing] it. Thus the British community 
had...started and built all the first class clubs; but already in 1919 all 
these...were being absorbed by the Argentines....The English social and 
country clubs in all the provincial centres were first infiltrated by
157 Ibid., 43-44.
158 Bland, Men, M anners and M orals, 97. These post-war assessments o f  Argentine consumer tastes are 
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Argentine members and then gradually transformed until the English 
element was frozen out.161
It appears the British manner of setting themselves visibly apart, yet remaining 
largely accessible, gave them a social distinction or exclusivity that became desired and 
thus imitated. Speaking of what were first considered British idiosyncrasies, Koebel 
admitted, “It is true that for generations the man of the Iberian stock took some pleasure 
in referring to the Northerner as the loco Ingles—the mad Englishman.” However, it was 
not in derogatory manner, “the adjective, emitted in jocular resignation, was devoid of 
sting; for at all times the Iberian considered the other an honest loco, and now for more 
than a generation he has joined him in his madness—in almost all forms, from hygiene 
and social clubs to the cult of balls [soccer]! Moreover is not the word of an 
Enlgishman—Palabra de un Inglezl— an oath in itself? Is not the expression Hora 
Inglessa an appeal to punctuality?”162 After taking joy in the prevalence of tastes for 
English goods and styles in Argentina, Bland asserted: “All this is very grateful, an 
abiding testimony to the virtue of those pioneers of bygone days, traders and estancieros,
1 f i 'X  • •who built on the sure foundations the tradition of the palabra d ’Ingles.” British
observers believed their acceptance in Southern Cone society was facilitated, if not the 
product, of their ‘past achievements’ and ‘character’—all coalescing into one prestige 
supporting reputation.
Throughout the First Word War era the British never let down this distinction 
they had partly earned and partly constructed for themselves. During the war the Times 
o f Argentina lambasted British commercial rigidity, but did concede “that British
161 Kelly, The Ruling Few, 114-15.
162 Koebel, British Exploits in South Am erica, 528-29
163 Bland, Men, Manners and M orals, 97.
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businessmen have a reputation for honesty and straightforwardness which is not exceeded 
by any nationality.”164 South Americans often accepted these sentiments, participating in 
the same discursive dialog. In the sixth month of the war La Prensa commented on “the 
world-wide faith which the British Empire inspires.”165 In Britain during his European 
tour in the summer of 1922, Argentine President-Elect Alvear was feted for several days. 
At a farewell luncheon in which speeches and toasts were reciprocated between Alvear 
and Prime Minister David Lloyd George, Alvear praised the stereotypical characteristics 
of British ‘character’: “We admire your energy, your constancy, your calmness.
Tolerant, loyal, generous, respectful of the dignity of others because you mean your own 
to be respected, you form that type of man honoured and known throughout the world 
under the name of gentleman.”166 A Chilean’s July 1915 letter to the South American 
Journal echoed this Argentine confidence or ‘faith’ in the British: “The Chilians will 
never forget their indebtedness to France and England. While it is true that Englishmen 
have found Chile a profitable country to them from a financial standpoint, it is equally 
true that they have not been content to selfishly drain our country of its riches and
1 7abandon it after satisfying themselves, as very often happens.” In contemplating the 
postwar trade battle that would erupt, the Uruguayan Minister to Britain, Pedro Cosio 
believed the most beneficial of all Britain’s commercial strengths was its “traditional
164 Times o f  Argentina  (Buenos Aires) quoted in South American Journal, December 16, 1916, 489. In 
1921 the Journal chastised British manufacturers for not taking full advantage o f  British commercial 
prestige, since, “There is every reason to believe that our old reputation for good and honest trading is an 
asset which still belongs to us.” “British Trade Push,” Ibid., October 15, 1921, 301-2.
165 La Prensa  quoted in Ibid., February 27, 1915.
166 South American Journal, July 29, 1922, 88-9.
167 Ibid., July 10, 1915, 23. The South American Journal observed that this trust in the British was 
manifested by “Chilian statesmen cling[ing] to their commercial and financial liens with the Old World.” 
It, however, admitted, “This feeling may be more sentimental than practical.” Ibid., February 10, 1917, 
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reputation for honesty and fair dealing.”168 Until a coup in the mid-1920s, Chilean 
political stability through much of the nineteenth and early twentieth century gave it 
cause to refer to itself with the treasured label, ‘the England of South America.’169 When 
speeches were made at the dedication of a statue of George Canning upon the Prince of 
Wales’s 1925 Visit to Chile, former longtime Chilean Minister to Britain Augustin 
Edwards exclaimed, “For a century British commerce has enjoyed in America the 
prestige which it has acquired through its legendary honesty.”170
This British ‘reputation’ contrasted with what the South American Journal termed 
“‘yanqui bluff,’ a [South American] phrase used for North American methods to 
distinguish them from ‘palabra Inglesa.’”171 An American business writer lamented the 
“unwarranted idea that the Yankee is tricky in all his dealings” was prevalent in Latin 
America.172 This dilemma of a poor public image and ill reputed character was echoed 
by an author for The American Economic Review, “Many of the people in South 
America.. .have distrusted our purpose, and feared our power.” He had been told “at one 
important place in South America, that until within a comparatively few years when an 
American appeared in their city as a settler, he was usually asked what his name used to 
be.”173 Latin American perceptions of American character deficiencies, led the South
168 M ontevideo Times quoted in Ibid., January 12, 1918, 24.
169 Mayo, “The British Communities in Nineteenth-Century Chile,” 201-2. Referencing Chile as the 
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American Journal to believe predominant European influence, including British, was 
quite safe for years to come.174
CONCLUSIONS ON BRITISH LEGACY AND CHARACTER
Britain was not burdened by its past, but rather propelled by it. No other foreign 
power could draw on the pride of the revolutionary era like the British did in the Plata or 
Chilean coast. The recognition of past British accomplishments gave the British strength 
in the present and helped persuade themselves and others that greatness was also in store 
for the future. The stereotyping of British ‘character’ as honest, dependable and always 
within respectable bounds was also integral to British prestige. Well into the twentieth 
century, acting British or emulating the British, if only in certain spheres of life, was felt 
to be desirable to many in the Southern Cone. Sports were to prove a dynamic cultural 
front in the twentieth century and the British, so to speak, got the ball rolling. Sports 
allowed British ‘fair play’ to be seen in person, gave justification for Anglo-South 
American interchange through reciprocating team tours, helped proliferate the English 
language, and steered South Americans to stores like Harrod’s to buy British sporting 
equipment.
174 In a 1916 leading article entitled “South America After the War,” the newspaper editorialized: “We 
believe that the future o f  these matters will be controlled entirely by economic factors, and that most o f  the 
expectations that they may be strengthened by common American ties o f  political, ethical or social 
concordance are based upon weak and illusory suppositions....There exist potential influences antagonistic 
to anything approaching exclusive American consolidation, and we believe that the United States will never 
occupy a predominant place in Latin-American sympathies or preferences.” South American Journal, June 
29, 1916, 81-2. This line o f  thought in postwar predictions remained prevalent: “ ...looking at the onerous 
terms which the Americans have demanded [in Latin American business transactions]... it may be doubted 
if  the United States will supplant Great Britain to the extent which Americans hope when the war is over, 
especially in view o f  the general distrust o f  the United States in South America.” Ibid., January 10, 1917, 
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CHAPTER IV
THE PRESTIGE OF AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK 
The British monthly Review o f  the River Plate (Buenos Aires) in 1915 described 
the British agricultural edifice in the Plata: “Not less than 100 British companies, of 
varying importance, have placed very large sums in Argentine rural exploitations, whilst 
the number of British estancieros is considerable. The same cannot be yet said of any 
other nation. Although there are numerous foreigners devoting their energies to this class 
of business, non-English firms owning rural establishments are non existent, or 
practically so.” It proudly concluded, “The Anglo-Saxon race is eminently agricultural 
and pastoral.”175 Similar to other sectors, such as banking or railways, pastoral 
agriculture reinforced the notion that British influence was overwhelmingly beneficial 
among South Americans and Britons themselves. The development of an export 
economy centering on pastoral products had eighteenth century roots when cattle hides 
from the River Plate Basin satisfied demand elsewhere on the continent and in Europe. 
Augmented by the introduction of large scale sheep-herding in the 1830s, the Plata’s 
exports depended heavily on hides, tallow, and wool. Argentina and Uruguay did not 
become dependent on the British market until the turn of the twentieth century, as 
pastoral goods turned toward the more remunerative sale of meat—a development only 
made possible through political stability, improvements in stock bloodlines, and
•  17  f \  • •refrigeration technology. This was concomitant with farmers cultivating hectares upon
175 Review o f  the River P late  quoted in South American Journal, July 31, 1915, 92.
176 Henry S. Ferns, “Investment and Trade Between Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century” The 
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hectares of grain. All of these commodities required credit, insurance, and sophisticated, 
capital-intensive transport networks by rail and sea.177 Britain’s need for food and the 
Plata’s need for these services and manufactures created what has been termed the 
‘Anglo-Argentine Connection.’178 The cultural influence, and thus prestige, garnered 
through pastoralism should be appended to this ‘connection.’
The typical attack on the British in South America, especially from recent 
scholars, has been that British relations were too business-oriented and not socially or 
culturally driven. For example, Gerald Martin has chastised past British practice in the 
region, arguing that “people do not live by trade alone and do not wish to talk about 
business all the time,” especially in Latin America.179 However, this and other arguments 
that Britain abstained from cultural work or social functions rests on the notion that 
business cannot be embedded up in a larger social and cultural system. This is not 
always the case. In no other sector was this more apparent than in the culture of pastoral 
industries in Argentina, Uruguay, and the temperate southern states of Brazil, particularly 
Sao Paulo.180 Britain was the overwhelming external influence in the livestock sectors of 
cattle and sheep, and, to a lesser degree, in horses. Because these geographic regions 
were largely dependent on pastoral exports, both the rural pampas, where livestock was 
raised on estancias (ranches), and the urban railroad and coastal towns, where livestock 
was transported, processed, and shipped, made these disparate regions interconnected not
177 Lewis, British Railways in Argentina, 1-3, 217-21.
178 Gravil, The Anglo-Argentine Connection. See especially chapter 1.
179 Martin, “Britain’s Cultural Relations with Latin America,” 29; Hennessy, “Argentines, Anglo- 
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only commercially,181 but in a way culturally. In scholarly treatments of Anglo- 
Argentine interchange, this aspect is remarkably absent.182
Sir Reginald Tower explained in his 1912 Annual Report on Argentina, “The 
question of cattle is one of the most important to this country and one at the same time 
vitally interesting the United Kingdom.”183 Great Britain dominated pedigree livestock 
imports more than almost any other pre-war trade sector, save coal. Of Argentina’s 
importation of pedigrees, between 1885 and 1904 Britain provided 87.8 per cent of the 
cattle, 92.2 per cent of the sheep, and 55.4 per cent of the horses (Appendix II, Table 
l) .184 The only hindrance to the trade was the outbreak of foot and mouth in both 
countries, leading to temporary embargos.185 Concomitant to the flow of British breeds 
were British methods, techniques, and ideas on agriculture as well as thousands of 
Britons who became a part of pastoral communities, especially as managers. British ‘past 
achievements’ in Argentine and Uruguayan livestock were indeed considerable, adding 
further to their pastoral reputation, and thus their overall prestige. Scottish and Irish 
colonization on the Plata frontier in the nineteenth century helped introduce pedigree 
lines. Many of these early settlers became assimilated into the population; one observer
181 Arthur P. Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone: Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976), 31-33, 48-9.
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writing in 1920 found of those “who go racing on a Sunday afternoon you find good old 
English, Scotch and Irish names, pronounced a l’espagnole.”
Bloodlines were continually improved for cattle, with the introduction of 
Shorthorns and Herefords; for horses, through Clydesdales, Lincolns, and Hackneys; and 
through superior sheep breeds, such as Leicesters, Lincolns, Southdowns, and
1S7 • tShropshires. Prior to the First World War Merino stud rams and ewes were imported 
in large quantities by British land companies from Australia and New Zealand. Between 
1909 and 1913, 5,915 British breeding-quality sheep stock were imported to Argentina.188 
When Donald Maclenan was feted in 1914 for being a pioneer breeder of Shorthorns in 
Argentina during the 1880s, the South American Journal explained “the vast export trade 
in beef, worth millions of pounds annually, could never have been developed but for the 
importation to that country of good cattle. For these magnificent economic results the 
Republic owes a debt of gratitude to Mr. Maclennan.”189 This improvement of bloodlines 
along British auspices continued well into the interwar years.190 As railways were central 
to the meat business, quality studs and expert breeding practices were critical as well.
The intricacies of livestock directly affected the lives of the estanciero elite, 
whether it involved importing pedigree studs to improve bloodlines, discussing 
preventive veterinary medicine, or planting of fattening grazing grasses. Social occasions
186 Bland, Men, Manners and M orals, 251.
187 Koebel, British Exploits in South America, 496, 499-500; Mulhall, The English in South America, 337, 
408-9, 427-28; South American Journal, January 24, 1914, 151; August 7, 1915, 103;
188 Ibid., November 16, 1912, 573; November 23, 1912, 605; November 30, 1912; 652, December 7, 1912, 
666; February 28, 1914, 285. A special correspondent for the Journal covering Uruguayan wool 
prizewinners at 1918 Bradford, United Kingdom fair, commented: “[I]t will always be an historical fact o f  
which sheep breeders o f  England may well be proud, that the present excellence o f  flocks in other parts o f  
the world is due primarily to an infection o f  blood from their established breeds.” “South American Sheep 
and Wool: British Blood Responsible for General Improvements,” Ibid., September 21, 1918, 182.
189 Ibid., March 7, 1914,310.
190 Clarence F. Jones wrote in 1927: “The introduction o f  pure-bred cattle has been a prime factor in the 
evolution o f  the meat trade... .As in Argentina, the British have had a good part in the improvement o f the 
[Uruguayan cattle] herds.” “The Trade o f  Uruguay” Economic G eography 3 (July 1927): 378f.
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such as livestock shows, horse races, auctions, and veterinary lyceums were both a 
socially prestigious hobby as well as an entrepreneurial-minded pursuit. What Sir David 
Kelly found during his first stint in Argentina in the early 1920s and again in the 1940s 
was that in male conversations, “horses and cattle were certain to infiltrate” at even the 
most recreational of gatherings.191
British influence was ubiquitous in this culture of pastoralism. It entrenched a 
general acceptance of British techniques as being superior. As horseracing grew in 
popularity it followed British practices; starting the race with a gunshot was referred to as 
“a l’anglais.” Races and riding techniques were shifted along British lines, focusing on 
the long gallop instead of short bursts.192 Apparel for such events took their cues from 
the British or was indeed the genuine article.193 One of the founding members of the 
Argentine Rural Association, one of the most important landowner social clubs through 
World War II, was an early British estanciero.194 Robert Whitworth, a Yorkshire 
manufacturer and horse breeder, who served as the hackney horse judge at the National 
Argentine Show in 1909, commented in an interview, “The British nation is esteemed 
above any other [in agriculture], and that there is no prejudice against our people as such 
is proved by the fact that many of the big estancias are managed by Englishmen.” And 
like their urban countrymen, Whitworth emphasized that only “Men of the right sort 
would be welcomed” by the British rural community.195 In a lecture before the Royal 
Colonial Institute in 1914, Herbert Gibson, who would later be decorated for his work as
191 Kelly, The Ruling Few, 124-25
192 Koebel, British Exploits in South America, 496-97.
193 James Bryce, South America: Observations and Impressions (London, 1912): 517-18 quoted in Joslin, A 
Century o f  Banking in Latin America, 98.
194 Mulhall, The English in South America, 608.
195 “A Yorkshireman’s Visit to Argentina,” Yorkshire Herald, excerpted in South American Journal,
January 22, 1910, 105.
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the Royal Wheat Commissioner in Argentina during the First World War, corroborated 
Whitworth’s observations: “It is impossible, we are informed, to travel through the 
Argentine without being struck with how large a share in proportion to their number is 
taken by men of British nationality or origin in the more responsible part of her rural 
industry.”196 He also stressed that those Britons contemplating working in Argentine
1 07agriculture “must be men of education, energy, and intelligence.” The British 
reputation for expertise and character had to be upheld.
Whitworth was not alone. Time after time Britons served as livestock show 
judges,198 traveled in agriculture-pastoral missions,199 and manned booths at 
expositions.200 When Britain sent an official mission, led by Sir Maurice de Bunsen, to 
South America in 1918, pastoralism was not far from the agenda. While in Uruguay, the 
delegation spent some relaxation time on the Finance Minister’s estancia near 
Montevideo. As de Bunsen elaborated, “He is a successful breeder of cattle, from stock 
purchased in England.” In Argentina the Mission visited the Agricultural Museum and 
was officially received by the President of the Rural Society.201 As Rosita Forbes 
traveled the Brazilian state of Sao Paulo, she found the English language pervasive:
196 South American Journal, February 14, 1914, 224.
197 Ibid., February 14, 1914, 224.
198 Ibid., June 14, 1913,762;
199 Agricultural M issions were often reciprocated back and forth during the period. In December o f  1926 
the Argentine Rural Society sent delegates to London. In 1928 the Society invited a Parliamentary Cattle 
M ission, led by the Under Secretary o f  Agriculture, Lord Bledisloe, which had already been preceded by 
the National Farmer Union o f  England. Ibid., December 18, 1926, 370; A.M. Welby, “Current Events for 
the month o f  October,” Buenos Aires, October 31, 1928 in U.S. M ilitary Intelligence Reports, Reel 1 ,416.
200 At the 1910 Argentine Centennial Exhibition in Buenos Aires the British Board o f  Agriculture and 
Fisheries provided a 10,000 square meters indoor and outdoor display touting British livestock, agricultural 
machinery, and agricultural colleges. Designed to evoke a feeling o f  Britishness, the exhibit’s structure had 
a Tudor fa?ade and its large marquee was o f  an Indian motif. South American Journal, January 22, 1910, 
92; April 16, 1910,422.
201 Doc. 8 Sir Maurice de Bunsen to Arthur Balfour, Estancia Martin Chico, Uruguay, May 30, 1918 in 
Correspondence Respecting the British Mission to South America, 14; Doc. 10 Sir Reginald Tower to 
Balfour, Buenos Aires, June 6, 1918 in Ibid., 16.
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“Owing to the initiative of British and American land development or meat companies, it 
is possible to travel many thousand miles speaking only English.”202 That British land 
companies’ properties in Argentina and Brazil totaled 7.2 and 4.7 million hectares, 
respectively, her observation does not seem too exaggerative.
The amount paid at auctions and shows for prized calves and sires, often 
adjudicated by British judges, demonstrated that a socio-cultural element of pride 
influenced cattlemen’s business decisions as much as rational self-interest. At the 
Argentine Rural Show in 1915 a British judge “caused a sensation” by awarding 
champion to a Shorthorn calf of only twenty months; it thus fetched $60,000 (Argentine 
dollars) (£5,240) in the auction that shortly followed. A less handsome, but hardly 
atypical, price of £910 was garnered in 1916 for a Shorthorn bull with all the proceeds 
going to the Agricultural Relief of Allies Fund.204 Reporting on the 1921 Palermo Show, 
the United States Military Attache in Buenos Aires had to concede, “The visiting judges 
sent out by the Royal Agricultural Society of England were all authorities and well 
known breeders of the different classes of animals they judged.” Prizewinners from 
Britain were also highly sought and fetched a premium; one British Shorthorn bull was 
sold and shipped to Argentina in the winter of 1919 for £7,000.
202 Forbes, Eight Republics, 26.
203 In 1913 there were 139 British land companies in South America owning 15.14 million hectares o f  land. 
Though not all holdings were devoted to ranching or agriculture, in Argentina most were. In 1908 British 
companies and British nationals owned 28.6 per cent o f  the Santa Fe province’s total area. A.J. 
Christopher, “Patterns o f  British Overseas Investments in Land, 1885-1913,” Transactions o f  the Institute 
o f  British Geographers 10, no. 4 (1985): 455-62.
204 South American Journal, September 18, 1915, 226; July 15, 1916, 43; October 16, 1926, 346.
205 Military Attach^, “Items o f  Interest— Argentina,” Buenos Aires, September 14, 1921 in U.S. M ilitary 
Intelligence Reports, Reel 4, 715.
206 Such purchases also occurred during the war; a Durham bull that placed First Prize at the 1916 Perth 
show was sold in the Plata for $34,000 (£3,000). Other Plata purchases from the same event ranged 
between $4,000 (£ 350) and $14,000 (£ 1,270). South American Journal, October 28, 1916, 343; January 
17, 1920, 47.
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Because a critical amount of their traffic depended on agricultural and pastoral 
products, British railways in the Plata and Sao Paulo appear to have appreciated and 
participated in this rural culture as well. For example, the Argentine North Eastern 
Railway hired an outside expert in fruit planting to educate farmers in their district; the 
massive Central Argentine Railway distributed pamphlets on crop diversification; and the 
Buenos Aires Western Railway held local maize-growing competitions for prizes of cash 
and agricultural machinery.207 British lines in Uruguay were no less active; they operated 
or funded experimental tree farms, distributed higher yielding wheat strains for free, 
carried emerging crops, such as potatoes, at no cost and acted as an agricultural extension 
office, disseminating information on topics such as pest control.
Because British capital funded much of the major transportation and commercial 
services of the Plata’s food exports, estancieros and farmers were able to place their 
domestic capital into herd, land, and tool improvements rather than “low-yielding 
infrastructure projects” such as railways and port works.209 It was not lost on the Plata 
elite that Britain provided their herds with bloodline improvements, means of conveyance 
to port, and, finally, a consuming market. Prior, during, and after the war the Plata was a 
critical cog in Britain’s Atlantic food economy.210 By 1929 the pastoral linkages had 
become evermore intimate and evermore more critical to the export economy of the Plata. 
Of Argentina’s exports in 1928, Britain purchased 54 per cent of its frozen beef, 94.5 per 
cent of its frozen mutton, and a staggering 99 per cent of its chilled beef. The British
207 South American Journal, October 16, 1926, 353; November 13, 1926, 455;
208 Forbes, Eight Republics, 80.
209 Lewis, British Railways in Argentina 1857-1914, 219.
210 Avner Offer, The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989), Chapters 6, 10, and 15.
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market was also crucial for Argentina cereals.211 As Imperial Preference came closer and 
closer to being a reality in the early 1930s, Argentina’s invaluable British market for beef 
was threatened, and there were no comparable substitutes with continental Europe and 
the United States behind tariff walls.
However, Argentines did not seem overly worried; they seemed to firmly believe 
the meat and grain linkage with Britain was unbreakable. The Argentine Minister of 
Agriculture assured estancieros at the 1932 Rural Society’s Palermo stock show that the 
issue would be resolved satisfactorily, because the “indestructible moral bonds uniting 
the two nations” could never be ruptured.212 A more appropriate setting could probably 
not be found for an expression of such irrational faith in the 4 Anglo-Argentine 
Connection’ than a cattlemen social gathering with decades of tradition. American 
economist Clarence F. Jones believed it to be the same across the Plata. In referring to 
Anglo-Uruguayan trade in 1927, he asserted “no stronger natural bond exists between
213Uruguay and any other country than that between Uruguay and the United Kingdom.”
The Argentine issue was temporarily resolved with the Roco-Runciman Pact of 1933, 
codifying a relationship of relatively stable, closed bilateral trade until the Second World 
War.214 British pastoral repute remained into the 1940s; British Ambassador Sir David 
Kelly spoke at the Rural Society’s centennial celebration of the Shorthorn’s introduction 
from England. Besides the presence of the Argentine President and Minister of
211 Department o f  Overseas Trade, Report on the British Mission to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay 
(London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1930), 21.
212 Secretary o f  Agriculture Antonia de Tomaso quoted in Tulchin, Argentina and the United States, 54.
213 Clarence F. Jones, “The Trade o f  Uruguay,” 377.
214 Paul Goodwin, “Anglo-Argentine Commercial Relations: A  Private Sector View, 1922-43,” The 
H ispanic American H istorical Review  61 (February 1981): 43-7; Tulchin, Argentina and the United States, 
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Agriculture the crowd was over 2,000. The entire affair was “calculated to enhance our 
prestige” among the elite and the public, as Sir David put it.215
Joseph Tulchin has argued that Argentine government thinking, well into the 
1930s, focused on maintaining its politico-economic “commitments to Europe and the 
international division of labor.” Even the nationalism of radical Argentine President 
Hipolito Yrigoyen that made so many Britons uncomfortable, “never questioned the
9 1 f\Anglophile assumptions underlying the traditional policy” of international trade. The 
Plata sought a postwar that mimicked the comfortable belle epoque. The ‘cultural 
internationalism’217 of pastoralism deserves importance when explaining the resilience of 
British influence in the region and why 1930s Argentina had a “conservative, Anglophile, 
estanciero regime.”218 The constant cross-directional flow of experts, fashions, and ideas 
between British and Plata pastoral interests was accompanied with its respective social 
occasions, offering the British an ability to influence not only the business of the estancia 
and stockyard but its culture as well. In many respects British prestige in the Plata could 
be said at times to rest on four hooves.
215 Kelly, The Ruling Few, 293-94.
2,6 Tulchin, Argentina and the United States, 27.
217 Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1997).
218 Knight, “Latin America,” 634.
CHAPTER V
MONITORING AND ENHANCING BRITISH PRESTIGE 
Of scholars who have analyzed the British presence in Latin America, one of the 
most acclaimed and prolific has been D.C.M. Platt and he has concluded, “Trade, in fact,
 ^1 Q
was the beginning and the end of British diplomacy in Latin America.” This statement 
is echoed in the Annual Reports of British legations and embassies immediately before 
the First World War into the early 1920s. Reginald Tower, the British minister to 
Argentina, opened his 1913 Annual Report, thus: “I take it that the machinery of 
Government, the composition of the Cabinet, the actions of the provincial governors and 
the like possesses little or no interest to His Majesty’s Government. It is only 
commercial development of the republics that we desire, and it is natural that in the
OJAUnited Kingdom results should be looked for.” To the Foreign Office in London, 
primarily concerned with policy formulation on a global scale, trade was the “beginning 
and the end of British diplomacy in Latin America,” but for minister Tower and his 
colleagues in South America it was not so simple. Sustaining “results” for London 
required a jack-of-all-trades, a formal diplomat who could conduct official foreign policy; 
a lobbyist who could advocate British interests to politicians; a knowledgeable tracker of 
the economy; and, with implications on all these responsibilities, a public relations expert 
who monitored, upheld, and enhanced British prestige.221 This required extensive
219 Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 352.
220 Doc. 54 Reginald Tower to Sir Edward Grey, “Annual Report for Argentine Republic for the Year 
1913”, Buenos Aires, 1 January 1914, in Philip, British Documents on Foreign, “Latin America 1845- 
1914,” Vol. 9, 292.
221 “The work o f  this Embassy,” explained the British Ambassador to Brazil in 1921, “is concerned not 
only with the ordinary diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries, but with the affairs 
o f  the great British institutions in this country: the banks, the railways, and the public utility undertakings.”
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knowledge of South American political systems and the diligent maintenance of 
professional and social networks. The sizable British communities of the Southern Cone 
looked to him as a leader222 and directly and indirectly worked with him to cultivate 
British prestige. As the British Minister to Cuba realized trade “depends a good deal on 
[the] sentiment” of local elites and consumers.223 In most capitals he was the top British 
citizen, requiring a socialite existence among business, cultural, and political movers and 
shakers.224 Personality and etiquette mattered; the last sentence in a serious and scholarly 
American book on Latin American business read: “For a little sentiment goes a long way 
with the Latin races.” British diplomats, businessmen, and journalists largely did not 
admire South Americans privately,226 but fawned over them at times so publicly provides
Doc. 37. Sir John Tilley, “Brazil, Annual Report, 1921,” 20 February 1922, in Philip, British Documents on 
Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939”, Vol. 3, 50.
222 Speaking o f  the many meetings, grand openings, and events o f  the British organizations, clubs, and 
charitable institutions in Argentina, Sir Reginald commented, “At these ceremonies the British Minister is 
usually expected to appear, and generally to preside at the numerous committee, general, and other 
meetings connected with the community.” Britons both wanted and expected their onsite authority figure to 
play an active, albeit non-authoritarian, role in their lives. Doc. 52 Sir Reginald Tower “Annual Report on 
the. Argentine Republic for the year 1912,” Buenos Aires, January 1913 in Philip, British Documents on 
Foreign Affairs, “Latin American 1845-1914” Vol. 9, 256.
223 Doc. 28.H. G. Haggard, “Annual Report on Cuba for 1921”, 8 May 1922 in Philip, British Documents 
on Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, 372.
224 Sir David Kelly, third secretary to Argentina in the early 1920s and later Ambassador in the early 1940s, 
was certain, that in Latin America, “Human relations are what really count— ‘Es la persona que cuenta.’” 
Kelly, The Ruling Few, 7. This view was widely shared by Britons as well as Americans. Another British 
diplomat in South America, Sir Robert Marett, professed, “The loyalties o f  a Latin American are to people 
rather than institutions.. .In Latin American business life the ‘old boy net-work’ is o f  immense importance.” 
Marett, Latin America, 185. An American business expert concurred, concluding “The amount o f  flattery 
that he will stand for and assimilate is beyond belief.” Aughinbaugh, 243-44.
225 Warshaw, The New Latin America, 358. One could find the same advice in the 1917 edition o f  
Encyclopedia o f  Latin A m erica: “The merchant in most parts o f Latin America does not take to the idea o f  
buying and selling impersonally...but considers that a commercial relation ordinarily involves a certain 
social relation as w e ll ...” Otto Wilson, “Trade Methods for Latin America” in Encyclopedia o f  Latin 
America, eds. Marrion W ilcox and George Edwin Rines (New York: Encyclopedia Americana, 1917), 670- 
1. This could found in postwar United States Department o f  Commerce handbooks. P.L. Bell advised 
American businessmen to “endeavor to cement personal relations in every way possib le.. .to the maximum 
extent.” Columbia: A Commercial and Industrial Handbook  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1921), 17.
226 As Joseph Smith found, “In general, the statements o f  British diplomats on Latin American affairs and 
politicians were rather scathing.” Illusions o f  Conflict: Anglo-American Diplom acy Toward Latin America, 
1865-1896  (University o f  Pittsburgh Press, 1979), 14.
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proof that a policy of prestige was consistently pursued. Appearances had to be kept, no 
matter who was the target audience.
Generally speaking, both the British ministers and community felt their prestige 
within Southern Cone republics, despite numerous challenges from the United States and 
Germany, remained unassailable during the years in question. However, this did not 
preclude them from trying to cultivate prestige through various gestures, events, and 
ceremonies. British ministers and British interests appreciated prestige as a valuable tool 
and thus monitored it closely. The role played by British ministers in the opening 
festivities of British undertakings in South America and the orchestrated activities 
between the minister and the Royal Navy in cultivating British naval prestige will be 
examined.
The cultivation of prestige through diplomacy comported well with British 
strengths, but was also resorted to out of weakness. An angry letter to The Times 
(London) complained, “The British trade in the Argentine wants the diplomatic support 
of his Government.”227 The press argued this was in marked contrast to the efforts it saw 
being expended by governments of United States and Germany in furthering their 
trade 228 Interestingly, British ministers appreciated the complaints of the business 
community. Their actual tools to exert power over South American governments were
227 As the correspondent complained, British rivals, especially France, the United States, and Germany 
were aided by their diplomats’ capability to negotiate a “flexible tariff.” “The only one who does 
nothing— and can do nothing— is the British Minister, who has nothing to offer. He cannot trade because 
his Government carefully emptied his pockets before they sent him to market.” “Letter to the Times,” 
South American Journal, 5 February 1910, 163. Well into the First World War The South American 
Journal continually lambasted the Foreign O ffice’s “laissez faire” policy stances as “submissive.” It 
lamented, “If we are to judge by the action o f  the people in Downing Street, it is the business o f  England to 
hold the candle for the United States.” “British Trade with Central America,” Ibid., 7 May 1910, 520; “Our 
Submissive Foreign O ffice,” September 1910, 266.
228 “The United States and South American Trade,” in Ibid., 267-68; “The Kaiser Courteous,” September 
10, 1910, 295; July 1, 1911; “The United States and Latin America,” August 19, 1911,210; “United States 
Diplomacy in Latin America,” April 20, 1912, 458; August 10, 1912, 159
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limited; they did not have the authority to prevent loans, cut off British immigration, or 
negotiate tariffs. “[T]herefore,” reported the Brazilian Legation, we “reply upon the 
weight that the British name carries throughout the world and on the personal relations of 
the head of the mission and his staff with the Ministers of State and various Government 
Officials.”229 The thrust of British public relations was to play on British legacy and 
‘character’ in the region as well as stress British power in the present and its potentialities 
for the future.
British ministers’ perception of their nation’s primary presence in South America 
was reflected in their comments on British prestige. In the 1913 Annual Report on Chile, 
the British minister proudly reported, “I think it is not too much to say that of all the 
foreign nations, England is perhaps the best liked in Chile.” Despite an influx of
0 incompetition, “the Englishman occupies a privileged position in Chile.” Similar 
assessments were made in Argentina and Uruguay. During the war years and 
afterward, British confidence in their prestige rarely wavered. Despite losing major 
shares of trade to United States during the war years (Appendix III, Tables 10, 11, and 
12), Britain’s diplomatic corps perceived commercial reputation as their nation’s most 
durable, and at the time, valuable asset. Comparing themselves to their rivals, especially
229 Doc. 39 Malcolm Arnold Robertson, “Annual Report Brazil for the year 1913,” Petropolis, Brazil, 
January 15, 1914 in Philip, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1845-1914” vol. 9, 157.
230 No. 56. Allen C. Kerr to Sir Edward Grey, “Annual Report on Chile for the Year 1913”, Chile, 10 
March 1914, in Philip, British Documents on Foreign Affairs “Latin America 1845-1914”, Vol. 9, 336.
231 In the conclusion to his 1913 Annual Report on Argentina, Sir Reginald Tower asserted, “I have said 
that optimism is the rule in this country. A general blind faith in the future [for British interests] is 
everywhere apparent.” Doc. 52 Tower to Sir Edward Grey, “Annual Report o f  Argentine Republic for the 
Year 1912”, Buenos Ayres, 3 January 1913, in Ibid., 272.
232 Speaking o f  British prestige in Uruguay prior to the war, W.H. Koebel praised Robert J. Kennedy, the 
British Minister to Uruguay: “There can be no doubt, moreover, that the present satisfactory phase is very 
largely due to the efforts o f  Mr. R.J. Kennedy, the British Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy 
Extraordinary, whose tact and conscientious ability have won for him respect and popularity on the part o f  
Uruguayans and resident British alike— a consummation to which it is the lot o f  sufficiently few ministers 
to attain.” Koebel, Uruguay, 34.
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the United States, reinforced the optimism of British businessmen, diplomats, and 
commercial journalists. The British minister to Brazil in 1915 reported on both rigorous 
American efforts and successes to expand trade, but concluded, “Yet I doubt whether 
their business methods are wholly suitable to South America, and I should have little fear 
of them if we could make a serious effort ourselves.” He suggested that the sending of a 
goodwill mission “to see the country, to judge personally of its potentialities and to get 
into touch with the right people.. .would flatter Brazilian vanity and bear good fruit.”
This was to come to all of South America with the Sir Maurice de Bunsen Mission of 
1918.234
The resources expended in winning the Great War were considerable for the 
British Empire; this had incredible economic repercussions. Britain was no longer a 
net creditor with the United States, owing her $4.7 billion. This debt, lower gold 
reserves, and currency instability (the gold standard was dropped in 1919) led the Bank 
of England and Treasury to implement stringent fiscal policies.236 The loss paid by the 
British expatriate communities in blood was considerable as well.237 As the world
233 Doc. 24. Robertson to Sir Edward Grey, Rio de Janeiro, 23 April 1915, in Philip, British Documents on 
Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939,” Vol. 1, 29-30.
234 After his extensive tour, Sir Maurice informed the Foreign Office with undoubtedly good news, “I saw  
enough o f  the British Legations at the different capitals to lead me to believe that, taking it all round, no 
Government is better represented than the British in these countries. The British Legation is generally the 
centre o f  the Allied [Patriotic] Committees. Everywhere it is looked up to and respected.” Doc. 25 Sir 
Maurice to Balfour, Steamship Megantic, September 18, 1918, in Correspondence Respecting the British 
M ission to South America, 30.
235 As economic historian Eric Hobsbawm described the situation, “The single liberal world economy, 
theoretically self-regulating, but in fact requiring the semi-automatic switchboard o f  Britain collapsed 
between the wars.” Industry and Empire (New York: N ew  Press, 1999): xiii.
236 Reinstituting the gold standard in 1925 with pound sterling set at $4.86 was considerably arduous. 
Enforcing strict economy resulted in less loan floatation in London. From 1924 to 1930 London issued 
£132 million in new capital to Latin America. This was only one-third o f  Manhattan issuances to Latin 
American governments alone. Frank C. Costigliola, “Anglo-American Financial Rivalry in the 1920s” Vol. 
37 (December, 1977): 914; Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000, 453-60; Miller, Britain and  
Latin America, 186.
237 Out o f  a male population o f  about 19,500, the British Argentine community sent 4,852 to serve in 
British Empire forces— 528 were killed or died in service. Among what came to be called the “River Plate
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economy tried to put itself back together under the aegis of Anglo-American leadership, 
the British commercial recovery in Latin American would be difficult.
A prime difficulty revolved around the fact that the “City” was no longer the 
financial capital of the world. London’s strongest card in Latin America had been its 
ability to supply fresh investments continually.238 A 1920 Foreign Office memorandum 
on protecting and advancing British Latin American commercial interests commented, 
“[W]e have in the past been able to use a very effective weapon of which we shall be 
deprived in the near future, namely, the control of surplus funds for investment
9*30abroad.” Lacking what it termed the “power of the purse,” British diplomats would 
need to exploit their belief that Latin American republics were “markedly accessible to 
flattery and personal influence... .It follows that the personality of our diplomatic 
representatives [in South America] makes possibly more difference than it would in large 
and more highly developed countries.”240 In the postwar decade, despite the horrendous 
damage wrought by the war, British “policy-makers did not accept that Britain’s future 
lay behind her after 1914.”241 Britain was retooling its methods; the maintenance and 
utilization of British prestige and reputation became even more official policy in the
Contingent,” there were 1,704 officers and 820 non-commissioned officers. They were an extremely 
skilled cohort, reflecting further on the composition o f  the British community. Though all Southern Cone 
nations sent sizable groups o f  British volunteers, the losses among the Argentine staffs o f  British banks are 
telling. See “Volunteers from Argentina,” in Holder, Activities o f  the British Community, especially 118-9.
238 Miller, Britain and Latin America , 146.
239 The diplomatic corps would need to take a more active role in protecting British interests as compared to 
laissez faire-leaning pre-war practices. In a statement o f  stiffened resolve, the memorandum proclaimed, 
“In the sphere o f  protection, however, it would appear that the Foreign Office must remain the supreme 
authority, especially in countries like Latin America.” Doc. 52. R.S. Report, “The Protection o f  British 
Interests in Latin America,” 1920, in Philip, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914- 
1939,” Vol. 1 ,342.
240 However, the Foreign Office found in the years 1910 to 1920 “the best men in the [Foreign] Service 
have not been sent to South America. Considering our great need during the period o f reconstruction for 
securing the greatest possible return on our investment abroad, it maybe hoped that this tradition will not be 
continued.” Ibid., 341-342.
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1920s. The United States might have concrete advantages over a war-bedraggled Britain, 
but long-held British commercial reputation and recently-acquired American ill repute 
would drive customers back to tried-and-true British suppliers and service brokers. At 
least that’s what British interests hoped as they tried to use “flattery and personal
949influence” more and more.
The large republics of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were of primary concern. 
British prestige was felt to be resilient in Argentina, favored by their legacy and heavily
949entrenched business operations. In postwar Brazil British ministers expressed similar 
feelings, for example Sir Ralph Paget’s 1919 Report asserted: “I was assured by the 
editor of the Paiz that at no time in the history of Brazil had British prestige stood higher 
than at the present moment.”244 “I am convinced,” wrote the British Minister, “that 
British methods of doing business and British goods are infinitely more to the liking of 
Brazilians than are American ways and American products.”245 ‘Sentiment’ disfavored 
‘Yankees’ according to H.G. Chilton. In his 1920 Report London was told, “The United 
States and her citizens are undoubtedly unpopular in Brazil to-day.”246 In his Annual
242 The South American Journal professed, “The British name and prestige is still a magnificent factor in 
Latin-America.... We must, however, be determined to put our ‘back’ into the business and throw o ff our 
former lethargy and laissez fa ire , remembering that we are practically opening a new chapter in our 
commercial history.” October 19, 1918, 246.
243 British Minister Ronald Macleay reported, “The Argentine is perhaps unique in the presence o f  a British 
resident community, which in virtue o f  its commercial importance and traditional prestige dating from the 
pioneer days, has a really important influence in the life o f  the country.” Doc. 35 J.W.R. Macleay, “Annual 
Report on the Argentine Republic for the year 1919,” Buenos Aires, April 7, 1920 in British Document in 
British Documents on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939,” Vol. 1, 160. In his report a year later, 
M acleay reiterated similar themes: “[T]hroughout the year public opinion in general has not been friendly 
to the United States... [,]principally due to the dishonest and unscrupulous behaviour o f  numerous 
American exporting houses.” Doc. 45 J.W.R. Macleay, “Argentine Republic, Annual Report for 1920,” 
Buenos Aires, March 7, 1921 in Ibid., 184.
244 Paget also stressed, “It is true that American commercial men are not popular.” “Annual Report on 
Brazil for the year 1919,” April 5, 1920, in Ibid., 62-3.
245 Doc. 4 H.G. Chilton to Earl Curzon, 14 December 1920, in Philip, British Documents on Foreign 
Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939”, Vol. 3, 3.
246 Chilton also reported, “Great Britain enjoys a considerable amount o f  prestige in this country, which 
undoubtedly sincerely admires us for the part we played during the war.” Doc. 48. H.G. Chilton, “Brazil,
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Report on Chile for 1919, J.C.T. Vaughan professed, “Great Britain undoubtedly enjoys 
the position of first favourite among foreign nations, and she certainly deserves it, as 
Britons and men of British extraction have done more for the country than those of any
747 74ftother nationality.” Vaughan echoed these evaluations regularly. British ministers 
felt their prewar prestige was intact, if not enhanced by the war, thus a postwar 
commercial recovery was believed to be entirely possible. Such confidence stemmed 
from consistent monitoring of prestige. However, British ministers could do more than 
just monitor.
ENHANCING PRESTIGE THROUGH BRICK AND MORTAR
A hitherto unacknowledged aspect of British public relations, especially during 
the First World War, was the construction and grand openings of British-company 
buildings or services in Southern Cone urban areas. Excellent examples were the series 
of completions by British businesses in Buenos Aires. Each was capped with opening 
ceremonies replete with speeches, press, and politicians. At every occasion the British 
Minister, Sir Reginald Tower, was present, often directing the festivities. These events
Annual Report for the year 1920,” 16 February 1921, in Philip, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
1,233-4.
247 Doc. 32. J.C.T. Vaughan, “Annual Report on Chile for the year 1919,” 20 March 1920, in Ibid., 94.
248 In the immediate postwar period, Vaughan reported from Chile that “‘Yankees’ are not popular in this 
country.. .due partly to distrust and partly to resentment at the patronizing attitude” o f the United States. 
Anglo-Chilean bonds, however, were reinforced through various formal and informal social functions. The 
Chilean Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs held a banquet for the British legation at the “Union Club o f  about 150 
covers, which was attended by all the leading Chilean statesmen, and to which heads o f  the Foreign 
M issions were invited.” Besides a preeminent commercial and foreign policy presence, Britain was felt to 
enjoy an ideological favoritism in Chile too. Vaughan glowed, “I believe it is not to Spain that Chile— I do 
not like to say South America— looks for ultimate support in defense o f  her liberties in the future, but to the 
champion o f  Liberalism— Great Britain.” Doc. 49. J.C.T. Vaughan, “Annual Report on Chile for 1920,” 
February 25, 1921, in Ibid., 259-260; Doc. 32. Vaughan, “Annual Report on Chile for the year 1919,” 
March 20, 1920, in Ibid., 94; Doc. 43 Vaughan to Earl Curzon, Santiago, Chile, December 31, 1920, in 
Ibid., 172-173.
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gave Britain valuable official and public attention to help rebut German propaganda and 
trumpet the British legacy in Argentina.
The Buenos Aires correspondent for the South American Journal wrote on the 
flurry of British wartime building activity in November 1915: “British capital has 
adorned the city with two handsome buildings, one being the new Central Argentine 
Railway Station at Retiro, and the other the Anglo-South American Bank in Calle 
Reconquista... .The Station is reputed to be the finest in existence in any country; it is 
replete with accommodation and convenience of every kind.” 249 The massive and ornate 
Retiro Station located on the aptly-named Plazo Britannico opened in August 1915. Sir 
Reginald accompanied Argentine President Vitorino de la Plaza and other politicians. M. 
Mayano, the Argentine Minister of Public Works, in his keynote address spoke to the 
effect of such visible signs of British capital and industry: “If there is any doubt of the 
strong and intimate ties in which these [railway] companies are bound to the national life 
and expansion of national progress, such doubt must decidedly disappear when 
contemplating such examples of activity and power.”250 The British message was simple; 
Britain had helped develop Argentina, was developing her now, and would do so in the 
future, and native politicians were only concurring with the idea.
Twelve months later, in August 1916, another Central Railway project completion 
was organized as a major public event. The Argentine President, Minister Tower, the 
diplomatic corps, politicians, and society elites crowded into the Retiro Station once 
again. On platform number 3, the opening of the electric train service between the Retiro
249 South American Journal, September 4, 1915, 187; December 4, 1915, 449.
250 “Opening o f  the N ew  Retiro Station,” in Holder, Activities o f  The British Community, 261-2. For a 
partial listing o f  British suppliers and contractors associated with the project, see South American Journal, 
September 28, 1912,351.
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Station and the city Tigre was given jubilant fanfare. The Argentine president of the 
company’s local board of directors echoed the Minister of Public Works the year before, 
“This system which we are now inaugurating further reveals the power of British capital 
and industry, which in spite of the European conflagration have managed to fulfill their 
contracts.” Moyano’s speech followed; he spoke on the modernity of the service and 
showered compliments on the railway company and its Retiro Station. Minister Tower 
gave the final address. It was a history lesson of British rails and capital coming to 
Argentina for decades. Tower skillfully turned the British legacy of “progress” around to 
lay compliments on Argentina as well: “The British investor was content with the low 
rate of interest from Argentine railways because he was sure of the safety of his 
investment. He placed his savings so freely and so cheaply at the disposal of the 
Argentine Republic because of his confidence” in it. Discussion of British legacy shifted 
to the other pillar of prestige, British character: “The Argentine people and Government, 
on their side, have had an opportunity of testing the character and methods of British 
enterprise. They have been brought into contact with all that is best in British finance
OC1
and commerce;.. .they can say whether the result has been satisfactory.” The 
Argentine elite were, indeed, evincing their satisfaction once again.
British construction garnered attendance at the Argentine President Plaza once 
more with the unveiling of the British community’s 1910 Centennial gift.252 On May 24,
251 “Electrification o f  the Central Argentine Railway,” in Holder, Activities o f  the British Community, 270- 
2 .
252 During the winter o f  1909-10 the British community in Argentina formed a committee under the 
leadership o f  the British Minister, Walter Townley, to build a monument for the occasion. They decided 
upon “an Ornamental Clock Tower.” Out o f  eighteen design submissions, Ambrose M. Poynter o f  the 
Royal Institute o f Architects won. As the London representative o f  the committee explained in a 
November 8, 1909 letter to the South American Journal, “Such a memorial, occupying so prominent a 
position, will be an object o f  both public utility and interest, and serve as a perpetual reminder, not only o f  
British appreciation o f  the commercial advantages which Argentina offers to British enterprise, but also o f
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1916, across from the Retiro Station in the center of the Plaza Britannico, Sir Reginald 
unveiled a clock tower built exclusively from British donors; the total cost was over 
£30,000. Still standing today, the Elizabethan four-sided clock tower was complete with 
chiming bells, an electric lift to an observation deck, and interior paneling. Its location in 
the park square accentuated its height of 207 feet to a weather vane of a three-masted 
British sailing ship. It was meant to be a generous gift of permanence and functionality.1 
Staying true to its location, the structure was to be obviously British. Sir Reginald told 
the crowd in Spanish: “We decided unanimously that the construction should be entirely 
British; British in character, British in substance.” The Elizabethan motif set the context 
for the minister to insert elements of the British legacy midway through his speech with 
the exploits of Sir Francis Drake in the Plata. Sir Reginald did not conclude his remarks 
without mentioning, naturally, the service of Admiral Brown, Britain’s recognition of the 
republic, and the early roots of Anglo-Argentine commerce. The Argentine Minister of 
Foreign Affairs gave the reply, hitting conventional legacy elements as well; laudatory 
references were made to George Canning, the amount of British investments in the 
country, “Parliament and the Habeas Corpus Act,” and the British Empire.
This all starkly contrasted with the rest of the city’s “paralyzed” construction due 
to the war-induced building materials shortage. A correspondent reported, “Only the
the benefits which the Argentine Republic has derived from such enterprise.” Among the largest donors 
were the ‘big four’ British railroads in Argentina, each subscribing £2,500. British banks, estancias, 
merchant houses, and other concerns fill the donor rolls. A scale model was placed on display during the 
centennial and the foundation stone laid with a silver trowel later presented to the Argentine Minister o f  the 
Interior. South American Journal, January 8, 1910, 33-4; March 16, 1910, 340; June 11, 1910, 653; March 
4, 1911, 249. The donor lists were published in Ibid., February 10, 1910, 189; April 2, 1910, 373-4. They 
were intended, as the committee explained, “as a reminder to these who have no yet contributed to this 
Memorial.”
253 “The British Memorial Clock Tower,” in Holder, Activities o f  the British Community, 263-7; South 
American Journal, June 3, 1916, 479; June 15, 1916, 48. The South American Journal’s Buenos Aires 
correspondent reported, “the sound o f  the [tower’s] great bell is now heard regularly in a large portion o f  
the city.”
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metallic framework of the great building for the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company is 
being constructed.” As progress towards its completion kept moving, so did the ships of 
its owner at the docks of Buenos Aires despite the war. Continuity and perseverance was 
the message imparted once again. It provided another soiree in which the British 
Minister and Argentines could exchange complements, express their optimism for 
Argentina’s future and trumpet British prestige elements.254 The tall triangular structure 
was aptly named the Edificio Britananico. Besides holding the offices of all the primary 
British shipping companies, its entire sixth floor housed the British legation and 
consulate; the official London bankers for the Argentine government, the House of 
Barings, were located two floors down.255 During the 1920s the localization of such 
powerful and prestigious interests under one impressive roof had to redound with 
intangible benefit for the British.
No other external power, even the United States, was able to produce such visible 
concrete manifestations of wealth in Buenos Aires during the war years than the 
British.256 Each opening was an orchestrated public relations event between the British 
state’s onsite agent and private British interests. The attention and participation at these
254 South American Journal, December 18, 1915, 494; May 6, 1916, 403. The newspaper reported that Sir 
Reginald Tower’s speech “was very warmly applauded.”
255 “Chronological References,” in Holder, Activities o f  the British Community, 227; Kelly, 128-9; South 
American Journal, June 8, 1918, 361. In addition to the Royal M ail’s offices, the building also contained 
its large subsidiary shipping lines o f  Lamport and Holt and the Nelson Line.
256 Other high visibility construction works by British concerns included the Anglo-Argentine Tramways 
wartime extension o f  their line between the suburb o f  Quilmes and Plaza de Mayo. Work that begun late in 
the war finished by the end o f  1919 for Harrod’s new department store at the prominent intersection o f  
Calle San Martin and Cordoba. The eight floor building had 643 feet o f  sidewalk frontage to display its 
wares and twelve acres o f  floor space. At the time it was the largest and most modem retail store in South 
America, boasting the motto: “Everything under one roof.” Its tearoom became a popular destination for 
Britons and Argentines, especially ladies. As the company’s chairman boasted in 1920, “Our stores system  
has brought about a change in the social life o f  the [Argentine] women., who were seldom seen about in 
public. N ow  afternoon tea at the [Harrod’s] Stores is one o f  the social functions.” A multilevel store was 
also opened in Santiago, Chile in the summer o f  1920. South American Journal, December 5, 1914, 397; 
December 6, 1919, 469; January 24, 1920, 69; November 6, 1920, 366-7; August 14, 1920, 124.
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events provided a free venue to put British prestige on display and thus enhance it. The 
overall message was the longevity of the British presence and its contribution to 
Argentina’s development at every step. As time and progress went on, British capital, 
industry, and construction went along with it. Argentines were being reassured that, like 
their past, Britain would figure positively in their future. Both believed it steadfastly.
This notion would not go away for at least two more decades. It was also an indirect jab 
at the relatively recent arrival of Germany and the United States on the Argentine scene. 
What it certainly reveals is a British public relations campaign to cultivate prestige with 
the urban populace and Argentine elite. During what were years of overall stagnation 
and occasional regression for British interests in Argentina, high profile events helped 
stem that impression. Since the subject of these commemorations were all visually 
prominent and provided public functions, it can be assumed the effect produced longevity 
for British aims.
A PRESTIGE THAT FLOATS: THE ROYAL NAVY IN THE SOUTHER CONE
The Royal Navy played an integral role for the British presence in the Southern 
Cone during the era of the Great War. This important role has been underappreciated.257 
Based on the functions it carried out in conjunction with the British Ministers up to the 
Second World War, the Royal Navy knew its presence in South American waters had less
257 Among those few who have addressed the topic, Barry Gough situates British withdrawal o f  influence 
and presence from South America far too prematurely in the twentieth-century, concluding that, by the First 
World War, “the old techniques o f  the Pax Britannica  under the aegis o f  the Royal Navy came to an end.” 
Gough further contends, “Once the United States had supplanted British naval power in the western 
hemisphere, as it did clearly after 1914 ....The more benign symbol o f  the white ensign supporting consuls 
and bankers ashore gave way to a new system o f  Yankee imperialism.” “Profit and Power,” 80-1; Knight 
seems to also suggest the Royal N avy’s role in the Southern Cone was no longer in need by the end o f  the 
nineteenth-century because South American elites were thoroughly ‘collaborating’ with British interests. 
“Britain and Latin America,” 139.
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to do with the maintenance of order, but more to do with public relations. From all 
indications, it was one of the most successful of British initiatives in the region. During 
the war’s early years the British deployments in the South Atlantic were quite active in 
hunting down German commerce-raiders—a decisive victory being the Battle of the 
Falklands and the patrolling of the coastlines.258 During the pre- and postwar years 
British ministers welcomed the Royal Navy’s courtesy visits because such visits 
impressed the local military and politicians; and in the eyes of the public and press such
CQ
visits were integral to British prestige. Impressing upon South American statesmen 
and their peoples of the Royal Navy’s power, nearly constant presence, and storied 
tradition involved the coordination not only of H.M.’s ships, but the planning of onshore 
diplomatic staff and the participation of the British expatriate community.
The basic “tactics” a navy could implement to enhance its prestige and its nation’s 
prestige in a neutral nation included: an operational presence, ceremonial and informal 
naval visits, and naval aid.260 Britain, for the most part, provided all of these to Southern 
Cone nations preceding, during, and following the Great War. It appears, above all the 
other powers, Britain had the most consistent and heavy naval presence in the Southern 
Cone. This led to visits of an operational character, to replenish supplies and provide
258 For helpful and concise treatments on the Royal Navy in the South Atlantic during the war, see Robert 
K. Massie, Castles o f  Steel: Britain, Germany, and Winning o f  the Great War at Sea  (New York: Random 
House, 2003), Chapters 10, 11, 12, and 14; John Keegan, Intelligence in War: Knowledge o f  the Enemy 
from  N apoleon to Al-Q aeda  (New York: Knopf, 2003), Chapter 4; Ronald H. Spector, “The First Battle o f  
the Falklands,” in The G reat War: Perspectives on the Great War, ed., Robert Cowley (New York: 
Random House, 2003). For Winston Churchill’s contemporary assessments, see his The W orld Crisis 
(New York: Scribner’s, 1931), Chapter 15.
259 Robert Albion concluded: “The Royal N avy’s constant showing o f  the flag in distant waters also 
promoted British interests. Only in occasional emergencies did naval forces actually intervene ashore, but 
their very presence had a valuable psychological effect. That is attested by occasional plaintive memorials 
from American mariners and merchants in Latin American ports, urging the presence o f  United States 
warships; the Royal Navy, they pointed out, was always present, and no one ever pushed the British 
around.” “Capital Movement and Transportation,” 370.
260 Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy  (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 40.
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shore leave, as well as good-will visits of ceremonial in character and often coordinated 
with an appropriate welcome organized by the British minister. In the early twentieth 
century the Royal Navy could be said to specialize in display and pomp. As Jan Morris 
described it:
The Royal Navy did not lack self-esteem. It loved to show off its 
brilliance and its seamanship. There was nothing on the seas to equal the 
panache of a British warship, when she sailed into a foreign port all flags 
and fresh paint, the Marine band playing on the forecastle and the captain 
indescribably grand upon his bridge. This was a genial sort of 
conceit.... Appearances counted most of all. The success of a commander 
was judged chiefly by the appearance of his ship, how white its paintwork, 
how burnished his brass, how smart its time-honored drills.261
0  A 9Thus naval diplomacy was a favored British tool in competing for influence. Putting 
British power on display, as Nicolson argued, gave added “lustre” to other British 
prestige elements such as legacy and character. An example of a concerted policy of 
prestige by British ministers and the Royal Navy are the naval visits and aid sent to Chile 
before and after the war in order to maintain Britain’s preeminence.
That Southern Cone nations believed in naval prestige is evidenced by a prewar 
naval arms race among Argentina, Brazil, and Chile that went well beyond their needs or 
means. None of the countries had the expertise or the facilities to build warships, so they
261 Jan(James) Morris, Pax Britannica N ew  York: Harcourt Brace, 1968. 424, 428.
262 For example, Charles Des Graz’s 1913 Annual Report for Peru mentioned three separate times that the 
Peruvian government was trying their utmost to ingratiate themselves with the United States. In light o f the 
heightened competition with the United States for attention and influence in Peru, Des Graz suggested 
more naval visits since “the policy o f periodical or even occasional visits o f  ships o f  His Majesty’s navy 
contribute directly to further the interests and increase the prestige o f  Great Britain.” When three Royal 
Navy vessels visited the republic in 1913 it “was looked upon with the greatest interest by the Peruvians.”
A different minister repeated these same sentiments in 1919, feeling “sure that the presence o f  His 
Majesty’s ships in Peruvian waters has done much towards cementing friendship between the two 
countries.” Doc. 43. Charles Des Graz, “Annual Report on Peru for the year 1913,” Lima, 5 January 1914, 
,” in Philip, British Documents on Foreign, “Latin America 1845-1914,” Vol. 9, 193-205; Doc. 30. Ernest 
Rennie to Earl Curzon, “Peru Annual Report, 1918,” Lima, 28 January 1919, in Ibid., 61.
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Ifi 'Xwere forced to buy from the Great Powers and have them funded through loans. 
Precipitated by Brazil’s ordering of two massive 21,000 ton battleships in 1906,
Argentina answered with its own naval building program: two 28,000 ton battleships and 
destroyers.264 The naval arms trade was rightly seen as “an entering wedge” for future 
remunerative orders, as well as conducive to enhancing political and commercial 
influence.265 When Argentina awarded the winning tenders, £2,200,000 per battleship, to 
United States shipyards in January 1910 it caused an uproar, especially among the 
British. When it became known, generally and rather quickly, that the reason was not 
due to price or technical specification, but was largely a matter of political horse-trading, 
the aggrieved powers became more incensed. Britain and Italy were especially 
insulted.
Their sense of being wronged reflected how sure they were in their naval prestige. 
As Seward Livermore described the British frustration, “England was not accustomed to 
playing second fiddle to any country in naval matters.” At least, from the British point of 
view, the Argentine order pressured Brazil to order a third battleship with their Elswick
263 Though battleships were rarely dispatched to the South American station, the presence o f cruisers 
certainly helped increase the desirability for naval prestige. Wanting naval prestige signified a respect for 
naval prestige. The Anglo-German naval race’s product o f  ‘dreadnought’-style battleships came to be, as 
John Keegan argues, “a symbol o f  a state’s international standing, whether or not it served an objective 
national purpose.” This was no different in South America. The First World War (New York: Vintage, 
200), 259.
264 Harold F. Peterson, Argentina and the United States (Albany: State University o f  N ew  York, 1964), 
291-4 Massie, Castles o f  Steel, 21-2; Seward Livermore, “Battleship Diplomacy in South America: 1905- 
1925,” The Journal o f  M odern H istory 16 (March, 1944): 31-3.
265 Ibid., 3 1 ,3 5 . A total o f  thirty-three international firms placed a total o f  144 tenders (sixty-seven for the 
battleships and seventy-seven for the destroyers) to win orders from the Argentine Naval Commission.
266 Peterson, Argentina and the United States, 294-7; Livermore, “Battleship Diplomacy in South 
America,” 36-8. The United States lifted the duty on hides as well as issued a last second six-point list o f  
diplomatic concessions, including a promise not to oppose current Argentine Latin American claims, the 
appropriation o f  substantial funds for the Pan American Conference to be held in Buenos Aires, and the 
sending o f  an official squadron to the Argentine Centennial Celebration in May 1911.
267 Times quoted in South American Journal, January 29, 1910, 116
268 Ibid., February 12, 1910, 170, 175.
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yards almost immediately.269 With Chile certain to augment its fleet, the British were not 
to be out-done. Their efforts to secure not only the Chilean order, but assert to everyone 
that the Chilean Navy was Britain’s domain of influence provide an excellent example of 
British naval prestige in action.
If British naval prestige had been high in Argentina before the contracts were
9 7 0announced, it was felt to be unassailable in Chile before tenders were even requested. 
Chile’s Director-General of the Navy was Admiral Jorge Montt, a former president; he 
had filled the post since 1896. Under his 7a Republica ChiccC naval program the service 
was reorganized to copy the British Admiralty. Separated from the national government 
and army in Santiago, having the Naval Board, Naval Academy, and Naval War 
Academy in Valparaiso also gave the large British community in the port city further
971influence and access to naval circles. An ideal opportunity to further cultivate naval 
prestige in Chile was offered with its upcoming centennial. Preceded by Argentina’s 
celebration in May 1910, the United States sent four light cruisers and a scout ship to 
participate. Though it had plans to send ships, the Royal Navy was precluded from 
attendance due to the mourning of King Edward VII’s death.272 In London the centennial
9 79occasion was celebrated at banquet in which Sir Edward Grey spoke. It did not seem 
to matter in the short term, as Royal Naval prestige seemed secure and the chance of the
269 Livermore, “Battleship Diplomacy in South America,” 37, 40; South American Journal, January 29, 
1910, 134.
270 For a relatively recent article that argues British naval influence in Argentina has been overestimated, 
see Varun Sahni, “Not Quite British: A Study o f  External Influences on the Argentine Navy,” Journal o f  
Latin American Studies 25 (October 1993).
271 Philip Somervell, “Naval Affairs in Chilean Politics, 1910-1932” Journal o f  Latin American Studies vol. 
16 (November 1984): 384-5, 389.
272 South American Journal, January 15, 1910, 58; May 14, 1910, 549; August 6, 1910, 142; September 3, 
1910, 254; September 24, 1910, 340, 345. However, the British still participated in the Centennial’s 
exhibitions, including even a paintings exhibit.
273 South American Journal, November 26, 1910, 608.
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American firms winning any naval orders seemed slim. Despite all their efforts, the 
American Naval Attache informed Washington, “I do not believe that the Chilean
• 7 7 AGovernment wants, intends, or can order its ships elsewhere than in England.”
Joining British and American efforts to win the Chilean orders was Germany.275 
In the meantime, on December 30th’ the Chilean Naval Commission had arrived in 
London and opened tenders.276 The British community and press, especially in Chile, 
were distraught that their government had not sent vessels to Chile by this point; 
however, four Royal Naval vessels had attended the Argentine presidential inauguration 
in lieu of missing the centennial.277 The Foreign Office and Admiralty responded. It was 
timely announced that four Royal Navy officers were to be sent to Chile to augment the 
British Naval Mission already present, including a Commander to become head of the 
Naval War College for a period of two years. The newly appointed Chilean Minister to 
Great Britain was hosted at a banquet by the British Minister in Chile. A Chilean
278General and Admiral were formally invited to attend the coronation of King George V. 
However, true relief came when British residents and diplomats in Chile learned a 
compensatory visit of ships was scheduled for April 1911 comprised of HMS Kent and 
Challenger?19
274 Commander A.P. Niblock, October 1, 1910 quoted in Livermore, “Battleship Diplomacy in South 
America,” 41.
275 The new battle cruiser SMS Van der Tann was sent on a South American tour to display German naval 
engineering. The United States answered with a second naval cruise by the brand new USS Delaware. 
Ibid., 41-2; “The Kaiser Courteous,” South American Journal, September 10, 1910, 295.
276 Ibid., September 10, 1910, 282; October 29, 1910, 488.
277 The South American Journal's complaints reflected how the community o f  British interests valued naval 
prestige, especially its commercial spin-off. As the Journal opined, “It is thought all the more difficult to 
understand the British policy since the Argentine orders were already placed, while Chili within three 
months will spend £6,000,000 in naval construction, for which will be the keenest competition.” December 
3, 1910, 626.
278 Ibid., December 10, 1910, 670; December 17, 1910, 758; January 28, 1911; February 11, 1911;
279 Ibid., February 25, 1911, 226.
80
The British newspaper in Valparaiso, the South Pacific Mail, felt the visit was
certainly a success. The occasion was one for drumming up the British legacy with
Chile. “To no other country is Chili so deeply indebted for the magnificent support and
encouragement given in her path of progress than to England,” wrote the British paper,
“and that Chili fully appreciates it and is truly grateful has been manifested over and over
again during the two weeks’ stay” of the British vessels. The officers were taken on a
round of social occasions by the British Minister and Consul including functions with the
British community and Chilean elite; they were received even by the President and
Cabinet. In giving the main banquet’s toast, the Chilean Minister of War, exhibited
plainly that British naval prestige had its own discursive elements based on the British
South American legacy:
Lord Cochrane and a group of noble English officers laid the foundations 
of our national marine... [I]n no other sphere has our friendship with Great 
Britain been more effective and constant than in the navy, which was 
founded by Britishers on British traditions, in addition to the fact that to 
every possible extent we have considered Great Britain our tutor and guide
O O A
in the development of this noble institution.
It came as little surprise when the British won the tender for the first battleship in July
AO 1
1911. British naval prestige was vindicated.
Visits, naval aid, and ceremonies further cemented Anglo-Chilean diplomatic 
relations before the First World War. Every time a British-built ship for the Chilean 
Navy was launched and christened it was another occasion for visually and vocally
280 Kent's commander reciprocated the toast with the more suave British Minister, Henry C. 
Lowther, giving the final speech. South Pacific M ail quoted in South American Journal, May 20,
1911, 593-4.
281 Livermore, “Battleship Diplomacy in South America,” 42; South American Journal, August 26, 1911, 
233; September 2, 1911. Admiral Montt presided over the meeting to vote on the battleship tenders on 
August 2nd. The final vote was nine to four in favor o f  the winning British firm.
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strengthening British prestige.282 Royal Navy visits and technical assistance also 
continued. In 1912 King George V awarded Vice-Admiral Montt the highest grade of the 
Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George. The distinction was celebrated 
at a 250 person banquet in Valparaiso by the Vice-Admiral, several cabinet members, and 
British Consul Allen C. Kerr. As the South American Journal reported, “The utmost 
enthusiasm prevailed. The health of King George was drunk standing, and the British 
and Chilian National Anthems were sung with heartiness.” When the medal finally 
arrived in Chile, the December 20, 1912 bestowal-ceremony evoked pomp, glitter, and 
speeches. British Minister Lowther, who presented the medal, was accompanied by his 
legation staff, the British military attaches, and British community notables. They were 
in the company of the Chilean President, Cabinet, legislators, and military brass. Besides 
a banquet and a pinning ceremony to congratulate Vice-Admiral Montt, a third event was 
hosted by Lowther at Valparaiso’s Union Club later in the month. It was evident the 
Chilean Navy and political elite felt honored. As David Cannadine has argued, such 
British honors formed “the most complex and comprehensive titular hierarchy in 
existence anywhere in the western world, rewarding and recognizing the greatest range of
282 Ibid., February 8, 1913, 220.
283 In addition to these gestures, the impressive battle cruiser HMS New Zealand  called at Valparaiso for 
seven days in September 1912. This was followed by the British community forming a Navy League in the 
city to further Royal Navy public relations locally. The British Naval M ission continued to operate in 
Chile with positions o f  importance; in addition to the head o f  the Naval War Academy, Royal Navy 
lieutenants were in charge o f  gunnery instruction and torpedoes and submarines. AN engineer in the 
Chilean Navy was invited to study in the United Kingdom. Meanwhile, British maritime interests were 
enjoying large contracts in Chile; the British firm o f  S. Pearson and Sons was awarded a seven year 
contract to build docks, quays, cranes, and warehouses for the port o f  Valparaiso. South American Journal, 
September 7, 1912, 263; September 14, 1912, 291, 300; October 5, 1912, 371;October 12, 1912, 405, 413; 
December 21, 1912, 720; February 1, 1913, 185, February 21, 1914, 285; Doc. 56 Allen C. Kerr, “Annual 
Report on Chile for the year 1913,” March 1914 in Philip, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, “Latin 
America 1845-1913,” Vol. 9, 338, 354-6.
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people, racially, geographically and sociologically.”284 Britain was incorporating Chile’s 
Naval Commander-in-Chief directly and Chile as a nation indirectly into its hierarchy of 
prestige.
Besides the purchase of the battleships (a second order was placed in June 1912), 
an order for four destroyers had also been placed with the United Kingdom. Better also 
was the fact that Chileans seemed to take pride in their previous British-built vessels, 
telling Kerr that one British-built ship was a fourth of a knot faster than its original trials 
seventeen years ago. Those in Chilean naval and political circles were also taking 
satisfaction in the delays incurred by their Argentine neighbors’ battleship construction in 
the United States.285 Kerr assured London “of the determination in naval circles in 
Valparaiso to have nothing but British material in the navy.”286 Also to Britain’s benefit 
was the fact Anglophiles remained in charge of the Chilean Navy after Montt retired in 
1913.287
284 As Cannadine argues, “the acceptance o f  an honour did not merely elevate someone in the social and 
imperial hierarchy; it also put them formally in a direct, and subordinate, relation to the [British] monarch.” 
David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 98, 100.
285 Kerr, Consul to Chile, felt an anecdote merited inclusion in his report. After introducing the officers o f  
HMS New Zealand  to the Chilean President in September 1913, as Kerr explained, the British cohort 
followed the other diplomatic corps that had preceded them through the main exit with no fanfare. 
However, as Kerr recalled, “as soon as our party appeared at the door cries were raised on all sides, ‘Viva 
los Inlgeses!’ and ‘Viva la Marina de Ingleterra!”’ “It was a small incident perhaps,” admitted Kerr, “but 
being quite spontaneous it showed that the affectionate regard for the British navy among the usually 
undemonstrative Chilean crowd is firmly rooted and something more than a tradition.” Doc. 56 Allen C. 
Kerr, “Annual Report on Chile for the year 1913,” March 1914 in Philip, British Documents on Foreign  
Affairs, “Latin America 1845-1914,” Vol. 9, 338, 354-6. Submarines purchased from the United States, 
under the intense scrutiny o f  the Chilean press, were charged as defective. South American Journal, May 
9, 1914, 578.
286 Allen C. Kerr to Sir Edward Grey, October 2, 1913 quoted in Somervell, “Battleship Diplomacy in 
South America,” 385.
287 Montt’s replacement was Vice-Admiral Luis A. Goni, who had been the head o f  the recent Naval 
Commission to London. While there he had been given golden treatment with his vessel awarded the place 
o f  honor next to the Royal Yacht during the coronation review at Spithead in 1911. Like Montt, Kerr was 
certain, “He also is possessed o f  British ideas and methods.” It appears heading the Naval Commission in 
London was one o f  the last steps in becoming Director-General o f  the Chilean Navy; Vice-Admiral Munoz 
Hurtado assumed the post in 1916 after commanding in London for several years. His tenure paralleled the
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During the first December of the war, Francis Stronge informed London, “Public 
opinion in Chile is undoubtedly favourable to the Allies, and the same feeling exists in 
the civil service. The Army is generally on the side of the Germans, but the navy is 
overwhelmingly British.” Stronge, however, was slightly worried in 1915 that future 
Chilean naval orders might be placed with the United States since Britain was unable to 
fulfill orders due to the war.288 In fact, Chile’s prewar naval orders were acquired by the 
Royal Navy once the war broke out. The battleship Latorre was temporarily 
recommissoned as Canada. As part compensation, the Royal Navy presented Chile with 
fifty airplanes and five submarines Britain had ordered for itself that were completed in 
1 9 1 ? 2 8 9  1918 de Bunsen Mission that toured nearly all of South America
augmented British prestige in Chile.290 In December of that year Chilean authorities 
unveiled a statue of Lord Cochrane in Valparaiso followed by the speeches of Chilean
9Q1Admirals and the British Minister.
The early 1920s were punctuated with increasing anxiety over Britain’s naval 
influence vis-a-vis the United States, especially in the South American republics of Brazil
construction by British yards o f  newly ordered capital ships and destroyers for Chile. He also placed orders 
in London for six shipboard wireless sets. South American Journal, December 28, 1912, 753; March 29, 
1913, 423; April 15, 1916, 337; Doc. 56 Allen C. Kerr, “Annual Report on Chile for the year 1913,” March 
1914 in Philip, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1845-1914,” Vol. 9, 354-6.
288 Doc. 18 Francis Stronge to Sir Edward Grey, Santiago, Chile, December 30, 1914 in Philip, British 
Documents on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939,” Vol. 1, 20; Doc. 22 Stronge to Grey, Santiago, 
Chile, April 4, 1915 in Ibid., 24. A  letter to the editor o f  the South American Journal in the spring o f  1918 
asserted, the Chilean N avy “is pro-English to the core.” “Is Chile Pro-German?,” April 20, 1918, 246.
289 South American Journal, October 31, 1914, 319; January 6, 1917, 5; September 7, 1918, 147; Beltran 
Mathieu, “The Neutrality o f  Chile During the European War,” The American Journal o f  International Law  
14 (July 1920): 338-9. Mathieu wrote this article as the Chilean Ambassador to the United States. Based 
on his gracious and appreciative tone the British gesture seems to have elicited the desired response.
290 As Reuters reported, “After leaving Santiago, the M ission received quite an ovation on its arrival at 
Valparaiso.. .the town was decorated as if  for a holiday.” Anglo-Chilean trust and admiration was voiced 
in the speeches and toasts by the Chilean Minister o f  War and the N avy’s Directory-General. South 
American Journal, June 29, 1918, 408.
291 “Chilean Tribute to the British N avy,” Ibid., December 28, 1918, 424.
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and Chile. London was advised in early 1920 that, “Attention should be drawn to the 
increasing United States influence in Brazilian naval affairs. In the past, and until the 
beginning of the war, the navy was quite imbued with British ideas. Latterly, however, it 
has become evident that the Americans intend with every prospect of success to usurp our 
place.” Prior to the war Britain filled many of Brazil’s naval orders and obligingly 
fulfilled a request for a naval mission in late 1912.293 However, during the war the 
United States Navy went to considerable lengths to cultivate South American countries, 
particularly Brazil.294 In 1919 the United States Navy had a Rear Admiral posted to 
instruct Brazilian officers and introduce American fire controls and Brazilian 
dreadnoughts, which were British-built, had been sent for refitting in New York, whereas,
• • • • 90SBritain only had a mine laying mission in Brazil.
In contrast to Brazil, during the years of 1919 and 1920 the British felt their naval 
influence was secure in Chile. In that first year HMS Southampton and Dartmouth 
performed an official visit, in which “many festivities were given in their honour,”
♦ • • • * 296especially with the President and Minister of War and Marine touring the flagship. 
Competing with the flurry of French and Italian air missions that descended on Latin 
America following the war, the British military gave Chile a squadron of Bristol aircraft
292 After assessing the post-war naval influence situation, the Royal Navy Attach^ in Washington DC 
reported in 1922: “There can be little doubt that the United States Government have a definite policy 
aiming at the establishment o f  American naval influence in all South American countries which maintain 
an effective navy and at the ousting o f  British naval influence where it still lingers. It cannot be gainsaid 
that the success o f  such a policy would have far-reaching effects to the lasting detriment o f  British 
interests.” Doc. 44. Captain Bailey, Royal Navy, “Extract form the Report on the Naval Situation in Brazil 
by the Naval Attach^, Washington,” Washington, D.C., 23 October 1922, in Philip, British Documents on 
Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939,” Vol. 3, 127.
293 Other Brazilian Naval procurements from Britain included Marconi wireless sets for its fleet. South 
American Journal, December 14, 1912, 700; January 4, 1913, 4; June 14, 1913, 762.
294 See David Healy, “Admiral William B. Caperton and United States Naval Diplomacy in South America, 
1917-1919,” Journal o f  Latin American Studies 8 (November 1976).
295 Doc. 31. Sir Ralph Paget, “Annual Report on Brazil for the year 1919,” 5 April 1920, in Philip, British 
Documents on Foreign Affairs, Vol. 1, 66.
296 Doc. 32. J.C.T. Vaughan, “Annual Report on Chile for the year 1919,” 20 March 1920, in Ibid., 94.
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accompanied with an officer adviser.297 All told, Britain delivered some fourteen
298seaplanes and fifty other aircraft along with maintenance equipment to Chile. In 1920 
ties were strengthened further through the Chilean Navy’s purchase of five Royal Navy 
vessels, the posting of a British Commander as a head naval instructor, and the hiring of 
British military aviation experts. HMS Dartmouth, Weymouth, and Yarmouth also made 
formal visits. Britain was making such impressive inroads that Minister Vaughan 
suggested expansion of British influence into the army, a branch usually dominated by 
French or German missions. “The introduction of British instructors into the Chilean 
army,” he confidently hypothesized, “might lead to valuable commercial results. It 
would mean that the Chilean navy, army, and air force would probably [all] come under 
British influence.”299 A year later two British officers were attached to the Chilean Army 
and British firms were filling its aviation orders.300
However, in 1921 angst over British naval influence would spread from Brazil to 
Chile and the rest of the Southern Cone. Alarm among the British diplomats revolved 
around two elements: the Admiralty’s 1921 decision to withdraw the South Atlantic 
Squadron due to budget cuts and heightened American efforts to supplant British naval 
influence. That year Sir John Tilley, the ambassador to Brazil, reported the British 
community believed “the departure of the squadron is likely to be damaging to British 
prestige, and I share the hope that the squadron may be recommissioned.”301 The 
intensity of Anglo-American competition to curry Brazilian naval favor was palpable.
297 W esley Phillips Newton, “International Aviation Rivalry in Latin America, 1919-1927,” Journal o f  
Inter-American Studies 7 (July 1965): 350.
298 Beltran, “The Neutrality o f  Chile,” 339.
299 Doc. 49 Vaughan, “Annual Report on Chile for 1920,” 25 February 1921, in Philip, British Documents 
on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939,” Vol. 1, 258-259.
300 Doc. 38 Vaughan, “Chile, Annual Report, 1921,” 29 January 1922, in Philip, British Documents on 
Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939”, Vol. 3, 89-90.
301 Doc. 37 Sir John Tilley, “Brazil, Annual Report, 1921,” 20 February 1922, in Ibid., 51.
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Four Royal Marine instructors were posted to Brazil, as were three United States Navy
lecturers at the‘Brazilian Naval College. Considerable anxiety hung on whom the
Brazilians would invite to head their planned foreign naval mission. Tilley attested to the
implications, the “advantages of supplying this mission would be many and important,
politically and commercially.”
From 1921 Vaughan’s worry over British naval influence in Chile became one of
his passions. His complaints over the South Atlantic Squadron’s withdrawal were rife in
his dispatches and reports:
The decision will, I fear, adversely affect our commercial interests for the 
following reason: It will be interpreted as a sign that we are willing to 
abandon South American markets to our United States competition. The 
retention of the squadron for the actual protection of commerce is of 
course merely a form of speech, but the presence of such a squadron is 
undoubtedly of value as an external and tangible sign that we are not 
abandoning the [commercial and financial] field, and for that reason is 
conducive to the maintenance of our prestige in these parts.303
Vaughan’s concern was echoed on the east coast by the British business community. The
British Chamber of Commerce in San Paulo and Southern Brazil joined its counterpart in
Uruguay in lodging a formal request to keep the ships on active station. In their letter to
the British Ambassador at Rio de Janeiro, the Chamber spoke of “the adverse effect
which the withdrawal of the British Naval Unit from South American waters must have
on British prestige, and therefore on British trade.”304
302 Ibid., 70-71.
303 Doc. 21 Vaughan to Earl Curzon, Santiago, Chile, 4 April 1921, in Philip, British Documents on 
Foreign Affairs, “Latin American 1914-1939,” Vol. 3, 27.
304 The Chamber also explained how much it enjoyed the visits o f  Royal Navy ships themselves, since the 
British community “were very much cut o ff from the home country, and often have cause to think they 
have been completely forgotten by His Majesty’s Government, and, therefore the withdrawal o f  the Unit 
would still further increase that sense o f  isolation.” Quoted in South American Journal, October 15, 1921, 
328-29.
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A great power who valued a close relationship with a Southern Cone market was 
expected to station a fleet off its coasts. Not only were the British losing face, but 
Vaughan was also certain that with the absence of permanent Royal Navy vessels, the 
United States was “seizing the opportunity to impress her [Chile] with naval strength.”
• • 305Making it worse, British policy was perceived as conciliatory to the United States. 
Vaughan’s severe chagrin seems overreacted since Chile once again purchased ships 
form Britain and the current directors of the war academy, naval target practice, and 
naval aviation school were all British. Even the army had taken on two British officers as 
advisers. When HMS Southampton visited that year its crew “received every 
consideration;” the officers dined privately with the Chilean President. Upon the 
Prince of Wales’ visit in the late summer of 1925 the President of Chile personally and 
officially requested “that His Majesty’s Government would be good enough to send to
0^7Chile a complete naval mission.”
Britain obliged and enjoyed the consequent benefits. Reformist elements in 
Chile’s navy used Royal Navy expertise to affect a “complete re-organization on British 
lines.” Besides attaining strong administration and doctrinal influence, the British also 
sold Chile submarines and destroyers and secured the refitting of the battleship Latorre
305As Vaughan explained: “The decision o f  His Majesty’s Government to withdraw the British squadron 
from South American waters is in some quarters actually attributed to this m otive.. .and it is hinted that we 
would rather sacrifice our trade in South America than impair our relations with the North.” Doc. 25. 
Vaughan to Earl Curzon, Santiago, Chile, 27 April 1921, in Philip, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 
“Latin America 1914-1939,” Vol. 3, 32. Vaughan hammered this theme home to London. In a concerned 
dispatch later that year, he had found, “The idea appears to prevail, that following the European war, His 
Majesty’s Government decided to withdraw from active interest in Central and South America and to leave 
the field clear for the United States. The withdrawal o f  the South American squadron served to lend colour 
to the idea.” Doc. 31 Vaughan to Earl Curzon, Santiago, Chile, September 1921 in Ibid., 41.
306 Doc. 38 Vaughan, “Chile, Annual Report, 1921,” Santiago, Chile, January 29, 1922 in Ibid., 78, 88-90.
307 The visit was felt to be a “most complete success,” especially owing to the fact it had “already borne 
practical results” in naval affairs. Doc. 99. Sir T. Hohler to Austen Chamberlain, Santiago, Chile, 19 
September 1925, in Philip, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939”, Vol. 4, 130; 
Doc. 133 Hohler to Chamberlain, Santiago, Chile, September 22, 1925 in Ibid., 133-4.
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for British shipyards.308 British consternation, such as Vaughan’s, likely reflected the 
near unchallenged nature of British naval influence in Chile in previous years, which had 
recently come under American competition.
Up to the mid-1920s Britain was able to keep a primary naval influence in 
Argentina and Chile, but had lost major ground in Brazil. In fact, the United States’ new 
naval mission to Brazil pushed Argentina closer to Britain, leading the Argentine 
administration to request a British naval mission in retaliation.309 The Royal Navy had 
seemed to suffer a reduction in naval prestige among certain South American Republics 
which, whether true or not, British diplomats felt would eventually translate into an 
erosion of both commercial and political prestige. It certainly coincided with an erosion 
of Britain’s relative share in the major South American import markets, especially 
Brazilian (Appendix III, Tables 10, 11, and 12). Those nations where Britain retained the 
most naval missions, attaches, and envoys, such as Argentina and Chile remained the 
most dependable South American markets for British exports (Appendix III, Table 13).
As a percentage of total exports to Latin America, Argentina in 1920 accounted for 37.5 
per cent, by 1930 its share had increased to 45.5 per cent; Chile’s share increased from 
8.4 per cent to 11 per cent, respectively. In Brazil, where British naval influence was felt
T1A p
to be plummeting, its share of British Latin American exports fell from 21.2 percent in
308 Somervell, “Naval Affairs in Chilean Politics,” 395-7. Chilean personnel were also sent to Britain to 
undergo wireless signal training. South American Journal, October 30, 1926, 391.
309Ambassador to Argentina to Secretary o f  State, Buenos Aires, December 20, 1922 in Department o f  
State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations o f  the United States 1922 vol. 1 (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1938), 655; Doc. 51. Sir C. Mallet to the Marques Curzon ofK edleston, Montevideo, 22 
December 1922, in Philip, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, “Latin America 1914-1939,” Vol. 3, 133- 
134.
310 Shipbuilder Sir John E. Thomycroft, in an interview with the Evening Standard, was quite pessimistic 
after visiting Brazil for three weeks in 1922: “The outstanding fact o f  interest is that while Brazilians 
generally, and the Government in particular, are very sympathetic to Great Britain, we have lost 
considerable ground during the war. This is partly due to our inability to assist them by sending a Naval
89
1920 to 14.7 percent in 1930.311 A difficult question is whether British naval prestige 
declined due to decreased commercial share or commercial share declined due to a 
decrease in naval prestige. Most definitely it was the cause of the former; British 
industry could not produce cutting-edge goods in adequate quantity or at competitive 
prices. However, there was indeed a reciprocal relationship to a limited degree between 
the naval prestige and commercial success in the large South American Republics.
British diplomats were wise to seriously monitor this situation.
Commission, as requested, towards the end o f  the war. The Americans accordingly took the opportunity to 
push forward and dominate the situation to such an extent that now they are firmly established in the 
country as Brazil’s naval advisers.” Quoted in South American Journal, November 25, 1922, 427.
311 Miller, Britain and Latin America, 190.
CONCLUSION 
ASSESSING PRESTIGE’S IMPACT 
What constituted prestige to the British in the Southern Cone has hopefully been 
explored satisfactorily. Prestige in the British case had multiple legs of support; this gave 
it added strength and undoubtedly explains its durability into the 1920s. This survey of 
British prestige cultivation and monitoring affirms the unconventional assertions of Cain 
and Hopkins, that prewar and interwar “Britain remained a dynamic and ambitious 
power” and the “war had dented Britain’s resources.. .but it had stiffened her resolve to 
win the peace and given her the chance of doing so.”312 Appreciating British prestige in 
the Southern Cone offers larger suggestions about British confidence in the face of their 
global challenges during the early interwar years. It also allows us to expand the role of 
British influence and sway in South America beyond commercial services, particularly 
high finance.
The British were extremely self-conscious in South America. As explained, this 
should not be interpreted as just insecurity, but a constant need to assert Britishness, 
manifested in a pride of past and moral character. For it was these qualities that the 
British thought set them apart from the ‘Teuton’ or the ‘Yankee.’ The reputation 
elements o f ‘past achievement’ or legacy, ‘character,’ and ‘power’ helped produce closer 
ties with and inspire confidence in South Americans; this situation redounded with 
commercial benefit. Overall, the British prestige edifice trumpeted the positive benefits 
South Americans accrued through their British linkages, such as railways, purebred 
sheep, or parliamentary government. Keeping up appearances had made and kept 
‘British’ a positive adjective. Probably the audience most receptive and accepting of
312 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, 1688-2000, 402, 407.
90
91
British prestige in the region were themselves. It should not be understated how 
important prestige cultivating activities were in galvanizing British identity for immediate 
and long-term goals. Prestige diplomacy’s impact on its own actors should not be seen as 
just vain ego-satisfaction, but as a mechanism for regenerating and maintaining morale.
It seems previous inquiries have limited ‘culture’ to the realm of the museum, 
library, or concert hall; places exactly where the new consumer culture was not to be 
found. Instead British culture was conveyed through values, recreational practices and 
their corresponding fashions, and ‘Britishness.’ Ultimately, Britons continually reminded 
their South American audience of how great they had been, how great they were, and 
great they would remain. That they deluded themselves and South Americans at times is 
obvious. Gerald Martin has made the indictment that “historically, our diplomatic effort 
towards Latin America has been fundamentally—culturally, intellectually, and
TITpolitically—lazy, passive, reactive, neglectful and often patronizing.” Though the 
Foreign Office was far from masterful in its handling of Latin American affairs during 
this period, the description is inaccurate and unfair, at least as applied to those British 
officials and businessmen who were concerned with the Southern Cone. As evidenced in 
the activities of pastoralist circles, grand opening festivities in wartime Buenos Aires, and 
the Royal Navy’s visits and aid, British efforts toward that particular region can hardly be 
termed “lazy, passive, reactive, [or] neglectful.” Briton’s valued what South Americans 
perceived.
As for Britain’s reduced postwar import trade to the Southern Cone, the British 
undoubtedly felt, more privately than openly, that their true competitive edge was nearly 
gone. British products remained uncompetitive primarily because of domestic British
313 Martin, “Britain’s Cultural Relations with Latin America,” 27.
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problems: currency exchange (higher prices), labor unrest, and industrial malaise. 
However, a lack of dynamism in merchandising and banking was also quite apparent.315 
Noting the fact that Britain did regain its Argentine and Brazilian markets, albeit for only 
a couple years, despite having just emerged from the war was no mean feat. If the British 
postwar economy had not been wracked with so many domestic issues, it is plausible a 
more successful commercial recovery could have occurred due to Britain’s positive 
image in the region. However, this was not the case and British interests on the ground 
had to make the best they could of the situation, focusing more on selling items for 
‘British quality’ more so than their newness or attractiveness. Cultivating prestige aided 
and abetted this policy of selling a brand name over value. It was probably just as much 
an inability to adapt her wares as it was culturally difficult for Britain to make itself 
produce cheap, glossy goods for mass consumption.316 The British Chamber of 
Commerce in Argentina believed in 1922, “British goods to-day in almost every line sell 
here for two reasons; their quality and the reputation of British and Anglo-Argentine 
firms for square dealing.”317 H.O. Chalkley, the Commercial Secretary to the Plata 
commented, “The competition of British with locally-made products, since it cannot be
315 Kinder, “British Export Promotion,” Chapters 6, 9 ,  10 and 11. As Kinder comments, “There was a 
general lack o f  vigor, initiative and enterprise on the part o f  representatives o f  British exporters, even in the 
face o f  heavy competition, and a complacency which is am azing...The British export community seems to 
have been psychologically incapable o f  the radical changes necessary for the recovery o f  its prewar 
position in South America.” 346-7. For a scathing survey o f  British industrial decline and its global 
implications, see Corelli Barnett, The Collapse o f  British Power (New York: William Morrow, 1979), 
Chapter 3.
316 As one commercial observer before the war explained this merchant smugness, Britons do not “enter 
into competition for cheap articles, being, for the most part, content to be regarded as makers o f ‘the best,’ 
and the best only.” Percy F. Martin, “British Trade Competitors in South America,” South American 
Journal, August 13, 1910, 178. For a more in-depth analysis see Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 
chapters 7 and 8.
317 Monthly Journal (Buenos Aires) quoted in South American Journal, July 29, 1922, 91.
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on prices, must be intensified on brands and qualities... .full use [should] be made of such 
terms as ‘Made in England.’”318
In the years 1926 and 1927 Clarence F. Jones performed in several articles a 
survey of South American foreign trade for the journal Economic Geography. With 
United States imports in the lead in most countries, Jones was fairly certain that British 
industry’s competitive edge had “reached its peak and appears to be on the decline.” 319 
However, a recurring theme of his articles was the long legacy British interests had 
within the region and the commensurate benefits that still entailed. British prestige was 
not to be taken lightly. Jones warned his fellow Americans that Britain’s drop in the 
Uruguayan import trade “may not be considered permanent, because.. .the traditional 
custom of South American merchants to buy from those in whom confidence and 
friendship repose, enjoys special advantages in the market.” As for Chile, British 
manufactures had “enjoyed for many years an excellent reputation. Since the Chilean is 
accustomed to purchasing and using a certain brand of goods, many old British lines 
practically sell themselves.” Where American postwar gains had been the best, in 
Brazil, Jones still lauded British resiliency in commerce. Their first strength was that 
“they have been in the local market for years and have built up a clientele, which means a
318 H.O. Chalkley, Commercial Secretary, “Report (Consular) on Argentina,” excerpt in Ibid., January 26, 
1924, 121. The 1929 Department o f Overseas Trade D ’Abernon M ission to the Southern Cone found the 
habit still alive, reporting “in the markets which we investigated the criticism is frequently made that 
British goods last lon g ... .We aim, in short, too much at intrinsic merit and not enough at show or novelty.” 
It was still difficult to reconcile with British commercial practice, that “Quality and durability come after” 
price. The Report o f  the British Mission, 45.
319 Clarence F. Jones, “The United States and its Chief Competitors in South America” Economic 
Geography 3 (October 1927): 423.
320 Clarence F. Jones, “The Trade o f  Uruguay,” 377.
321 Jones concluded: “With all the advantages o f  an early start, a favorable basis for interchange o f  goods, 
an active resident population, and mounting investments, the British stand in a position to hold a prominent 
place in Chilean commerce; they may even crowd the United States as the principal source o f  a variety o f  
good quality manufactured wares for the Chilean market.” Clarence F. Jones, “Chilean Commerce” 
Economic Geography 3 (April 1927): 164.
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great deal in South American markets... .They are firmly established in Brazilian
commerce and will be able to hold their place in competition with the United States and
neighboring countries.”322
Devoting attention toward a policy of prestige seems to have been a wise course.
Remembering that British interests were becoming less import-oriented and centered
more on investments, cultivation of prestige directed toward the Southern Cone’s
conservative elite, was aimed at protecting fixed-capital interests: railways, utilities, and
commercial services. The British felt they were under assault by nationalist elements that
were vocal but without final say. In 1927 the United States Embassy to Argentina
reported the positive results of British efforts:
For many years England has invested capital in large quantities in 
railroads and in the animal industry. Some of these industries in times 
passed rendered very little return on the funds invested. This fact has been 
impressed very strongly on the Argentine mind, and through clever 
propaganda England has brought herself in the happy position to have 
Argentines believe that all her investments are for the benefit of
324Argentina.
Argentines and their South American neighbors in large numbers believed the British 
presence was a force for good, especially materially. Frustrations, especially Argentine,
325regarding international and domestic issues were given vent toward the United States. 
That Britain, for the most part, was able to keep nationalist critics and labor unrest to at
322 Clarence F. Jones, “The Evolution o f  Brazilian Commerce” Economic Geography 2 (October 1926):
566, 570.
323 For an overview, see chapters 9 and 14, Latin America, Economic Imperialism and the State: The 
Political Economy o f  the External Connection from  Independence to the Present, eds. Christopher Abel and 
Colin Lewis (London: Athlone, 1985). Also see Platt, Business Imperialism.
324 Major C.T. Richardson, “Foreign Relations,” Buenos Aires, May 18, 1927 in U.S. M ilitary Intelligence 
Reports, Reel 2, 105.
325 Glen Barclay, Struggle fo r  a Continent: The Diplom atic History o f  South America 1917-1945 (London: 
Sidgwick & Jackson, 1971), 39.
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least a tenable level until the World Slump began in 1929 can partly be attributed to its 
cultivation of prestige through passive and active public relations methods.326
Though foreign capital was becomingly increasingly vulnerable to domestic 
politics, most British companies continued to enjoy good business throughout the 1920s. 
For example, the aggregate return on London Stock Exchange nominal investment in 
Uruguay was higher later in that decade than prior to the war. In 1913 the aggregate 
return was 4.6 per cent, in 1924 it was 4.7 per cent, in 1928 and 1929 it was 5.1 per cent, 
and in 1930 it reached 5.2 per cent.327 Similar trends occurred in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Chile. British Southern investments would also continue to grow; by the end of the 
decade Britain was still by far the largest foreign investor in all four countries except 
Chile (Appendix IV, Tables 14-23). From 1923 to 1928 the average return on British 
capital in the region was 4.4 percent. Putting this in perspective, one historian reminds us 
that this rate of return was “possibly as high as for any period of equal length in the long 
history of English investments in Latin America.”328 The 1920s were hardly bad for the 
British in South America; it was the start of the following decade, coinciding with the
326 For specific case-studies, see Finch, “British Imperialism in Uruguay,” in Abel and Lewis, Latin 
America, Economic Imperialism and the State; Paul B. Goodwin, “The Politics o f  Rate-Making: The 
British-Owned Railways and the Union Civica Radical, 1921-1928,” Journal o f  Latin American Studies 6 
(November, 1974); Raul Garcia Heras’s “World War II and the Frustrated Nationalization o f  the Argentine 
British-Owned Railways, 1939-1943,” Journal o f  Latin American Studies 17 (May 1985) and “Hostage 
Private Companies under Restraint: British Railways and Transport Coordination in Argentina during the 
1930s,” Journal o f  Latin American Studies 19 (May 1987).
327 During the 1920s, o f the four major British utilities in Montevideo, none did horribly. The Montevideo 
Gas Company’s average dividend between 1923 and 1932 was 5.1 per cent. The Montevideo Waterworks 
Company’s average dividend between 1909 and 1928 was 8 per cent. Both survived the Second World 
War and were also remunerative afterward. The Montevideo Telephone Company paid a dividend o f 3 per 
cent between 1920 and 1922, o f  5 per cent in 1923 and 1924, and 7 per cent in 1926. It was sold by the 
shareholders in 1927 at double each share’s face value. The United Electric Tramways company fared the 
worst. In the 1920s it paid dividends only in 1921 (4 per cent) and 1925 and 1926 (3 per cent). It was sold 
to a large British utility holding company, Atlas Electric and General Trust, in 1927. For further details see 
J.Fred Rippy, “British Economic Activities in Uruguay: An Example o f  Profitable Foreign Investment,” 
The Journal o f  Business o f  the University o f  Chicago  25 (April 1952): 125-29.
328 J. Fred Rippy, “British Investments in Latin America at Their Peak,” The Hispanic American H istorical 
Review  29 (February 1954): 94-5, 102.
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onset of the global depression that would finally topple what Germany, the United States, 
and a World War could not. Cultivating prestige aided competition vis-a-vis other 
foreign competitors while cultivating good will among the public and the elite especially. 
That one of Britain’s worst enemies in the region eventually resulted in South American 
nationalist and autarkic economic policies shows there was limited long term success.
Joseph Tulchin argues that during early postwar years the “majority of Argentines 
refused to see the shift in relative power from Great Britain to the United States,” having 
repercussions on economic policies, especially during Yrigoyen’s second term, that gave 
Argentina a pro-British orientation.329 As Paul Kennedy has commented on the interwar
^ A
years, “it still seemed a Eurocentered world.” Speaking of the Second World War, 
Rory Miller, argues that, still, “most Latin American officials remained under the spell of
331Britain’s reputation as the world’s leading trading and financial centre.” Why, 
however, this was the case does not seem to have been satisfactorily answered. Taking 
into consideration the pro-British and anti-American manifestations of Southern Cone 
elites and its major press organs during the 1920s, in addition to American complaints 
that they were not getting their due consideration,332 commercially or politically, might 
seem to suggest that the prestige policy was instituted with positive effect well into the
329 Tulchin, Argentina and the United States, 41.
330 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f  the Great Powers, 277.
331 Miller, Britain and Latin America, 231.
332 As Tulchin describes: “The Americans com plained.. .that they did not sell as much as their comparative 
advantages warranted and did not enjoy the same influence as the British. This was true. Argentina 
officially and unofficially continued to favor the British and to defer to them because o f  their perception o f  
the complementarity o f  interest they shared with the British and the strong reinforcement provided by the 
network created by the deeply rooted Anglo-Argentine community.” Tulchin, Argentina and the United 
States, quoted from 50-51. Also see 46-52, 59, 62-76; Whitaker, The United States and the Southern Cone, 
84-5.
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Great Depression.333 South Americans saw the British as a global imperial power, 
evidenced by Argentina’s and Chile’s repeated requests for Royal Navy Missions and 
orders for naval arms; as a global financial power, as seen in Britain’s continuing 
dominance as a leader in investment holdings in the Southern Cone in all but Chile by the 
late 1920s; as great transportation engineers; as unrivalled livestock experts and 
insatiable livestock eaters. Maintaining strong links with Britain was seen as wise.
Alan Knight argues that, ultimately, Britain in the postwar years “could not stand” 
against the changes of “mutually reinforcing, economic, political and cultural currents” 
that favored the United States.334 Appreciating British prestige in the region might shift 
the explanation for Britain’s fall more toward economic currents more so than political or 
cultural factors. The British were still relatively perceived as having been a force for 
good. Also, South Americans seemed to have questioned British character much less 
than their other foreign competitors. Professor Jacob Warshaw, a 1920’s observer, was at 
a loss to explain the British position: “Something, evidently, in the British temperament 
which defies analysis, has been responsible for the freedom from suspicion of sinister 
motives with which the British progress in Latin America has been viewed. Neither of 
the leading rivals of Great Britain has been able to inspire such trustful confidence.” 
Warshaw partly found the answer when he argued elsewhere in his book for the need in 
“national advertising” to polish the United States’ image in Latin America. As he put it,
333 For comments on British resiliency into the 1930s, see Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688- 
2000, 522-40; Barclay, Struggle fo r  a Continent, 38-9; Callum A. MacDonald, “End o f  Empire: The 
Decline o f  the Anglo-Argentine Connection 1918-1951,” in Hennessey and King, The Land that England  
Lost, Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, “Anglo-Brazilian Economic Relations and the Consolidation o f  American 
Pre-eminence in Brazil, 1930-1945,” in Abel and Lewis, Latin America, Economic Imperialism and the 
State ; Alan K. Manchester, British Preeminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline (Chapel Hill: University o f  
North Carolina Press, 1933). For a British contemporary’s account, see Sir Malcolm Robertson, “The 
Economic Relations between Great Britain and the Argentine Republic,” Journal o f  the Royal Institute o f  
International Affairs 9 (March 1930).
334 Knight, “Latin America,” 639.
“Great Britain has owed not a small part of her position to her unceasing; if somewhat 
subtle, self-display.”335 This ‘position’ would not last, but it’s safer to believe now that 
British power declined somewhat well before British reputation during the interwar years. 
In the face of serious challenges the durability of British prestige buoyed British power 
and commercial near-dominance in the Southern Cone.
335 Warshaw, The New Latin America, 119, 348.
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES FOR CHAPTER 1 
TABLE 1
RELATIVE PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN SHIPPING TONNAGE ENTERING
PRINCIPAL SOUTH AMERICAN PORTS, CIRCA 1913
British USA French German Italian
TOTAL
TONS
Rio De Janeiro, Brazil (1912) 46.3% 0.1% 9.5% 13.5% 9.9% 5,032,000
Santos, Brazil (1913) 43.9% 8% 18% 13.2% 4,424,000
Montevideo, Uruguay (1909) 53.6% 0.2% 10% 21% 7.3% 6,364,000
Buenos Aires, Argentina (1912) 56.2% 8.4% 14.8% 8.3% 5,428,000
Valparaiso, Chile (1912) 50.2% 0.6% 3.4% 38.5% 1,753,000
Source: Robert G. Albion, “Capital Movement and Transportation: British Shipping and 
Latin America, 1806-1914” 11 (Autumn, 1951): 373.
TABLE 2
BRITISH SHARE OF DIRECT AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS IN THE
SOUTHERN CONE, CIRCA 1913
Of Public Of Direct Foreign
External Debt Investment
Argentina 50.80% 46.70%
Brazil 83.40% 50.90%
Chile 73.00% 43.10%
Uruguay 75.00% 43.40%
Latin America 
Total 67.80% 47.40%
Source: Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The Economic History o f  
Latin America Since Independence, Second Edition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003),
102.
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TABLE 3
COMPOSITION OF BRITISH INVESTMENTS
IN LATIN AMERICA, 1905 AND 1913
1905 1913
Government Loans £307,800,000 £445,500,000
Railways £237,300,000 £404,500,000
Financial £50,900,000 £139,000,000
Public Utilities £40,900,000 £96,900,000
Raw Materials £27,200,000 £38,200,000
Industrial and Miscellaneous £18,500,000 £37,400,000
Shipping. £6,000,000 £18,300,000
TOTAL £688,500,000 £1,179,900,000
TABLE 4
GEOGRPAHIC DISTRIBUTION OF BRITISH INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH
AMERICA, 1905 AND 1913
1905 1913
Argentina £253,600,000 £479,800,000
Brazil £124,400,000 £254,000,000
Chile £42,100,000 £76,100,000
Uruguay £39,200,000 £47,300,000
Peru £22,500,000 £29,700,000
Venezuela £9,600,000 £9,800,000
Colombia £7,600,000 £12,900,000
Bolivia and Paraguay £4,000,000 £6,100,000
Ecuador £2,900,000 £4,200,000
Source (Tables 4 and 5): Irving Stone, “British Direct and 
Portfolio Investment in Latin America Before 1914,” The 
Journal o f Economic History 32 (June 1972): 694-5.
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TABLE 5
SOUTHERN CONE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE INVESTMENTS AND
RETURNS FOR 1913
Total Total Annual Avg.
Investment Return Return
Argentina £357,740,661 £17,662,309 4.90%
Brazil 223,895,436 10,932,077 4.80%
Chile 63,938,237 3,807,332 5.90%
Uruguay 46,145,393 2,146,367 4.60%
Total £691,719,727 £34,548,085 5.0%
Source: South American Journal and Brazil and River 
Plate Mail (London) February 21, 1914, 285.
TABLE 6
SOUTHERN CONE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE RAILWAYS, 1912
Miles Total Capital
Avg.
Return
Argentina 14,294 £210,143,753 4.70%
Brazil 3,372 24,501,549 7.00%
Chile 1,430 14,539,729 9.60%
Uruguay 1,314 14,401,460 5.20%
Total 20,410 £263,586,491
Source: South American Journal, January 7, 
1914, 30.
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TABLE 7
ARGENTINE, BRAZILIAN AND CHILEAN IMPORTS 
FROM SELECT COUNTRIES IN 1913
Argentine Brazilian Chilean
From
Imports Imports Imports
UK £30,505,614 £16,449,977 £7,470,503
USA 14,457,954 10,575,192 4,142,094
France 8,874,303 6,585,515 1,365,620
Italy 8,108,341 2,546,505 652,650
Japan 202,360 35,756 29,164
Austria 1,382,903 1,014,781 2,933
Germany 16,620,551 1,176,100 6,102,709
Source: “Opportunities After the War,” South 
American Journal, July 17, 1920; September 18, 1920, 
228; November 20, 1920, 415.
TABLE 8
RELATIVE SHARE OF LATIN AMERICAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1913
Percentage of Latin Percentage of
American Latin American
Imports From Exports To
09131 (1913)
BRITAIN 30% 20%
USA 30% 30%
GERMANY 17% 12%
FRANCE 7% 7%
ITALY 4% 24%
OTHERS 15%
Source: P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism 1688-2000 
(London: Longman, 2002), 689.
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APPENDIX B 
TABLE FOR CHAPTER 4 
TABLE 9
ARGENTINE IMPORTS OF PEDIGREE LIVESTOCK, 1885-1904
From the United All Other % From
Kingdom % From UK Countries Others Total
Cattle 8,149 87.8% 1,127 12.2% 9,276
Sheep 49,721 92.2% 4,182 7.8% 53,903
Horses 1,709 55.4% 1,374 44.6% 3,083
Total 59,579 89.9% 6,683 10.1% 66,262
Source: “Preface,” in Arthur L. Holder, ed., Activities o f  the British Community in 
Argentina During the Great War 1914-1919 (Buenos Aires: Buenos Aires Herald, 1920),
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APPENDIX C
TABLES FOR CHAPTER 5
TABLE 10
ARGENTINE WARTIME IMPORTS FROM SELECT COUNTRIES
From 1913 1915 1916 1918 1919
UK £30,505,614 £18,066,216 £20,436,430 £24,744,574 £30,589,803
USA 14,457,954 14,968,294 21,185,843 33,565,732 46,112,552
France 8,874,303 3,587,749 5,001,667 5,139,501 5,126,514
Italy 8,108,341 5,642,106 7,115,493 3,962,133 4,241,901
Japan 202,360 217,944 394,260 3,011,451 5,126,852
Austria 1,382,903 70,214 3,366 255 4,262
Germany 16,620,551 1,506,803 117,006 43,886 298,261
Source: South American Journal, September 18, 1920, 228.
TABLE 11
BRAZILIAN WARTIME IMPORTS FROM SELECT COUNTRIES
From 1913
UK £12,692,800
USA 8,122,996
France 5,067,793
Italy 2,011,611
Japan 28,807
Austria 785,425
Germany 8,978,552
1916 1917
£6,088,101 £5,928,563
10,994,705 14,683,347
1,403,852 1,387,308
1,073,996 642,420
11,872 50,681
300 17
10,005 46,217
1918 1919
£7,153,002 £8,528,940 
14,814,609 28,629,457 
1,656,078 2,022,923
807,461 702,040
213,928 452,631
0 86
0 3,4940
Source: South American Journal, February 14, 1920, 131.
TABLE 12
CHILEAN WARTIME IMPORTS FROM SELECT COUNTRIES
From: 1913 1916 1917 1918 1919
UK £7,470,503 £4,127,625 £4,842,225 £6,108,419 £5,840,398
USA 4,142,094 7,068,900 13,055,100 15,258,891 14,389,092
France 1,365,620 709,875 1,058,625 1,035,064 1,289,813
Italy 652,650 359,175 399,950 267,513 0
Japan 29,104 12,1275 245,175 882,173 604,286
Austria 2,933 108 468 0 0
Germany 6,102,709 93,328 13,923 2,212 52,484
Source: South American Journal, November 20, 1920, 415-6.
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TABLE 13
GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSION OF BRITISH EXPORTS TO LATIN AMERICA (1920s)
South America 1920 1925 1928 1930
Argentina £42,921,000 £29,145,000 £31,210,000 £25,234,000
37.50% 39.90% 43.70% 46.50%
Brazil 24,289,000 16,155,000 16,034,000 7,970,000
21.20% 22.10% 22.40% 14.70%
Chile 9,662,000 6,029,000 5,128,000 5,963,000
8.40% 8.30% 7.20% 11.00%
Peru 4,733,000 2,381,000 1,954,000 1,443,000
4.10% 3.30% 2.70% 2.70%
Uruguay 5,916,000 3,179,000 3,106,000 3,578,000
5.20% 4.40% 4.30% 6.60%
Bolivia & 
Paraguay 916,000 716,000 639,000 495,000
0.80% 1% 0.90% 0.90%
Colombia, 
Venezuela, & 
Ecuador 10,919,000 7,043,000 6,316,000 3,589,000
9.50% 9.70% 8.80% 6.60%
Rest of Latin 
America £15,076,000 £8,753,000 £7,048,000 £5,983,000
(Spanish 
Caribbean, 
Central America, 
and Mexico) 13.200% 12.00% 9.90% 10.90%
Source: Rory Miller, Britain and Latin America in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (London: Longman, 1994), 190.
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APPENDIX D 
TABLES FOR CONLUSION 
TABLE 14
NET ANNUAL RETURN FOR LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE INVESTMENTS IN 
THE SOUTHER CONE, 1913, 1924, AND 1928
1913 1924 1928
Argentina 4.90% 4.90% 5.60%
Brazil 4.80% 4.00% 4.90%
Chile 5.90% 7.50% 4.90%
Uruguay 4.60% 4.70% 5.10%
Source: South American Journal, February 
21, 1925, 198; March 21, 1925, 277-8; April 
18, 1925, 357-8; June 6, 1925, 509-10; J. 
Fred Rippy, “British Investments in Latin 
America at Their Peak,” The Hispanic 
American Historical Review 34 (February 
1954): 95.
TABLE 15
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE INVESTMENTS IN ARGENTINA, 1910-1925
Interest Avg. Annual Amount Not Paying
Year Total Capital Paid Return Interest
1910 £290,629,884 £13,958,983 4.80% £8,739,060
1913 357,740,661 17,662,309 4.90% 8,841,064
1918 379,489,826 14,575,614 3.80% 42,664,901
1923 396,114,573 18,827,691 4.70% 37,340,716
1924 395,048,454 19,468,905 4.90% 26,662,800
1925 400,804,340 19,917,113 4.70% 23,718,744
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TABLE 16
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE INVESTMENTS 
IN ARGENTINE RAILWAYS, 1910-1925
Interest Avg. Annual Amount Not Paying
Year Total Capital Paid Return Interest
1910 £174,464,274 No data 4.80% £700,000
1913 215,001,961 £10,358,851 4.80% 6,358,004
1918 226,551,936 6,941,791 3.00% 23,768,004
1923 232,930,414 11,589,269 4.90% 15,087,246
1924 232,928,754 11,564,378 4.90% 13,979,954
1925 236,545,457 11,752,819 4.90% 12,432,181
TABLE 17
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE INVESTMENTS IN ARGENTINE
MISCELLANEOUS ENTERPRISES, 1910-1925
Interest Avg. Annual Amount Not Paying
Year Total Capital Paid Return Interest
1910 £35,098,415 No data No data £1,739,060
1913 61,156,514 £3,740,757 6.10% 2,482,240
1918 70,143,864 3,936,713 5.60% 18,750,177
1923 84,059,148 3,722,651 4.40% 22,106,750
1924 82,543,839 4,369,155 5.20% 12,536,126
1925 88,879,943 4,821,192 5.40% 11,139,843
Source (Tables 16, 17, and 18): South American Journal, September 18, 1926, 251.
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TABLE 18
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE REGISTERED RAILWAYS 
IN ARGENTINA, 1925-26
Buenos Aires Great
Mileage Total Capital Net Profit
Ordinary Share 
Dividend
Southern 4,721 £67,685,197 £4,558,891 8%
Buenos Aires Western 1,882 31,849,914 1,770,335 7%
Buenos Aires Pacific 2,628 43,959,923 2,265,155 7%
Central Argentine 3,304 59,352,476 3,392,342 6%
Entre Rios 729 8,025,189 557,712 6%
Cordoba Central 1,202 20,724,182 1,032,525 2%
Argentine North-Eastern 752 62,21,690 234,599 nil
Argentine Transandine 111 2,110,563 19,437 nil
TOTAL 15,329 £239,929,134 £13,830,996 
Source: South American Journal, December 25, 1926, 601.
TABLE 19
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE INVESTMENTS
IN CHILEAN RAILWAYS, 1915-1926
Total Avg. Annual
Year Mileage Capital Return
1915-16 1,495 £14,811,207 7.00%
1916-17 1,512 14,789,107 9.70%
1917-18 1,511 14,672,517 10.70%
1918-19 1,481 14,727,959 8.60%
1919-20 1,484 14,775,277 5.10%
1920-21 1,383 15,290,660 7.40%
1921-22 1,376 15,510,660 2.00%
1922-23 1,377 15,489,960 5.30%
1923-24 1,383 15,468,460 8.70%
1924-25 1,383 15,734,860 9.40%
1925-26 1,385 15,734,860 7.90%
Source: South American Journal, October 30, 1926, 
389-90.
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TABLE 20
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE INVESTMENTS IN BRAZILIAN RAILWAYS
NET ANNUAL RETURNS, 1917-1925
Year Net Return on Capital
1917 4.80%
1918 3.80%
1919 4.50%
1920 4.20%
1921 2.80%
1922 4.00%
1923 4.30%
1924 5.20%
1925 6.00%
Source: South American Journal, August 18, 1923, 121-2; July 26, 1924, 
61-2; June 20, 1925, 554; June 12, 1926, 598.
TABLE 21
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE INVESTMENTS IN URUGUAYAN RAILWAYS 
NET ANNUAL RETURNS, 1912-13, 1922-1926
Year Net Annual Return on Capital
1912-13 5.20%
1922-23 6.50%
1923-24 6.60%
1924-25 6.10%
1925-26 6.10%
Source: South American Journal, November 24, 1923, 405-6; November 15, 
1924, 385-6; November 28, 1925, 466; November 27, 1926, 493-4.
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TABLE 22
BRITISH AND UNITED STATES INVESTMENTS 
IN THE SOUTHERN CONE, 1913 AND 1929
(Current US$ Millions)
1913 1929
USA UK USA UK
Argentina 40 1,861 611 2,140
Brazil 50 1,161 476 1,414
Chile 15 332 396 390
Source: Alan Knight, “Latin America,” in The Oxford History o f  
the British Empire: The Twentieth Century, eds., Judith M.
Brown and Wm. Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 629.
TABLE 23
LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE REGISTERED CHIILEAN NITRATE 
COMPANIES’ NET ANNUAL RETURNS, 1918-1925
Year Net Return on Capital
1918 14.90%
1919 8.90%
1920 19.70%
1921 13.40%
1922 11.40%
1923 13.10%
1924 12.70%
1925 9.80%
Source: South American Journal, June 30, 1923, 549-50; 
September 13, 1924, 203; August 29, 1925, 162; July 10, 1926, 26.
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